Maloley v. Cent. Neb. Pub. Power & Irrigation Dist., 931 N.W.2d 139

Maloley lived at a leased lot (Bass Bay, Lot 25) at Johnson Lake occupied by his mother’s lease; he was an occupier but not the leaseholder.
In 2012 a neighbor obtained a harassment protection order against Maloley; Central’s attorney gave notice to the leaseholder that Maloley’s conduct interfered with neighbors and negotiated an exit plan; Maloley left the property in reliance on that process.
Central served Maloley with a written ban notice (Aug. 12–13, 2013) forbidding entry onto Central’s real estate in Dawson and Gosper Counties.
After returning to the property, Maloley was arrested multiple times and ultimately convicted in two separate criminal trespass cases; those convictions have not been reversed, expunged, or invalidated.
Maloley sued under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alleging deprivation of procedural and substantive due process, First and Fourteenth Amendment violations, and other civil-rights claims based on the ban and exclusion; the district court held a bench trial, ruled for the defendants, and dismissed the complaint with prejudice.
On appeal the Nebraska Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Maloley’s § 1983 claims, if successful, would necessarily call into question his outstanding trespass convictions and are barred by Heck v. Humphrey.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Did denial of summary judgment require reversal?	Denial was erroneous.	Denial is moot after a full trial on the merits.	Moot; final trial renders denial immaterial.
Was Maloley deprived of a property/liberty interest requiring due process?	Maloley claimed exclusion deprived him of property, liberty, association, and occupation rights.	Maloley waived rights when he left; once a trespasser he had no protected interest.	Court found no recognized protected interest given facts and trespass status.
Was the 2012 notice/procedure constitutionally inadequate under Mathews?	Process was insufficient to protect his property/possession rights.	2012 communications provided adequate process; Central had legitimate safety/peace interests.	Court found the 2012 process fundamentally fair under Mathews balancing.
Are Maloley’s § 1983 claims cognizable despite trespass convictions?	Claims challenge the ban/process, not the convictions; Heck should not bar them.	Convictions remain valid; success on § 1983 would undermine convictions, so Heck bars relief.	Heck bars the § 1983 claims because success would necessarily imply invalidity of outstanding trespass convictions.

Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994) (§ 1983 claim that would imply invalidity of an outstanding conviction is barred until conviction is favorably terminated)
Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976) (three-factor balancing test to determine required procedural due process)
Wilkinson v. Dotson, 544 U.S. 74 (2005) (Heck applies regardless of relief sought if success would invalidate conviction)
Smith v. City of Hemet, 394 F.3d 689 (9th Cir. 2005) (a § 1983 action must be dismissed when criminal conviction is fundamentally inconsistent with the alleged unlawful behavior for which damages are sought)