Mallory York, Jr. v. Makeatha Cooper-York
02-20-00356-CV
| Tex. App. | Jul 1, 2021Background
- Appellant Mallory York Jr. sought a bill of review to set aside a 2014 Dallas County divorce decree that awarded the family home to his ex-wife, Makeatha Cooper‑York.
- The decree (a pro se form) both describes the house by address and contains inconsistent language characterizing the property as community and as the wife’s separate property; it recites York was present and announced ready.
- York testified he did not contest the decree because Cooper‑York threatened to take the house and the children; he introduced a video of alleged threats and a deed showing title to Cooper‑York (deed listed her as a married woman).
- York lived in the house after the decree until 2019, when Cooper‑York told him to leave; York then pulled the deed (June 24, 2019) and filed his bill of review on December 17, 2019 (more than four years after the 2014 decree).
- The trial court held a brief evidentiary hearing, denied the bill of review, and failed to file requested findings of fact and conclusions of law; York appealed.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (York) | Defendant's Argument (Cooper‑York) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Trial court’s failure to file findings and conclusions was harmful error | York: lack of findings prevented him from presenting issues on appeal | Cooper‑York: (by default) record and brief suffice; no demonstrated harm | Not harmful — single claim, short record, appellant’s brief sufficient; no reversal |
| Bill‑of‑review tolled by extrinsic fraud / discovery rule (timeliness) | York: threats and concealment prevented discovery until 2019; discovery rule/fraudulent concealment tolls the 4‑year period | Cooper‑York: record shows York was present, knew or should have known earlier; evidence supports adverse credibility finding | Denied — fact questions on discovery and diligence resolved against York; trial court did not abuse discretion |
| Decree defective for failing to legally describe land, so statute didn’t accrue until repudiation | York: decree disposes of house but not land; thus cotenancy; limitations tolled until she forced him out | Cooper‑York: decree describes property by address (house and land entries) and is sufficient; no ambiguity | Rejected — decree adequately describes both house and land; no delayed accrual |
| Merits (existence of meritorious defense that home was community property) | York: deed and marriage at time of conveyance show community interest; meritorious defense exists | Cooper‑York: York acquiesced to decree, sought relief late, credibility issues; trial court weighed testimony | Not reached on merits — statute of limitations/credibility resolved against York; bill‑of‑review barred |
Key Cases Cited
- PNS Stores, Inc. v. Rivera, 379 S.W.3d 267 (Tex. 2012) (defines bill‑of‑review scope and extrinsic vs intrinsic fraud)
- Caldwell v. Barnes, 975 S.W.2d 535 (Tex. 1998) (four‑year limitations period applies to bills of review)
- King Ranch, Inc. v. Chapman, 118 S.W.3d 742 (Tex. 2003) (narrow grounds for bill‑of‑review relief)
- Montgomery v. Kennedy, 669 S.W.2d 309 (Tex. 1984) (distinguishes intrinsic fraud; perjury as intrinsic)
- Browning v. Prostok, 165 S.W.3d 336 (Tex. 2005) (fiduciary concealment can constitute extrinsic fraud)
- Valdez v. Hollenbeck, 465 S.W.3d 217 (Tex. 2015) (discovery rule vs fraudulent concealment; standards for tolling)
- Ad Villarai, LLC v. Chan Il Pak, 519 S.W.3d 132 (Tex. 2017) (presumption of harm when trial court fails to file findings can be rebutted)