Maldonado v. U.S. Attorney General
664 F.3d 1369
| 11th Cir. | 2011Background
- Maldonado, a Mexican native, entered the U.S. in 1976 and became a lawful permanent resident in 1991.
- In 1993 Maldonado was convicted of child molestation and aggravated child molestation under Georgia law, sentenced to five years’ probation.
- In 1994, INS charged removability under two grounds (two CIMTs and an aggravated felony) based on the 1993 convictions; IJ terminated proceedings for lack of qualifying grounds.
- In 1996 Congress expanded the definition of aggravated felony to include sexual abuse of a minor; the government re-charged removability in 2009 under the amended statute.
- The BIA remanded in 2009, and the IJ again denied termination; in 2010 the BIA ultimately denied Maldonado’s appeal and Maldonado petitioned for review.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether the court has jurisdiction to review res judicata on the merits despite §1252(a)(2)(C). | Maldonado argues res judicata should bar the new claim. | Government argues §1252(a)(2)(C) bars review of removability. | Court holds jurisdiction exists under §1252(a)(2)(D) to review the res judicata issue on the merits. |
| Whether res judicata bars the 2009 removal proceedings given an intervening change in law. | Res judicata should bar because the 1994 decision addressed the same convictions. | Change in law created a new ground of removability not available in 1994. | Res judicata does not bar; intervening statutory change creates a new actionable ground. |
| Whether the intervening 1996 amendment to the INA applied retroactively to Maldonado’s prior convictions. | Retroactivity of the broadened definition supports new proceedings. | Retroactivity should be applied to permit the new removal ground. | Court agrees the amended definition applies retroactively to Maldonado. |
| Whether four elements of res judicata are satisfied here. | All four elements met; prior proceedings were on the merits. | Fourth element not met because ground was not litigated before. | Because new ground arose from intervening law, res judicata does not bar the new proceedings. |
Key Cases Cited
- Singh v. U.S. Att'y Gen., 561 F.3d 1275 (11th Cir. 2009) (intervening legal changes can create new grounds not litigated earlier)
- Norfolk S. Corp. v. Chevron, U.S.A., Inc., 371 F.3d 1285 (11th Cir. 2004) (res judicata is a pure question of law in this context)
- In re Piper Aircraft Corp., 244 F.3d 1289 (11th Cir. 2001) (foundation for the scope of res judicata under this circuit)
- Alvear-Velez v. Mukasey, 540 F.3d 672 (7th Cir. 2008) (administrative res judicata more flexible; statutory changes may justify new actions)
- Dalombo Fontes v. Gonzales, 498 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 2007) (recognizes retroactive application of broadened aggravated felony)