MALDONADO v. MERENDINO, 1:22-cv-04874

Petitioner Samuel Maldonado, a federal inmate at FCI Fairton, filed a § 2241 habeas petition challenging the BOP's sentence computation, asserting he was denied credit for presentence custody while on a writ of habeas ad prosequendum.
Florida convicted Maldonado on March 28, 2018 (three-year state sentence for lewd/lascivious molestation); a federal indictment for failure to register issued September 28, 2017.
A federal writ ad prosequendum issued May 16, 2018; federal authorities took physical custody June 6, 2018 and held him on the writ until his Florida sentence expired December 15, 2019, when he entered exclusive federal custody.
Maldonado pled guilty in federal court February 24, 2022 and was sentenced April 5, 2022 to 70 months; the BOP credited prior custody for other discrete periods but did not credit June 6, 2018–December 14, 2019.
Maldonado made informal and initial Warden-level administrative submissions but conceded he did not appeal to the Regional Director or BOP Central Office; he argued the Warden’s untimely reply made further appeals unavailable.
The District Court held that BOP administrative exhaustion was required (and not shown or excused), treated the petition as unexhausted, dismissed it without prejudice, and denied the motion for pro bono counsel as moot.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether Maldonado is entitled to credit for time in federal custody on a writ ad prosequendum (June 6, 2018–Dec 14, 2019)	Maldonado: BOP failed to apply credit for that period while he was in secondary federal custody.	BOP: It credited all prior custody periods not applied to other sentences; the contested period remained part of the state sentence.	Court did not reach the merits; petition dismissed without prejudice for failure to exhaust administrative remedies.
Whether failure to exhaust BOP administrative remedies bars § 2241 relief and whether exhaustion was excused by the Warden’s delayed response	Maldonado: Warden’s failure to respond within 20 days rendered appeals unavailable, so exhaustion should be excused.	Government: Regulations treat lack of timely response as a denial and permit appeal; inmate must proceed to Regional and Central Office.	Court: Exhaustion required; futility not shown; dismissal without prejudice for failure to exhaust.

Maleng v. Cook, 490 U.S. 488 (1989) (custody requirement for habeas jurisdiction)
Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97 (1976) (pro se pleadings held to less stringent standards)
Moscato v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 98 F.3d 757 (3d Cir. 1996) (administrative exhaustion required for habeas petitions)
Gambino v. Morris, 134 F.3d 156 (3d Cir. 1998) (circumstances that may excuse exhaustion, e.g., futility)
Barksdale v. Sing Sing, [citation="645 F. App'x 107"] (3d Cir. 2016) (BOP has authority to correct credit calculations; administrative process not futile for credit disputes)
Millhouse v. Lewisburg, [citation="666 F. App'x 98"] (3d Cir. 2016) (lack of response does not foreclose appeal to Central Office)
Campbell v. Vaughn, 209 F.3d 280 (3d Cir. 2000) (standards for evidentiary hearings on habeas claims)
Royce v. Hahn, 151 F.3d 116 (3d Cir. 1998) (liberal construction of pro se submissions)