419 F.Supp.3d 1136
N.D. Cal.2019Background
- Plaintiff Khairuldeen Makhzoomi, an Iraqi‑American Muslim, spoke in Iraqi Arabic on a Southwest flight; a nearby passenger (Dr. “Anaisha Patel”) reported overhearing words she understood as relating to "martyrdom," "American," and "inshallah."
- Flight crew and gate personnel investigated; customer service supervisor Shoaib Ahmed (an Arabic speaker) escorted Makhzoomi to the jet bridge for questioning. Accounts differ whether Ahmed asked about specific threatening words or chastised Makhzoomi for speaking Arabic.
- Law enforcement and FBI were called; Makhzoomi was detained, questioned, released, and not allowed to reboard; his flight departed without him.
- Makhzoomi sued under 42 U.S.C. § 1981 and California law (Unruh Act, negligence, intentional infliction of emotional distress). Defendants moved for summary judgment on all claims, asserting FAA/ADA preemption and statutory immunities.
- The court denied summary judgment on the § 1981 and Unruh Act claims (finding triable issues about discriminatory motive and pretext), and granted summary judgment for defendants on negligence and IIED claims. Preemption and immunity defenses were denied without prejudice where fact disputes remained.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| 1) Section 1981 discrimination | Ahmed denied him reboarding and turned him over to police because he spoke Arabic; that treatment was discriminatory and pretextual. | Actions were safety‑based responses to a credible report that plaintiff used threatening words; investigation and denial were nondiscriminatory. | Denied SJ: disputed facts about what Ahmed said/did and whether the safety explanation was pretext create triable issue. |
| 2) FAA (49 U.S.C. § 44902(b)) preemption of state claims | State torts here challenge discriminatory conduct, not a federal safety decision; plaintiff does not contest investigation but contests denial as discriminatory. | Claims are preempted because airline’s refusal to transport was safety‑based and thus federally regulated. | Denied SJ: factual disputes permit a jury to find the refusal was arbitrary/pretextual rather than a protected safety decision. |
| 3) ADA (49 U.S.C. § 41713(b)) preemption | Refusal to board based on race/language is not a preempted "service" regulation; ADA preemption covers economic regulation of routes/prices/schedules. | Denies: state claims relate to airline service (denial of transportation) and thus are preempted. | Denied SJ: court adopts Ninth Circuit line limiting "service" and follows authority that boarding/refusal discrimination is not ADA‑preempted. |
| 4) ATSA (49 U.S.C. § 44941) and Cal. Civ. Code § 47 immunity for reports to law enforcement | Reports were false or made with reckless disregard; immunity exception applies and precludes summary judgment. | ATSA and California privilege protect airline/employees for voluntary reports of suspicious activity unless knowingly false or made with reckless disregard. | Denied SJ without prejudice: unresolved factual disputes about who told law enforcement what prevent ruling on immunity at summary judgment. |
| 5) Negligence duty | Airline breached duties arising from contractual relationship and safety obligations by humiliating/deplaning him. | No cognizable special duty beyond ordinary safety; plaintiff fails to identify a legal duty under California law. | SJ granted for defendants: plaintiff failed to identify a legal duty under Rowland factors. |
| 6) Intentional infliction of emotional distress (IIED) | Public deplaning, pat‑down, detention and distress constitute outrageous conduct causing severe emotional harm. | Conduct was investigation of a safety complaint and not "extreme and outrageous" as a matter of law. | SJ granted for defendants: record lacks conduct rising to the extreme/outrageous threshold required for IIED. |
Key Cases Cited
- Domino’s Pizza, Inc. v. McDonald, 546 U.S. 470 (2006) (§ 1981 protects equal right to make and enforce contracts)
- McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973) (burden‑shifting framework for discrimination claims)
- Lindsey v. SLT Los Angeles, LLC, 447 F.3d 1138 (9th Cir. 2006) (application of McDonnell Douglas in § 1981 commercial services context)
- Christian v. Wal‑Mart Stores, Inc., 252 F.3d 862 (6th Cir. 2001) (alternative prima facie test for § 1981 commercial services claims)
- Montalvo v. Spirit Airlines, 508 F.3d 464 (9th Cir. 2007) (FAA preemption can occupy field of aviation safety where pervasive regulations exist)
- Martin ex rel. Heckman v. Midwest Express Holdings, Inc., 555 F.3d 806 (9th Cir. 2009) (FAA preemption limited to areas with pervasive federal regulation)
- Ventress v. Japan Airlines, 747 F.3d 716 (9th Cir. 2014) (state claims preempted when they intrude on FAA’s safety regulatory field)
- Air Wisconsin Airlines Corp. v. Hoeper, 571 U.S. 237 (2014) (ATSA immunity for voluntary reports, except where made with actual malice/reckless disregard)
- Charas v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 160 F.3d 1259 (9th Cir. 1998) (ADA preemption targets economic regulation of prices/routes/services; "service" construed narrowly)
- Newman v. American Airlines, Inc., 176 F.3d 1128 (9th Cir. 1999) (ADA "service" definition does not encompass alleged discrimination during boarding)