Mais v. Gulf Coast Collection Bureau, Inc.
944 F. Supp. 2d 1226
S.D. Fla.2013Background
- Mais went to Westside Regional Hospital in 2009 for treatment; wife provided his cell number and signed admission papers including Conditions of Admission.
- Hospital disclosed information under Notice of Privacy Practices to assist with treatment, payment, or healthcare operations.
- Florida United Radiology provided the treatment; Sheridan is its parent holding company; McKesson billed as Florida United’s agent and retrieved contact information from the Hospital.
- Debt of $49.03 was incurred to Florida United; Gulf Coast collected the debt after forwarding the account from Sheridan.
- Gulf Coast used a predictive dialer to place calls to Mais’s cell; 15 calls were actually dialed, with 4 messages, alleged as TCPA violations.
- Plaintiff sued under TCPA; Defendants moved for summary judgment arguing consent; the issue also involved HIPAA relevance and FCC rulings.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Mais gave prior express TCPA consent | Mais argues no consent was given to Florida United for debt collection calls | Defendants argue consent evidenced by number provided to creditor during debt transaction (2008 FCC ruling) | No prior express consent found; not established under TCPA as applied |
| Whether Sheridan and Florida United can be held vicariously liable | Plaintiff asserts vicarious liability under TCPA for Gulf Coast's calls | Defendants contend no vicarious liability under 227(b)(1)(A); 227(c)(5) only; no control shown | Sheridan and Florida United not vicariously liable under 227(b)(1)(A); summary judgment for them affirmed |
| Damages and injunction under TCPA | Plaintiff seeks damages for all violative calls and injunctive relief | Gulf Coast argues fewer calls and potential defenses apply; argues willfulness issue later | $500 per each of 15 dialed calls; injunctive relief against Gulf Coast; willfulness to be decided by jury |
| Hobbs Act jurisdiction and deference to the FCC ruling | Plaintiff argues district court can review FCC ruling under Hobbs Act | Defendants contend lack of jurisdiction or Chevron deference should apply to FCC ruling | Hobbs Act does not deprive jurisdiction here; FCC ruling not entitled to deference for 227(b)(1)(A); ruling limited to consent context |
Key Cases Cited
- Self v. Bellsouth Mobility, Inc., 700 F.3d 453 (11th Cir.2012) (addresses Hobbs Act jurisdiction in TCPA context)
- Cowen v. Bank United of Texas, FSB, 70 F.3d 937 (7th Cir.1995) (class certification and merits sequencing in complex litigation)
- Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984) (establishes Chevron deference framework)
- Koch Foods, Inc. v. Sec’y, U.S. Dept. of Labor, 712 F.3d 476 (11th Cir.2013) (no Chevron deference where statute unambiguous)
- McFarlin v. Conseco Servs., LLC, 381 F.3d 1251 (11th Cir.2004) (test for interlocutory appeal under 28 U.S.C. 1292(b))