MacArio Bonilla v. Loretta E. Lynch
840 F.3d 575
| 9th Cir. | 2016Background
- Bonilla, an LPR admitted in 1989, was ordered deported in 1995 after a 1994 misdemeanor firearms conviction; the BIA affirmed the deportation and he was removed in March 1996.
- After removal, Bonilla married a U.S. citizen; his initial counsel (Rivera) failed to file an I-130 or I-485 and provided incorrect/insufficient advice; subsequent counsel likewise failed to pursue timely reopening.
- Bonilla reentered the U.S. without inspection years later and filed a second (very late) motion to reopen in 2011 alleging ineffective assistance of counsel and seeking equitable tolling of the filing deadline.
- Following the Supreme Court’s change in law in Judulang (which invalidated the BIA’s comparable-grounds approach to former § 212(c) relief), Bonilla supplemented his motion asking the BIA to reopen sua sponte so he could pursue § 212(c) relief.
- The BIA denied equitable tolling (finding Bonilla not sufficiently diligent) and declined to reopen sua sponte, reasoning Bonilla had lost LPR status upon the final deportation order and thus could not meet § 212(c)’s seven‑year domicile requirement even if reopened.
- The Ninth Circuit denied review of the equitable‑tolling ruling but held it had limited jurisdiction to review sua sponte denials for legal or constitutional error, found the BIA relied on a legal error about loss/restoration of LPR status, vacated the sua sponte denial, and remanded for reconsideration.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Bonilla was entitled to equitable tolling for his late motion to reopen based on ineffective assistance of counsel | Bonilla argued Rivera’s and others’ ineffective assistance prevented timely filing and he acted with due diligence once he discovered the deficiencies | Government/BIA argued Bonilla had an unreasonable six‑year gap (2002–2008) relying on limited workshop advice and thus lacked due diligence | Denied — BIA did not abuse discretion: Bonilla failed to show reasonable diligence; equitable tolling not warranted |
| Whether the court has jurisdiction to review BIA denials of sua sponte reopening | Bonilla argued courts may review sua sponte denials to the limited extent of correcting legal or constitutional error | Government (implicitly) argued such denials are committed to agency discretion and largely unreviewable under Ekimian | Granted limited review — Ninth Circuit may review sua sponte denials only to determine if the BIA relied on legal or constitutional error |
| Whether the BIA legally erred in declining sua sponte reopening because Bonilla could not meet § 212(c)’s 7‑year domicile requirement after deportation | Bonilla argued that a grant of reopening would vacate the prior removal and restore his LPR status, yielding over seven years’ unrelinquished domicile (thus § 212(c) eligibility post‑Judulang) | BIA concluded deportation was a "transformative event" that terminated LPR status and permanently stopped accrual of lawful domicile, foreclosing § 212(c) eligibility | Held for Bonilla — BIA erred as a matter of law: reopening would restore prior status and accrual of domicile; remand required for discretionary reconsideration under correct legal framework |
| Remedy following legal error in sua sponte denial | Bonilla sought vacatur and remand for the BIA to exercise discretion under correct law | Government asked to uphold BIA denial (did not meaningfully contest legal‑error finding) | Court vacated BIA’s sua sponte denial and remanded for the Board to reconsider exercising its discretion in light of correct law; if BIA again denies without legal/constitutional error, that discretionary decision will be unreviewable |
Key Cases Cited
- St. Cyr v. INS, 533 U.S. 289 (U.S. 2001) (discusses § 212(c) relief and BIA practice)
- Judulang v. Holder, 565 U.S. 42 (U.S. 2011) (invalidated BIA’s comparable‑grounds approach to § 212(c))
- Kucana v. Holder, 558 U.S. 233 (U.S. 2010) (addresses reviewability of BIA sua sponte denials)
- Dada v. Mukasey, 554 U.S. 1 (U.S. 2008) (history of reopening authority and regulatory framework)
- Nken v. Holder, 556 U.S. 418 (U.S. 2009) (vacatur of removal order effects)
- Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821 (U.S. 1985) (agency discretion and nonreviewability principles)
- Singh v. Holder, 771 F.3d 647 (9th Cir. 2014) (Ninth Circuit reviewability where BIA commits legal error about its authority)
- Avagyan v. Holder, 646 F.3d 672 (9th Cir. 2011) (equitable tolling standard for ineffective assistance in reopening context)
- Ekimian v. INS, 303 F.3d 1153 (9th Cir. 2002) (generally no review of sua sponte denials under an unmanageable standard)
- Pllumi v. Attorney General, 642 F.3d 155 (3d Cir. 2011) (courts may review sua sponte denials to correct legal error)
- Mahmood v. Holder, 570 F.3d 466 (2d Cir. 2009) (same)
