Maages Auditorium v. Prince George's County, MD
681 F. App'x 256
| 4th Cir. | 2017Background
- Prince George’s County enacted zoning ordinances (CB-46-2010; CB-56-2011) restricting where adult entertainment businesses may operate, defining "adult entertainment," limiting hours, and requiring 1,000-foot buffers from schools, residences, and other adult businesses.
- Ordinances allowed adult businesses to operate "as of right" in I-2 industrial zones; existing businesses outside I-2 could seek a "special exception" under §27-317, governed by several discretionary criteria.
- Maages Auditorium (with John and Jane Doe proposed plaintiffs) sued, raising equal protection, First Amendment (prior restraint, procedural safeguards, unbridled discretion), vagueness, and inadequate alternative avenues claims; district court dismissed Doe plaintiffs for lack of standing and granted summary judgment for the County on most claims.
- Nico Enterprises brought a separate but similar challenge asserting vagueness and overbreadth; the district court dismissed for failure to state a claim and for lack of standing on vagueness.
- The Fourth Circuit affirmed: Doe plaintiffs lacked standing; County zoning regime is a content-neutral time, place, and manner regulation (not a prior restraint); alternative avenues were sufficient; challenged special-exception language was not unconstitutionally vague; Nico’s overbreadth and vagueness challenges failed.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Standing of John/Jane Doe | Doe plaintiffs may proceed anonymously and have standing to raise First Amendment claims | Maages failed to allege Doe anonymity or preserve overbreadth argument; no standing shown | Affirmed dismissal for lack of standing |
| Equal Protection (Count I) | Ordinance discriminates against adult businesses and singled out Maages | Regulation targets businesses with secondary effects, rational basis review applies | Affirmed for County; no suspect class and legitimate interest in combating secondary effects |
| Prior Restraint / First Amendment (Counts II, III, VI) | Zoning + special-exception operate as a prior restraint requiring strict scrutiny | The scheme is a content-neutral time, place, and manner regulation; businesses can operate in I-2 zones without discretionary permits | Affirmed: regulation is time, place, manner, not a prior restraint |
| Adequate Alternative Channels (Count VII) | Ordinance leaves insufficient sites for adult businesses to continue | Number of available I-2 sites >= existing adult businesses; special exceptions preserve options | Affirmed: alternatives sufficient; summary judgment for County |
| Vagueness / Overbreadth (Counts V and Nico’s claims) | Special-exception criteria are vague; ordinance could reach protected expression | Terms have ascertainable meanings; intent clause limits scope; plaintiffs lack standing for some vagueness claims | Affirmed: statutory language provides minimal guidance and notice; overbreadth claim rejected; Nico lacks standing for vagueness |
Key Cases Cited
- Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601 (1973) (standing and overbreadth principles in First Amendment challenges)
- City of Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc., 475 U.S. 41 (1986) (zoning to combat secondary effects is content-neutral time, place, manner regulation)
- FCC v. Beach Communications, Inc., 508 U.S. 307 (1993) (rational-basis review presumption of validity)
- Village of Hoffman Estates v. Flipside, Hoffman Estates, Inc., 455 U.S. 489 (1982) (vagueness standing and standard for commercial speech regulations)
- Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104 (1972) (vagueness requires minimal guidelines; perfect clarity not required)
- Giovani Carandola, Ltd. v. Fox, 470 F.3d 1074 (4th Cir. 2006) (recognizing substantial government interest in regulating adult entertainment’s secondary effects)
- 11126 Baltimore Blvd., Inc. v. Prince George's Cty., 58 F.3d 988 (4th Cir. 1995) (distinguishing prior restraints from zoning/regulatory schemes)
- Lady J. Lingerie, Inc. v. City of Jacksonville, 176 F.3d 1358 (11th Cir. 1999) (treating indispensable zoning exceptions like licensing in a different factual posture)