194 A.3d 374
D.C.2018Background
- In 2004 the Superior Court entered an Adjudication of Paternity naming R.W. as the minor child’s legal father; R.W. waived genetic testing. M.D. did not sign that adjudication.
- In 2008 a Maryland court, after genetic testing, excluded R.W. as the biological father; in 2009 M.D. (pro se) successfully amended the child’s D.C. birth certificate to remove R.W.'s name.
- The District later sought to reinstate and consolidate paternity/support proceedings (naming L.P. as a putative father); the District withdrew and M.D. pursued disestablishment herself in 2016.
- A Superior Court magistrate and then an Associate Judge denied M.D.’s Rule 60(b)(6) motion to vacate the 2004 adjudication, finding lack of diligence and no extraordinary circumstances; the court also denied L.P.’s motion to intervene.
- The D.C. Court of Appeals sua sponte consolidated two appeals, reversed the denial of Rule 60(b)(6) relief and remanded for further consideration, and held that L.P. must be permitted to intervene on remand.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (M.D.) | Defendant's Argument (R.W./L.P./Court below) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Rule 60(b)(6) relief should be granted to vacate the 2004 paternity adjudication | M.D.: the 2008 genetic exclusion and subsequent birth-certificate amendment justify vacatur; hardship includes risk of R.W. (alleged abuser) exercising parental rights and danger to child | Court below: M.D. delayed unreasonably, failed to act with diligence; no extraordinary circumstances; primary hardship is lack of support, not extreme hardship | Reversed and remanded: trial court must reexamine timeliness and hardship (including non‑financial risk to child) under a flexible "reasonable time" standard; remand for further analysis |
| Whether the trial court erroneously failed to apply Wylie Rule 60(b)(6) factors | M.D.: Wylie factors should guide the Rule 60(b)(6) inquiry here | Court below: Wylie applies mainly when default or no-merits judgments entered; not required here | Court of Appeals declined to resolve directly but held trial court had considered many relevant facts; remand required for fuller analysis of hardship and timeliness |
| Whether L.P. has a right to intervene under Super. Ct. Dom. Rel. R. 24(a)(2) | L.P.: he has a legally protectable, particularized interest in avoiding being declared father and in defenses (including statutory limits on testing) that the adjudication currently affords | M.D./trial court: any harm to L.P. speculative because further action would be required to impose liability | Held for L.P.: intervention as of right must be permitted — interest is concrete and timely, denial would impair his ability to protect that interest, and existing parties cannot adequately represent him |
| Whether an existing paternity adjudication bars relitigation whenever paternity was previously established | M.D.: challenges relitigation where conflicting orders exist; courts should allow relief in unusual circumstances | Court below: held paternity adjudication precluded relitigation and thus foreclosed action against L.P. | Court of Appeals rejected categorical bar; conflicting orders and unusual circumstances can justify relief; remanded for application of correct standards |
Key Cases Cited
- Wylie v. Glenncrest, 143 A.3d 73 (D.C. 2016) (articulating factors used in Rule 60(b)(6) paternity relief analysis)
- M.M. v. T‑M.M., 995 A.2d 164 (D.C. 2010) (affirming denial of disestablishment despite DNA exclusion in different factual context)
- Carrasco v. Thomas D. Walsh, Inc., 988 A.2d 471 (D.C. 2010) ("reasonable time" under Rule 60(b) depends on circumstances, including prejudice to non‑movant)
- Miranda v. Contreras, 754 A.2d 277 (D.C. 2000) (Rule 60(b)(6) requires extraordinary circumstances or extreme hardship but is not narrowly defined)
- HSBC Bank USA, N.A. v. Mendoza, 11 A.3d 229 (D.C. 2010) (standard of review and liberal interpretation of intervention-related rules)
- Calvin‑Humphrey v. District of Columbia, 340 A.2d 795 (D.C. 1975) (flexible, practical approach to defining "interest" for intervention)
- Crossroads Grassroots Policy Strategies v. Fed. Election Comm'n, 788 F.3d 312 (D.C. Cir. 2015) (allowing intervention where a judgment could remove barriers to enforcement despite contingent future liability)
- Clement v. District of Columbia Dep't of Human Servs., 629 A.2d 1215 (D.C. 1993) (conflicting orders can constitute an unusual situation warranting exception to finality)