Lynn Beth Baum v. David Baum
355489
Mich. Ct. App.May 26, 2022Background:
- In anticipation of divorce, David Baum transferred marital funds to relatives and related entities; a jury found fraudulent transfers of $240,583.90 to Madison Equities and $771,451.76 to Fraser Equities.
- Trial court entered a December 17, 2018 injunction prohibiting disposition of assets by David and transferees; a March 20, 2019 judgment followed awarding Lynn Baum recovery as to Fraser.
- Fraser had entered a sales agreement while the injunction was in effect; the property closed two days after the March 20 judgment. Lynn moved for contempt based on that sale.
- Separately, after a later November 14, 2019 injunction (entered as part of relief supplementary), Alliance Equities’ bank account showed a $370,000 withdrawal the same day; Alliance issued a cashier’s check payable to itself and held it until ordered to redeposit. Lynn moved to show cause against Howard (Alliance’s sole member) and Alliance.
- The trial court found Fraser in contempt for the March sale (first proceeding) and found Howard and Alliance in criminal contempt for the November withdrawal (second proceeding). On appeal, the court reversed as to Fraser (Docket No. 355489) and affirmed as to Howard and Alliance (Docket No. 355491).
Issues:
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Fraser committed criminal contempt by selling property two days after the March 20, 2019 judgment (i.e., whether Dec. 17 injunction survived and was violated) | Lynn: Fraser sold property in violation of the Dec. 17, 2018 injunction and must be held in contempt. | Fraser/Howard: Howard sought legal advice and reasonably believed the injunction was extinguished by the March judgment; Fraser had no separate advice and corporate intent is derivative of Howard. | Reversed as to Fraser — court erred: trial court found Howard (Fraser’s sole agent) lacked willful intent, so it was clear error to impute contrary intent to Fraser. |
| Whether Lynn's affidavit supporting the show-cause motion was deficient (personal knowledge/hearsay) | Lynn: Affidavit based on bank records obtained under subpoena; affidavits met court-rule requirements. | Howard/Alliance: Affidavit lacked personal knowledge and relies on hearsay because affiant was not present at withdrawal. | Held for Lynn — bank records fall under MRE 803(6) business-records exception; affidavit satisfied MCR requirements. |
| Whether the court abused its discretion by quashing Howard/Alliance’s subpoena for Lynn’s lawyer (fees tendered at service) | Lynn: Subpoena defective because witness fees weren’t tendered on service as required by MCR 2.506(G)(1); motion to quash proper. | Howard/Alliance: In criminal matters fees may be paid after testimony; quashing denied defense evidence and right to present. | Held for Lynn — quash affirmed. The court properly applied the court rule; tendering fees at service is procedural and required; testimony was not essential to the defense. |
| Whether Howard/Alliance violated the Nov. 14, 2019 injunction by withdrawing $370,000 and issuing a cashier’s check to Alliance, and whether Howard personally acted | Lynn: The cash withdrawal and issuance of a cashier’s check constituted interference/disposition in violation of the injunction; Howard, as sole member/agent, effectuated the transaction. | Howard/Alliance: Creation of a cashier’s check payable to Alliance is a certification, not a transfer; Howard challenges factual finding that he personally withdrew funds. | Held for Lynn — trial court’s factual findings were not clearly erroneous: issuing and holding the cashier’s check removed funds from the account and constituted interference; Howard, as sole member/agent, was properly found to have acted for Alliance. |
| Appropriateness of restitution and due-process challenge to open-ended 10‑day execution | Lynn: Court may order restitution and jail as criminal-contempt sanctions under applicable statutes/case law. | Howard/Alliance: Reliance on MCL 600.1721 was improper; open-ended execution of 10 days violates due process. | Held: Restitution challenge largely abandoned (appellants failed to challenge one statutory basis). Due-process claim premature/not ripe because the 10-day term has not been enforced; Levandoski factors apply when enforcement is attempted. |
Key Cases Cited
- MacLean v. People, 168 Mich App 577 (criminal contempt requires willful disregard of court order)
- DeGeorge v. Warheit, 276 Mich App 587 (abuse-of-discretion standard for contempt; clear-error review of factual findings)
- Upjohn Co. v. New Hampshire Ins. Co., 438 Mich 197 (corporate entities act via agents; knowledge may be imputed)
- Green v. Ziegelman, 310 Mich App 436 (non‑sentient entities cannot possess subjective intent apart from their agents)
- People v. Oros, 502 Mich 229 (circumstantial evidence and reasonable inferences support factual findings)
- People v. Reese, 491 Mich 127 (same; trial court may draw logical inferences)
- Beason v. Beason, 435 Mich 791 (appellate review of factual findings requires consideration of all evidence)
- Ferranti v. Electrical Resources Co., 330 Mich App 439 (affidavit deficiencies where affiant lacked personal knowledge)
- People v. Levandoski, 237 Mich App 612 (due-process concerns when a sentence is executed long after imposition)
- Castillon v. Roy, 412 Mich (quashing subpoenas without inquiry may be abuse where testimony is essential)
