954 F.3d 351
1st Cir.2020Background
- Three Massachusetts voters sued state officials challenging Massachusetts’ winner‑take‑all (WTA) method for appointing presidential electors as violating the Equal Protection Clause ("one person, one vote") and the First Amendment associational right.
- Massachusetts statute awards all electors to the statewide plurality winner; appellants say this consistently leaves minority‑party voters with "zero" elector representation despite casting lawful votes.
- Plaintiffs sought declaratory and injunctive relief (including ordering or directing a transition to district or proportional allocation if WTA were invalidated).
- The district court dismissed for lack of standing and failure to state a claim, relying in part on the Supreme Court’s summary affirmance in Williams. Plaintiffs appealed.
- The First Circuit held plaintiffs had Article III standing but affirmed dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6): Williams controls and, on the merits, WTA neither discriminates among Massachusetts voters nor imposes a severe associational burden.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Standing | Appellants say WTA concretely and individually dilutes their votes and impairs associational rights. | Commonwealth says the alleged injury is generalized because WTA applies equally to all voters and is a plenary state power. | Court: Plaintiffs have standing — injury is concrete, traceable, and redressable. |
| Applicability of Williams precedent | Plaintiffs: Williams is a summary order and not dispositive for their Gray‑footnote two‑step theory. | Commonwealth: Williams is controlling on the precise issue. | Court: Williams’ summary affirmance governs; it forecloses the claim. |
| Equal Protection (one‑person, one‑vote) | WTA "discards" losing votes (Gray footnote 12 two‑step theory) or dilutes minority voting as an at‑large multimember election. | WTA treats all voters equally in the statewide tally; historical/structural Electoral College features and McPherson permit WTA absent invidious discrimination. | Court: Claim fails — WTA does not arbitrarily or invidiously devalue individual votes; multimember/dilution analogies are inapposite. |
| Associational rights (First Amendment) | WTA severely burdens associational freedom by ensuring minority voters have no effect and discouraging candidate attention. | Commonwealth: WTA is a neutral rule that does not bar participation, ballot access, or party organization. | Court: Claim fails — no severe burden; rule is neutral and plaintiffs still have an equal opportunity to compete. |
Key Cases Cited
- Williams v. Va. State Bd. of Elections, 393 U.S. 320 (1969) (Supreme Court’s summary affirmance upholding a state WTA/unit rule against a one‑person, one‑vote challenge)
- Gray v. Sanders, 372 U.S. 368 (1963) (articulating the one‑person, one‑vote principle and discussing county‑unit system defects)
- McPherson v. Blacker, 146 U.S. 1 (1892) (state legislatures have plenary power to determine manner of appointing electors, subject to the Constitution)
- Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98 (2000) (equal protection violation where nonuniform recount standards produced arbitrary and disparate treatment)
- Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962) (voters alleging individualized injury have standing to challenge vote dilution)
- Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555 (1992) (standing requires concrete, particularized injury; causation; redressability)
- Timmons v. Twin Cities Area New Party, 520 U.S. 351 (1997) (balancing test for burdens on associational rights in election regulation)
- Whitcomb v. Chavis, 403 U.S. 124 (1971) (multimember districts may be challenged for vote dilution, but context focuses on invidious discrimination)