Lyles v. District of Columbia, 777 F. Supp. 2d 128

Plaintiff Evelyn Lyles sues her former employer, the District of Columbia Department of Mental Health, alleging sex, age, and disability discrimination and retaliation under DC Human Rights Act, Title VII, ADA, and ADEA.
Plaintiff was employed from 1979 to 2009 as a Vocational Rehabilitation Specialist until a 2008-2009 reduction in force terminated her position.
From March 2007 to October 2008 she alleges weekly sexual harassment by a subordinate, Miller, and a supervisor allegedly failed to remedy the harassment.
Plaintiff alleges PTSD and major depression from the hostile environment, leading to medical treatment and diminished life activities.
In 2008 she was reassigned to the Day Services/Day Treatment Program with reduced duties; she alleges this was discriminatory retaliation.
She applied for promotions (QIC and HCBSC) in late 2008/early 2009 and was not promoted; she claims younger, less qualified individuals were hired.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether plaintiff properly exhausted Title VII retaliation claims.	Lyles's amended EEO charge reasonably related to retaliation acts.	Several retaliation acts not reasonably related to the EEO charge; some claims untimely or not tied to the charges.	Some retaliation claims exhausted (transfer to Day Treatment Program and failure to promote), others not exhausted.
Whether plaintiff exhausted ADA disability claims.	Amended EEO charge sufficiently alleged disability discrimination and accommodations related to the Day Treatment Program.	Initial charge focused on ankle injury; amended charge must be reasonably related and specific to PTSD/mental impairment.	Amended EEO charge reasonably related; ADA claim exhausted.
Whether plaintiff exhausted ADEA age-discrimination claims.	Amended EEO charge stated denial of promotions due to age, reasonably relating to current claim.	Initial charge did not address age-based denial of promotions; Vinson v. Ford is distinguishable.	Amended charge reasonably related; ADEA claim exhausted.
Whether the DCHRA claims were proper or barred for lack of timely notice.	DCHRA claims align with other counts; exhaustion or notice should not bar the claims.	No timely notice to the Mayor under D.C. Code § 12-309; dismissal appropriate.	DCHRA claims dismissed.

Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (U.S. 2009) (plausibility standard for sufficiency of complaints)
Brown v. Marsh, 777 F.2d 8 (D.C.Cir. 1985) (notice and exhaustion principles for Title VII)
Loe v. Heckler, 768 F.2d 409 (D.C.Cir. 1985) (exhaustion focus within Title VII context)
Park v. Howard Univ., 71 F.3d 904 (D.C.Cir. 1995) (scope of what is reasonably related to EEOC charge)
Marshall v. Fed. Express Corp., 130 F.3d 1095 (D.C.Cir. 1997) (ADA exhaustion requires relation to administrative charge)
Morgan v. National Railroad Passenger Corp., 536 U.S. 101 (U.S. 2002) (discrete acts and time limits in discrimination claims)
Williams v. Dodaro, 576 F. Supp. 2d 72 (D.D.C. 2008) (liberal construction of EEO charges to protect complainants)
Vinson v. Ford Motor Co., 806 F.2d 686 (6th Cir. 1986) (distinguishes overlap between demotion and failure-to-promote claims for exhaustion)
Brown v. Marsh (cited again in context), 777 F.2d 8 (D.C.Cir. 1985) (notices and procedural posture relevant to exhaustion)