Luther Glenn v. District Attorney Allegheny Co, 2014 U.S. App. LEXIS 3085

Glenn was convicted of first‑degree murder in Pennsylvania state court and sentenced to life imprisonment.
Cotton testified she witnessed the killing but gave inconsistent accounts; the court held a in‑camera session and granted immunity, then Cotton’s testimony was stricken from the record.
The trial judge instructed the jury to disregard Cotton’s testimony and to treat it as if it never occurred.
Other trial evidence included a jailhouse confession by Glenn to Pratt, Blair’s vehicle pursuit and recovered Glock, and Johnson and Youngblood testimony linking Glenn to the scene.
Glenn filed a federal habeas petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2254, challenging due process and ineffective assistance claims; the district court denied relief but issued a COA on two issues, which the Third Circuit reviews de novo under AEDPA.
The court affirms the district court’s denial of relief under AEDPA, applying the “unreasonable application” standard to the state court decision.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Did the mistrial denial violate due process?	Glenn argues Cotton’s inconsistent testimony tainted the trial and only a mistrial could cure	The court’s curative instruction to disregard was sufficient to preserve fairness	No due process violation; jurors could follow instructions and evidence was still ample
Was trial counsel ineffective for not moving to strike other Cotton‑related references after her testimony was stricken?	Glenn contends counsel should have struck remaining Cotton references to avoid taint	Claims are procedurally defaulted or lack prejudice; references were arguably admissible to explain police conduct	No ineffective assistance; several defaults not excused, and remaining references unlikely to affect the verdict
Did Martinez and related procedures excuse procedural default on ineffectiveness claims?	Martinez should allow excusing default due to counsel’s failure in initial review	Underlying claims not substantial; default stands	Default not excused; underlying claims not substantial

Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62 (U.S. 1991) (due‑process limits on federal review of state‑law questions)
Donnelly v. DeChristoforo, 416 U.S. 637 (U.S. 1974) (due process standard for mistrials and curative instructions)
Greer v. Miller, 483 U.S. 756 (U.S. 1987) (jurors presumed to follow court instructions)
Richardson v. Marsh, 481 U.S. 200 (U.S. 1987) (co‑conspirator testimony and limiting instructions)
United States v. Bornman, 559 F.3d 150 (3d Cir. 2009) (applies to curative instructions and immunity issues)
Vazquez v. Wilson, 550 F.3d 270 (3d Cir. 2008) (Bruton issues; effectiveness of limiting instructions when non‑testifying statements are involved)
Moore v. Morton, 255 F.3d 95 (3d Cir. 2001) (prosecutorial misconduct and inadequacy of curative measures in certain contexts)
Martinez v. Ryan, 132 S. Ct. 1309 (2012) (excusing procedural default in some ineffective‑assistance claims)
Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722 (U.S. 1991) (procedural default and its exceptions in habeas review)
Moore v. Mazurkiewicz, 1 F.3d 159 (3d Cir. 1993) (treatment of evidence and opening statements in trial strategy)
McAleese v. Mazurkiewicz, 1 F.3d 159 (3d Cir. 1993) (state and federal standards for ineffective assistance)
Commonwealth v. Jones, 658 A.2d 746 (Pa. 1995) (admissibility of police conduct statements to explain investigations)