Luis Garcia-Urbano v. Jefferson B. Sessions, III
890 F.3d 726
8th Cir.2018Background
- Petitioner Luis Garcia-Urbano, a Mexican national admitted as an LPR at 17, pleaded guilty at 18 to Minnesota criminal sexual conduct in the third degree (Minn. Stat. § 609.344, subd. 1(b)) and to fleeing a police officer.
- DHS initiated removal proceedings, contending the sexual-conduct conviction was an "aggravated felony" as "sexual abuse of a minor" under the INA, and the fleeing conviction was a separate aggravated felony as a crime of violence.
- The immigration judge denied asylum; the BIA affirmed as to the sexual-conduct conviction, concluding it qualified as "sexual abuse of a minor," and therefore made petitioner ineligible for asylum. The BIA did not need to resolve the fleeing charge once it found an aggravated felony.
- Garcia-Urbano challenged the BIA’s classification, arguing the Minnesota statute was overbroad because it could criminalize relatively consensual teen sex (insufficient seriousness) and because it requires only a two-year-and-one-day age differential, not the larger differential he urges.
- The Eighth Circuit applied the categorical approach (look only to statute elements), considered Esquivel-Quintana v. Sessions, and concluded the Minnesota statute necessarily meets the INA’s "sexual abuse of a minor" definition.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Minn. Stat. § 609.344, subd. 1(b) is an aggravated felony as "sexual abuse of a minor" under the INA | Garcia-Urbano: statute is overbroad; conviction can cover non-"egregious" consensual teen sex so not categorically an aggravated felony | Government/BIA: statute criminalizes sexual penetration of a minor under 16, which fits the ordinary meaning of "sexual abuse of a minor" and thus is an aggravated felony | Held: Yes. The Minnesota offense necessarily constitutes "sexual abuse of a minor." |
| Whether "sexual abuse of a minor" requires an element of heightened seriousness beyond age-based sexual penetration | Garcia-Urbano: Congress intended only especially egregious felonies; consensual statutory-rape conduct is not sufficiently serious | Government/BIA: ordinary meaning includes sexual contact with a person below a specified age; Congress intended to capture age-based statutory-rape offenses | Held: Court rejected heightened-seriousness requirement; ordinary meaning covers age-based statutory rape. |
| Whether the INA requires a greater age differential (e.g., 4 years) than Minnesota’s ~2-year requirement | Garcia-Urbano: generic offense should mirror 18 U.S.C. § 2243(a)(2) (four-year differential), so Minn. law is overbroad | Government/BIA: adopting a larger differential would exclude most States’ statutes in effect when INA was amended; Esquivel-Quintana declined to adopt § 2243 definition | Held: Court rejects a >2-year differential requirement; Minnesota’s two-year-and-one-day rule fits within INA meaning. |
Key Cases Cited
- Esquivel-Quintana v. Sessions, 137 S. Ct. 1562 (Sup. Ct.) (interpreting "sexual abuse of a minor" in INA; held victim must be younger than 16 and declined to adopt a federal four-year-age-differential rule)