Luis Arnaldo Baez v. State
2015 Tex. App. LEXIS 10540
| Tex. App. | 2015Background
- Appellant Luis Arnaldo Baez was tried by jury and convicted on two counts of continuous sexual abuse of two foster children (D.I. and D.R.); life sentences imposed, to run consecutively.
- Counts alleged multiple specific acts during multi-month periods (Count 1: Oct. 1, 2007–Feb. 16, 2009 for D.I.; Count 2: Oct. 1, 2007–Apr. 6, 2009 for D.R.).
- Victims testified generally about repeated abuse over time rather than exact dates; a SANE examiner also recorded victim age ranges and descriptions of acts.
- The State offered testimony from another child (B.M.) as extraneous-offense evidence; the trial court admitted B.M.’s testimony under Tex. Code Crim. Proc. art. 38.37 §2(b).
- On appeal Baez raised: legal sufficiency challenges as to each complainant (timing/age/30‑day requirement), claimed the article 38.37 jury instruction was structural error (Sullivan/In re Winship argument), an ex post facto challenge to article 38.37 §2(b), and a claim that the court erred by denying a 30‑day continuance before an extraneous-offense admissibility hearing.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (State) | Defendant's Argument (Baez) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Sufficiency as to D.I.: whether evidence proved two+ sexual acts over a 30+ day period while victim <14 | Evidence (victim testimony, SANE, foster placement dates) supports inference of repeated abuse between ages 12–13 | Testimony and SANE age-range statements were speculative; could be compressed into <30 days or extend past 14th birthday | Affirmed: rational juror could find required acts occurred while D.I. was 12–13 and over a 30+ day period |
| Sufficiency as to D.R.: whether evidence proved required acts after statute effective date and while victim <14 | Foster placement dates, victim testimony of daily sex, and reasonable birthdate inferences support continuous abuse between Sept.1,2007 and victim’s 14th birthday | Victim’s dates uncertain; some alleged acts may predate Sept.1,2007 or occur when victim ≥14 | Affirmed: juror could infer D.R. was ≤13 for relevant period and that abuse occurred during 30+ day span after statutory effective date |
| Jury instruction under art. 38.37 §2(b): whether admitting/explaining extraneous-offense evidence constituted structural error | Instruction merely informed jury they could consider B.M.’s testimony for specified relevant purposes while separately defining elements and requiring proof beyond a reasonable doubt | Instruction misled jury into using extraneous acts as substantive proof of guilt (structural error not waived) | Not structural error; charge adequately defined elements and burden; instruction was proper explanation of §2(b) admissibility and no automatic reversal |
| Ex post facto challenge to §2(b) and denial of 30‑day continuance for admissibility hearing | §2(b) does not change elements or reduce quantum of proof; denial of continuance caused no specific prejudice | §2(b) retrospectively allowed extraneous acts as substantive evidence; trial court erred in refusing 30‑day continuance | §2(b) not ex post facto because it does not alter elements or burden; assumed continuance denial error but no specific prejudice shown, so no reversible harm |
Key Cases Cited
- Hooper v. State, 214 S.W.3d 9 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007) (standard for reviewing legal sufficiency)
- Brooks v. State, 323 S.W.3d 893 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010) (deference to jury credibility/weight determinations)
- Clayton v. State, 235 S.W.3d 772 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007) (consideration of combined direct and circumstantial evidence)
- Michell v. State, 381 S.W.3d 554 (Tex. App.—Eastland 2012) (purpose and requirements of continuous sexual abuse statute)
- Sullivan v. Louisiana, 508 U.S. 275 (U.S. 1993) (jury charge that lowers burden of proof is structural error)
- In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (U.S. 1970) (due process requires proof beyond a reasonable doubt of every element)
- Blue v. State, 41 S.W.3d 129 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000) (recognition of fundamental error under certain trial court statements)
- McCulloch v. State, 39 S.W.3d 678 (Tex. App.—Beaumont 2001) (article 38.37 does not change substantive burden of proof)
- Heiselbetz v. State, 906 S.W.2d 500 (Tex. Crim. App. 1995) (continuance denial requires specific showing of prejudice)