Ludimilla Ramos Da Silva v. Attorney General United States, 948 F.3d 629

Ludimilla Da Silva, a Brazilian national who overstayed a B-2 visa, married U.S. citizen Aziim Leach in 2012; Leach repeatedly subjected her to emotional, physical abuse and used her undocumented status as control.
Leach had an affair with coworker L.N.; in 2014 Da Silva confronted L.N. and struck her twice during confrontations; she was later arrested and pleaded guilty to two counts of assault under 18 U.S.C. § 113(a)(4), receiving an 18‑month sentence.
The government charged Da Silva with removability for overstaying; she applied for VAWA cancellation of removal but conceded she failed the statutory “good moral character” requirement because of her conviction.
Da Silva invoked the statutory exception that preserves eligibility if the act/conviction was “connected to” having been battered or subjected to extreme cruelty; the IJ and BIA found she was subject to extreme cruelty but held her convictions were not “connected to” the abuse because Leach neither induced nor directed the assaults.
The government moved to remand to the BIA to reconsider the meaning of “connected to”; the Third Circuit denied remand, interpreted “connected to” as unambiguous (a causal or logical relationship), held the BIA’s narrow coercion/inducement construction incorrect, found Da Silva’s convictions connected to the abuse, vacated the removal order, and remanded for further proceedings.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether to remand to the BIA for reinterpretation of “connected to”	Remand not appropriate; BIA already decided and the phrase is unambiguous	Remand requested so BIA can reconsider an allegedly ambiguous term	Denied — remand unnecessary because the statute is unambiguous and BIA already addressed it
Meaning of “connected to” in the VAWA exception to good moral character	“Connected to” means a causal or logical relationship between abuse and the act/conviction	Requires compulsion, coercion, or that the abuser asked/induced the petitioner to commit the act	Court: Unambiguous — means causal or logical relationship; BIA’s coercion/inducement standard too narrow
Application to Da Silva’s assault convictions	Assaults arose directly from confronting husband and mistress about the affair and thus are connected to the extreme cruelty	Assaults were provoked by the mistress, not committed at husband’s direction, so not connected to the husband’s cruelty	Convictions are connected to the extreme cruelty; BIA’s removal order vacated and case remanded

I.N.S. v. Orlando Ventura, 537 U.S. 12 (2002) (agency should decide issues in the first instance when it has not addressed them)
Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984) (framework for judicial deference to reasonable agency interpretations of ambiguous statutes)
INS v. Cardoza–Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421 (1987) (statutory construction and limits of agency expertise)
Christensen v. Harris County, 529 U.S. 576 (2000) (agency opinion letters receive respect under Skidmore but are not controlling)
Maracich v. Spears, 570 U.S. 48 (2013) (declining an expansive plain‑text reading of “in connection with” when it would defeat statutory purpose)
N.Y. State Conf. of Blue Cross & Blue Shield Plans v. Travelers Ins. Co., 514 U.S. 645 (1995) (context can require narrowing broad statutory phrases)
United States v. Loney, 219 F.3d 281 (3d Cir. 2000) ("in connection with" expresses a relationship that can be causal or logical)
Singh v. Ashcroft, 383 F.3d 144 (3d Cir. 2004) (declining to defer to BIA on criminal‑law interpretations)