Lucky's Detroit, LLC v. Double L, Inc.
533 F. App'x 553
6th Cir.2013Background
- Double L, Inc. (Double L) operates multiple "Lucky’s" restaurants (Lucky’s Steak House) in Michigan, using the marks since 1998 and federally registered for "restaurant services."
- Lucky’s Detroit, LLC (LD) operates three "Lucky’s Pub & Grille" restaurants in Detroit area (first opened 2008–2009; a Southfield location opened in 2010 during litigation).
- Double L sent a cease-and-desist in 2009 after alleged customer confusion; LD sued for declaratory judgment of non-infringement and abandonment; Double L counterclaimed for trademark infringement under the Lanham Act and state law.
- After motions and discovery, the district court granted summary judgment to Double L on liability and issued a permanent injunction prohibiting LD from using "Lucky’s" or "Lucky’s Pub and Grille." LD appealed.
- The Sixth Circuit reviewed likelihood of confusion under the eight Frisch factors, assessed affirmative defenses (estoppel and unclean hands), and affirmed the injunction.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (LD) | Defendant's Argument (Double L) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether LD’s use of "Lucky’s" is likely to cause confusion (likelihood of confusion / Frisch factors) | Marks are common/ descriptive; differences ("Pub & Grille" v. "Steak House") and different ambiance reduce confusion | Double L’s mark is strong and commercially recognized; services are related; marks similar; evidence of confusion and expansion increases likelihood | Court affirmed likelihood of confusion — most Frisch factors favor Double L (strength, similarity, relatedness, expansion); irreparable harm shown |
| Strength / distinctiveness of Double L’s marks (including incontestable status) | Mark is a personal name/descriptive; market is "crowded" with other "Lucky’s" uses | Mark is arbitrary to consumers and has incontestable federal registration and local commercial strength | Court: marks are conceptually and commercially strong; incontestable status precludes a mere-descriptive challenge |
| Whether Double L is estopped by prior PTO statements (prosecution history / waiver) | Double L’s USPTO filings acknowledged limited scope for "Lucky/ Lucky’s" marks and should bar broader enforcement | Prior PTO statements did not conflict with current position because Double L sought exclusivity for similar services; no detrimental reliance | Court: estoppel/prosecution-history argument fails; PTO statements not inconsistent with suit and LD showed no detrimental reliance |
| Whether unclean hands bars relief | Double L made misleading representations and seeks inequitable relief | No evidence Double L engaged in fraud, deceit, or bad faith related to this dispute | Court: unclean hands defense rejected; no proof of misconduct related to the matter |
Key Cases Cited
- Sec’y of Labor, U.S. Dep’t of Labor v. 3Re.com, Inc., 317 F.3d 534 (6th Cir.) (standards for review of permanent injunction)
- eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, LLC, 547 U.S. 388 (2006) (four-factor permanent injunction framework)
- Frisch’s Restaurants, Inc. v. Elby’s Big Boy of Steubenville, Inc., 670 F.2d 642 (6th Cir.) (eight-factor likelihood-of-confusion test)
- Homeowners Group, Inc. v. Home Marketing Specialists, Inc., 931 F.2d 1100 (6th Cir.) (view marks in marketplace context; ultimate confusion question)
- Maker’s Mark Distillery, Inc. v. Diageo N. Am., Inc., 679 F.3d 410 (6th Cir.) (conceptual vs. commercial strength of marks)
- Therma-Scan, Inc. v. Thermoscan, Inc., 295 F.3d 623 (6th Cir.) (assessing strength despite incontestable registration)
- Daddy’s Junky Music Stores, Inc. v. Big Daddy’s Family Music Ctr., 109 F.3d 275 (6th Cir.) (weight of actual confusion evidence)
- Park ’N Fly, Inc. v. Dollar Park and Fly, Inc., 469 U.S. 189 (1985) (incontestable mark cannot be challenged as merely descriptive)
- Leelanau Wine Cellars, Ltd. v. Black & Red, Inc., 502 F.3d 504 (6th Cir.) (evidence required for actual confusion / secondary meaning)
- Performance Unlimited, Inc. v. Questar Publishers, Inc., 52 F.3d 1373 (6th Cir.) (unclean hands doctrine in trademark injunctive relief)
