1:17-cv-00675
D. Or.Oct 27, 2021Background
- Lake County leased its 55-mile Lakeview Branch to operator LRY under a 2010 Lease (amended to 2035) that assigned routine maintenance to LRY but capital/bridge repairs to the County and included Paragraph 13.05 referencing $25,000 as "liquidated damages."
- Attorney John D. Heffner (later of Strasburger/Clark Hill) prepared/approved the Lease for LRY in 2009; he and associate James Savage had access to LRY confidential materials.
- In 2016–2017 Heffner accepted representation of Cornerstone and Bruce Addington (and later the County) to pursue removal of LRY as operator; he did not obtain LRY’s written consent and advised coordinated action (inspections, pressure on UP, and termination strategy).
- Lake County terminated LRY’s Lease effective April 30, 2017, citing Paragraph 13.05 and tendered $25,000; LRY sued for breach of contract, §1983 due process violations, and related tort and malpractice/fiduciary claims against Heffner’s Estate and Clark Hill; Cornerstone/Addington asserted cross-claims.
- Court ruled Paragraph 13.05 is a liquidated damages clause but is unenforceable as an unreasonable forecast of damages; Court granted LRY summary judgment on liability for breach of contract against Lake County.
- Claims against Heffner/the Estate and Clark Hill for breach of fiduciary duties, malpractice, tortious interference, negligent supervision, and vicarious liability raise disputed causation/factual issues; summary judgment denied on those claims (some claims dismissed: punitive damages vs Estate; breach-of-contract claim vs Estate).
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Interpretation/enforceability of Paragraph 13.05 (liquidated damages) | 13.05 is a liquidated-damages clause and $25,000 is not a reasonable forecast of termination damages, so it is unenforceable. | County contends 13.05 permits at-will termination upon payment of $25,000. | Court: 13.05 is a liquidated-damages clause (payable only if County terminates "without reasonable cause") and is void as an unreasonable liquidated-damage amount. Grant SJ to LRY on interpretation. |
| Breach of contract liability (County terminated Lease) | County’s termination under 13.05 was a breach because 13.05 is not an at-will termination clause. | County argues it had the contractual right to terminate under 13.05 and LRY failed performance/owed duty of good faith. | Court: County’s termination constituted breach; LRY entitled to summary judgment on liability. County’s good-faith argument does not defeat liability at summary judgment; damages reserved. |
| §1983 Due process/property interest | Lease created a protectable property interest (lease and related operational rights); termination without proper process violated Due Process. | County argues commercial lease cannot create a protected property interest or, alternatively, 13.05 made lease terminable at will. | Court: Lease can create a property interest; because 13.05 is not an at-will termination clause, County not entitled to summary judgment on §1983 claims. |
| Heffner’s fiduciary duties (loyalty & confidentiality) and malpractice | Heffner owed continuing duties to LRY; representing Cornerstone/Addington (and later County) in same/substantially related matter without LRY’s written consent breached loyalty/confidentiality and constituted malpractice; caused LRY’s loss. | Clark Hill/Estate argue representation was not substantially related or causative; any information was stale/general; factual causation lacking; some duties ended with prior representation. | Court: ORPC 1.9 creates continuing duties; existence of breaches (same/substantially related representation; lack of written consent) raises triable issues, including causation. Summary judgment denied to both sides on these claims (genuine factual disputes). |
| Clark Hill vicarious liability / negligent supervision / punitive damages | Clark Hill is vicariously liable for Heffner’s misconduct and was negligent in supervising him; punitive damages sought against firm. | Clark Hill argues claims mirror defective Estate claims and punitive damages improper where only vicarious liability exists. | Court: Denied summary judgment for Clark Hill on vicarious/negligent supervision (facts disputed). Punitive damages claim against Estate dismissed; punitive damages against Clark Hill survive at this stage. |
Key Cases Cited
- T.W. Elec. Serv., Inc. v. Pac. Elec. Contractors Ass'n, 809 F.2d 626 (9th Cir. 1987) (summary judgment standards and inferences at MSJ).
- Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S. 242 (1986) (standard for genuine issue of material fact at summary judgment).
- Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317 (1986) (party moving for summary judgment bears initial burden).
- DiTommaso Realty, Inc. v. Moak Motorcycles, Inc., 309 Or. 190 (1990) (defining liquidated damages vs payment clauses under Oregon law).
- Kesterson v. Juhl, 157 Or. App. 544 (1998) (Oregon two-step test for liquidated damages validity; application of ORS 72.7180 principles).
- Illingworth v. Bushong, 297 Or. 675 (1984) (use of Restatement guidance and statutory framework on liquidated damages).
- Bd. of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564 (1972) (property-interest test for due process—created by state law/understandings).
- Memphis Light, Gas & Water Div. v. Craft, 436 U.S. 1 (1978) (federal law determines if interest is a constitutionally protected property interest).
- Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593 (1972) (rules or mutual understandings can create property interests protected by due process).
- Damon v. Herzog, 67 F.3d 211 (9th Cir. 1995) (continuing common-law duty not to represent adverse interests in substantially related matters; basis for malpractice/fiduciary claims).
- Stevens v. Bispham, 316 Or. 221 (1993) (elements required to prove legal malpractice under Oregon law).
