Lowery v. Deal, 850 F. Supp. 2d 1326

Plaintiffs challenge Georgia's incorporation of Sandy Springs (2005), Milton (2006), Johns Creek (2006), Chattahoochee Hills (2007), and Dunwoody (2008), and the proposed Milton County.
Plaintiffs are seven black/AA voters in Fulton or DeKalb; GLBC is a non-individual plaintiff representing black elected officials.
New municipalities are predominantly white compared to the counties' demographics, suggesting potential racial vote-dilution concerns.
Plaintiffs allege the state’s actions diluted minority voting power by carving majority-white municipalities from majority-black counties and raise procedural objections to the legislative process.
Plaintiffs seek voiding charters, injunction against further dilutive acts (including Milton County), and attorneys’ fees; Deal moves to dismiss.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Viability of §2 vote-dilution claim	Gingles preconditions and totality support dilution; benchmark needed.	No reasonable alternative benchmark meets §2 requirements; claim fails.	§2 claim not stated; no workable benchmark.
Equal Protection claim viability	Discriminatory intent under EP supports dilution.	EP requires intent; §2 analysis suffices for dilution claims.	EP claim dismissed along with others.
Fifteenth Amendment claim viability	Fifteenth Amendment protects vote-dilution claims.	Fifteenth Amendment does not recognize vote-dilution claims.	Fifteenth Amendment claim dismissed.

Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30 (1986) (set preconditions for §2 vote-dilution claims)
Abrams v. Johnson, 521 U.S. 74 (1997) (discusses totality-of-circumstances in §2 and equal protection)
Gingles, 478 U.S. 30 (1986) (three preconditions for minority vote-dilution cases)
Johnson v. DeSoto County Bd. of Comm’rs, 204 F.3d 1335 (11th Cir. 2000) (relates Gingles preconditions to overall §2 analysis)
De Grandy v. Voinovich, 512 U.S. 997 (1994) (modifies Gingles preconditions for non-multimember contexts)
Bartlett v. Strickland, 556 U.S. 1 (2009) (minority voting potential tied to benchmark discussion)
Reno v. Bossier Parish Sch. Bd. (Bossier Parish I), 520 U.S. 471 (1997) (benchmarking requirement for §2 analysis)
Holder v. Hall, 512 U.S. 874 (1994) (describes need for reasonable alternative practice as benchmark)
Georgia v. Ashcroft, 539 U.S. 461 (2003) (distinguishes §2 and §5 benchmarks and purposes)
S. Christian Leadership Conference of Ala. v. Sessions, 56 F.3d 1281 (11th Cir. 1995) (state interest in benchmark selection considered)
Holt Civic Club v. City of Tuscaloosa, 439 U.S. 60 (1978) (deference to state structure in subdivision creation)
Dillard v. Baldwin Cnty. Comm’rs, 376 F.3d 1260 (11th Cir. 2004) (courts should work within state government framework)
Nipper v. Smith, 39 F.3d 1494 (11th Cir. 1994) (reminds of remedy-focused approach to §2)
Randall v. Scott, 610 F.3d 701 (11th Cir. 2010) (Twombly-Iqbal plausibility standard adopted)