Louise Dorr v. Sarah Woodard
140 A.3d 467
| Me. | 2016Background
- Petitioner Louise Dorr (paternal grandmother) sought court-ordered visitation with her granddaughter under the Maine Grandparents Visitation Act after the child’s father (Dorr’s son) died when the child was under one year old and contact with the mother, Sarah Woodard, ceased.
- Dorr filed a petition and affidavit alleging some pre-death contact (baby shower, present at birth, unspecified contact until father’s death) and post-death efforts to reestablish contact, including hiring a mediator and pursuing documents to establish the father’s paternity/beneficiary status.
- Woodard moved to dismiss, arguing the Act infringes her Fourteenth Amendment due process right to direct the care, custody, and control of her child.
- The District Court dismissed for lack of standing, concluding Dorr’s submissions failed to show a sufficient existing relationship or sufficient effort to establish one, and did not show “urgent reasons” to override the mother’s rights.
- The Law Court affirmed: it assumed Dorr’s efforts satisfied the statutory “sufficient effort” threshold for standing but held the facts did not demonstrate the constitutional “urgent reasons” (a compelling state interest focused on the child’s needs) necessary to intrude on a fit parent’s fundamental rights.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Dorr has statutory standing under 19-A M.R.S. §1803(1)(A) (parental death) | Dorr argued parental death satisfies §1803(1)(A) to confer standing | Woodard argued parental death alone cannot overcome mother’s fundamental rights | Held: Death alone is insufficient; Conlogue controls — parental death without urgent reasons does not confer standing |
| Whether Dorr has standing under §1803(1)(B) (sufficient existing relationship) | Dorr claimed prior contact established a sufficient existing relationship | Woodard argued contact was not extraordinary and would infringe her rights | Held: Alleged contacts (shower, birth, unspecified pre-death visits) were not extraordinary and did not meet §1803(1)(B) |
| Whether Dorr has standing under §1803(1)(C) (sufficient effort to establish relationship) | Dorr argued her post-death efforts (mediation, attempts to maintain contact, paternity/benefits actions) satisfy §1803(1)(C) | Woodard argued any statutory standing must also meet constitutional limits (urgent reasons) before litigation | Held: Court assumed Dorr met statutory “sufficient effort” but held the record lacks constitutional “urgent reasons” (no threat of harm, not a primary caregiver) to justify intrusion |
| Constitutional question: Does the Act, as applied here, violate a fit parent’s due process rights? | Dorr contended Act can be applied constitutionally on these facts | Woodard argued application infringes her fundamental liberty interest in childrearing | Held: Applying the Act on these facts would violate mother’s Fourteenth Amendment rights; strict scrutiny requires narrow tailoring and a compelling interest focused on the child’s needs (not grandparent’s desires) |
Key Cases Cited
- Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57 (2000) (recognizes parents’ fundamental liberty interest in child-rearing and limits third-party visitation statutes)
- Conlogue v. Conlogue, 890 A.2d 691 (Me. 2006) (parental death alone is not an automatic constitutional basis for grandparent standing)
- Rideout v. Riendeau, 761 A.2d 291 (Me. 2000) (‘‘urgent reasons’’ shown where grandparent served as primary caregiver/custodian over significant period)
- Robichaud v. Pariseau, 820 A.2d 1212 (Me. 2003) (existing-relationship standing requires extraordinary contact to satisfy compelling-interest standard)
- Davis v. Anderson, 953 A.2d 1166 (Me. 2008) (reiterating primary-caregiver/contact as the established example of an urgent reason)