913 F.3d 930
9th Cir.2019Background
- In 1972 Louis Taylor was convicted by an Arizona jury of 28 counts of felony murder for a Tucson hotel fire and imprisoned for decades.
- In 2012 Taylor presented new expert evidence undermining the arson theory; Arizona vacated his 1972 convictions and, under a 2013 plea agreement, Taylor pleaded no contest to the same counts, was resentenced to time served, and was released.
- Taylor sued Pima County and the City of Tucson under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging constitutional violations tied to the 1972 prosecution, including racial bias and failures to train/supervise prosecutors (Monell theories).
- The County removed the case to federal court and later moved to dismiss, arguing (1) Eleventh Amendment immunity (that relevant officials acted for the State, not the County) and (2) Taylor cannot recover incarceration damages because his time imprisoned is supported by the valid 2013 conviction.
- The district court denied the County Eleventh Amendment immunity and held Taylor may not recover wrongful incarceration damages; interlocutory appeals were sought and the Ninth Circuit resolved jurisdiction and the damages issue.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (Taylor) | Defendant's Argument (Pima County) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether interlocutory appellate jurisdiction exists over County's claim of Eleventh Amendment immunity | Removal by County waived immunity; appeal proper | County claims immunity from liability (not suit), preserved despite removal; collateral-order doctrine inapplicable | Court: collateral-order (§1291) does not apply to immunity-from-liability; denied §1292(b) review of immunity; County's appeal dismissed |
| Whether County may assert Eleventh Amendment immunity because officials acted for the State (affecting Monell liability) | Taylor: County liable under Monell for policies/practices | County: relevant actors were State actors, not County policymakers, so County not liable | Court declined to reach on interlocutory appeal (jurisdictional defect); concurrence: counties are not arms of the State so Eleventh Amendment inapplicable; issue is ordinarily a merits/liability defense |
| Whether Taylor can recover compensatory damages for wrongful incarceration given his 2013 plea/sentence | Taylor: challenges 1972 conviction; seeks damages for time imprisoned following original conviction; plea did not erase causation | County: all incarceration was supported by the valid 2013 conviction/sentence, so Heck/causation bar prevents recovery for incarceration time | Held: Taylor cannot recover incarceration-related damages for any period supported by the valid 2013 conviction/sentence; appeal affirmed in part and dismissed in part |
Key Cases Cited
- Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994) ( § 1983 claim barred if judgment would necessarily imply invalidity of conviction unless conviction vacated)
- Puerto Rico Aqueduct & Sewer Auth. v. Metcalf & Eddy, Inc., 506 U.S. 139 (1993) (collateral-order doctrine supports interlocutory appeal of immunity-from-suit)
- Lapides v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. Sys., 535 U.S. 613 (2002) (removal by a State can waive Eleventh Amendment immunity)
- SolarCity Corp. v. Salt River Project Agric. Improvement & Power Dist., 859 F.3d 720 (9th Cir. 2017) (distinguishes immunity from suit vs. immunity from liability for appellate jurisdiction)
- Jackson v. Barnes, 749 F.3d 755 (9th Cir. 2014) (no compensatory damages where imprisonment was supported by an unchallenged conviction)
- Olsen v. Correiro, 189 F.3d 52 (1st Cir. 1999) (where a later valid plea/sentence is sole legal cause of incarceration, plaintiff cannot recover incarceration damages)
- Poventud v. City of New York, 750 F.3d 121 (2d Cir. 2014) (plaintiff may not recover damages for time served pursuant to a valid plea agreement; may recover only for periods not covered by the valid judgment)
- Cortez v. County of Los Angeles, 294 F.3d 1186 (9th Cir. 2002) (interpreted to allow interlocutory appeal on similar municipal/state-actor issue; questioned in concurrence)
- Swint v. Chambers County Commission, 514 U.S. 35 (1995) (denied interlocutory appellate jurisdiction where county’s argument that sheriff was not county policymaker was treated as a liability defense)
- McMillian v. Monroe County, 520 U.S. 781 (1997) (distinguishes when officials act for state vs. county for Monell liability)