Louis DeNaples v. Office of the Comptroller of Currency
403 U.S. App. D.C. 431
| D.C. Cir. | 2013Background
- FDIA § 19 bars institution-affiliated parties with certain criminal dispositions from participation without agency consent; OCC and Board issued CEASE-AND-DESIST orders against DeNaples.
- DeNaples held leadership roles in First National, Bancorp, and Urban Financial Group, making him an institution-affiliated party under FDIA.
- DeNaples faced perjury charges in Pennsylvania; he entered an Agreement for Withdrawal of Charges in 2009 with conditions including divesting casino interests and reporting obligations.
- OCC and the Board deemed the Agreement a § 19 pretrial diversion or similar program, triggering prohibitions despite the District Attorney’s view otherwise; enforcement followed.
- DeNaples disputed agency authority and the § 19 interpretation; ALJ recommended against expansion of § 19, but OCC and Board issued cease-and-desist orders anyway.
- Court remands to reconsider whether the Agreement constitutes a § 19 pretrial diversion or similar program and to address expunction and policy-statement issues.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether § 8(b) removal authority may be exercised against DeNaples | DeNaples contends agencies lack authority to remove him under § 8(b) for a § 19 violation. | Agencies may remove or prohibit participation where statutory conditions are met under § 8(b) and related provisions. | Remanded; agencies’ use of cease-and-desist for removal remains permissible but must be reconciled with § 19 structure on remand. |
| Whether Chevron deference applies to Board’s interpretation of § 19 | DeNaples argues Board interpretations deserve Chevron deference. | Board interpretations are entitled to deference as agency interpretations of FDIA. | Rejected; no Chevron deference due to joint agency authority and multiple agency interpretations. |
| Whether the Agreement is a ‘pretrial diversion or similar program’ under § 19 | Agreement is not a pretrial diversion or similar program; expunged records should negate § 19 applicability. | Agreement fits § 19’s scope as a pretrial diversion or similar program despite expunction considerations. | Remanded to determine if the Agreement falls within § 19’s parameters in light of its text and state-law context. |
| How expunction and state-law considerations affect § 19 scope | FDIC policy statements exempt expunged convictions or diversions from § 19; expunction should foreclose § 19. | Policy statements are not binding or uniformly applied; expunction relevance varies by entity and statute. | Remanded; agencies must justify applicability of the FDIC policy and reconcile differences between expunged convictions vs. expunged pretrial-diversion. |
Key Cases Cited
- Grant Thornton LLP v. Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, 514 F.3d 1328 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (agency authority and deference considerations in FDIA context)
- Proffitt v. FDIC, 200 F.3d 855 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (removal standards under § 8(b))
- Mallen v. FDIC, 486 U.S. 230 (Supreme Court 1988) (discussion of § 1818 remedies and procedures)
- RadLAX Gateway Hotel, LLC v. Amalgamated Bank, 132 S. Ct. 2065 (2012) (treatment of specific vs general enforcement powers)
- Taniguchi v. Kan Pacific Saipan, Ltd., 132 S. Ct. 1997 (2012) (plain meaning and ambiguous statutory terms; use of ordinary meaning)
- Collins v. National Transportation Safety Board, 351 F.3d 1246 (D.C. Cir. 2003) (specialized agencies with overlapping authority; deference limitations)
- United States v. Santos, 553 U.S. 507 (2008) (statutory interpretation and issues of certainty in commands)