Los Fresnos Consolidated Independent School District and Michael L. Williams, Commissioner of Education v. Jorge Vazquez, 03-14-00629-CV

Background

Jorge Vazquez, a Los Fresnos CISD teacher, was proposed for nonrenewal under the Term Contract Nonrenewal Act (TCNA) after the 2012–13 school year and requested a §21.207 hearing before the local board.
At the board hearing the administration relied almost entirely on written statements from students and other third parties who did not testify; objections to that testimony as hearsay were made and noted.
The board voted to nonrenew; Vazquez appealed to the Commissioner of Education, who upheld the board in part by treating the contested hearsay as admissible under a liberal view of administrative hearsay exceptions.
The trial court reversed the Commissioner, finding the Commissioner’s decision lacked substantial evidence and was arbitrary and capricious because the record relied on hearsay that was objected to and no live adverse witnesses were produced for cross‑examination.
Appellee’s brief (Vazquez) argues (1) hearsay admitted over objection cannot constitute “substantial evidence” on appeal under the TCNA; (2) the Commissioner’s application of Government Code §2001.081 and related agency‑hearsay allowances was improper here; and (3) the board’s procedures (and lack of subpoena use) do not convert non‑evidence into substantial evidence.

Issues

Issue	Vazquez (Plaintiff) Argument	Los Fresnos/Commissioner (Defendants) Argument	Held
Whether properly objected to hearsay admitted at the local nonrenewal hearing may constitute "substantial evidence" on appeal	Hearsay that was objected to is not evidence and cannot satisfy the Commissioner’s substantial‑evidence review under the TCNA	Board may conduct hearings under its rules; the Rules of Evidence do not strictly apply to local board hearings, so statements may be considered	Trial court held Commissioner’s reliance on objected‑to hearsay failed the substantial‑evidence requirement (Vazquez argues affirmance of that result)
Whether the Commissioner properly applied §2001.081 (Gov’t Code) or other liberal hearsay exceptions to admit student statements	§2001.081 governs state agency contested cases and does not apply to local board nonrenewal hearings; the students’ statements were reasonably susceptible of proof and the District made no effort to subpoena or present them	Commissioner asserted difficulty procuring students (no subpoena power at board hearing) and relied on the broader agency hearsay provisions	Vazquez: Commissioner erred to rely on APA hearsay regime where not applicable and where the facts were reasonably susceptible of live proof; trial court found Commissioner’s approach arbitrary/capricious
Whether the board’s internal choice not to call students (or to disclaim TRE) cures the hearsay defect on appeal	A board’s procedural waiver does not convert non‑evidence into substantial evidence; permitting testimony from administrators recounting students’ statements denied the teacher cross‑examination required for credibility assessment	Board/Commissioner argued local procedures allow consideration of such material and practical concerns (protecting children) justify admitting student statements	Held (trial court view advanced by Vazquez): Board’s choice not to call witnesses cannot supply substantial evidence when only objected‑to hearsay exists
Whether the Commissioner’s departure from long‑standing TEA precedent on hearsay (that objected hearsay cannot support nonrenewal) warrants reversal	Commissioner reversed decades of TEA practice and thus erred as arbitrary and contradicting the statute’s plain meaning of "evidence" and "substantial evidence"	Commissioner claimed deference and invoked liberal administrative hearing standards	Trial court sided with Vazquez: prior agency practice and statutory meaning require excluding objected hearsay as non‑evidence for substantial evidence review

Key Cases Cited

Dodd v. Meno, 870 S.W.2d 4 (Tex. 1994) (agency construction entitled to deference if reasonable and consistent with statute).
Tarrant Appraisal Dist. v. Moore, 845 S.W.2d 820 (Tex. 1993) (administrative construction given serious consideration).
Board of Firemen's Relief & Retirement Fund Trustees of Houston v. Marks, 242 S.W.2d 181 (Tex. 1951) (explaining dual role of court in substantial‑evidence review).
Trapp v. Shell Oil Co., 198 S.W.2d 424 (Tex. 1946) (incredible or perjured testimony not substantial evidence; courts may examine for infirmities).
Railroad Comm'n v. Shell Oil Co., Inc., 161 S.W.2d 1022 (Tex. 1942) (record must be considered as a whole; substantial evidence standard explained).
Vitek v. Jones, 445 U.S. 480 (U.S. 1980) (when state creates protected expectations, minimal procedural due process applies).