430 S.W.3d 669
Ark.2013Background
- In 1991 Carlisle and Lonoke entered a settlement incorporated into a Lonoke County Circuit Court order requiring Lonoke County to pay one-half of municipal judges’ and clerks’ salaries and a proportionate share of municipal-court expenses beginning Jan. 1, 1991.
- The 1991 order stated the parties intended to follow Arkansas statutory law on sharing court costs and that the agreement would be amended if the law changed.
- The statute governing county/city obligations (Ark. Code Ann. § 16-17-115) was amended effective Jan. 1, 2012; the 2012 version changed terminology to "district court" and expressly allocates one-half of salaries to county and one-half plus operational expenses to the city, "unless otherwise agreed."
- In 2012 Lonoke City petitioned for a writ of mandamus seeking enforcement of the 1991 order against the County, alleging the County sought to reduce its obligations under the later statute.
- The circuit court granted the writ ordering the County to abide by the 1991 order and awarded the City $5,350 in attorney’s fees; the County appealed both the mandamus and the fee award.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (City) | Defendant's Argument (County) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether the 1991 agreed order remains enforceable after the 2012 statutory amendment | The 1991 order is an enforceable agreement; the 2012 statute’s "unless otherwise agreed" language preserves preexisting agreements so County must continue to pay the proportionate share specified in 1991 | The 1991 order contemplated following later statutory law; the 2012 statute created a new division of obligations (city pays operational expenses) and the County cannot be bound in 1991 to a 2012 statutory regime | Affirmed: Court held the 1991 order remains enforceable; 2012 statute did not abrogate the agreed allocation and preserved agreements between political subdivisions |
| Whether a writ of mandamus was proper to compel the County to perform under the 1991 order | Mandamus is appropriate to enforce a ministerial duty and the City has a clear right to enforcement of the agreed order | County argued the duty under the amended statute is different and discretionary; thus mandamus is inappropriate | Affirmed: Mandamus was appropriate because the duty was ministerial, City had a clear right, and no adequate alternative remedy existed |
| Whether the circuit court correctly interpreted § 16-17-115 when it found counties may be required to pay a proportion of court expenses in addition to salaries | The older and newer statutes both require counties to appropriate a sum sufficient to pay the county’s proportion of expenses; the 2012 language "unless otherwise agreed" contemplates and preserves intergovernmental agreements | County argued the 2012 statute limits county obligation to one-half of judge and chief clerk salaries and shifts operational expenses to cities unless subdivisions agree otherwise; County claims the 1991 order cannot constitute such an agreement with respect to a later-enacted statutory allocation | Court construed the statutes harmoniously and held both permit county obligation for a proportionate share of expenses; 1991 order is consistent with statutory scheme |
| Whether attorney’s fees awarded to City were permissible | City argued underlying petition enforced an agreed order (contract-like), so fees are recoverable under breach-of-contract statute § 16-22-308 | County argued no statute authorizes attorney’s fees in mandamus actions; the City prevailed only on a writ of mandamus, not a breach-of-contract action | Reversed: Attorney’s fees reversed because Arkansas law does not authorize fees for a mandamus action; fees require an express statutory authorization and the City prevailed on mandamus, not a contract claim |
Key Cases Cited
- Brown v. Gibson, 423 S.W.3d 34 (Ark. 2012) (standards for issuing writ of mandamus)
- Brock v. Townsell, 309 S.W.3d 179 (Ark. 2009) (statutory-construction reviewed de novo and give effect to every word)
- Hanners v. Giant Oil Co. of Ark., Inc., 284 S.W.3d 468 (Ark. 2008) (attorney’s fees are not recoverable absent statutory authorization even when dispute arises from a contract)
- Jackson v. Sparks Regional Medical Center, 294 S.W.3d 1 (Ark. 2009) (presumption against retroactive statutory application)
- Kildow v. Baldwin Piano & Organ, 969 S.W.2d 190 (Ark. 1998) (courts should not add words to a statute to create an intended meaning not expressed)