Lonnie Welsh v. Correct Care. L.L.C.
915 F.3d 341
| 5th Cir. | 2019Background
- Welsh sued Correct Care, McLane, Searcy, and others in state court alleging constitutional and related claims arising from Texas Civil Commitment Office custody; case was removed to federal court.
- McLane and Searcy moved to dismiss; McLane also filed an answer to an earlier (amended) state-court petition; after removal Welsh filed a later amended complaint to which no defendant answered.
- Welsh filed a notice seeking voluntary dismissal without prejudice.
- Due to a clerical error, the district court entered a nunc pro tunc order dismissing the action with prejudice, reasoning McLane had filed an answer.
- Welsh appealed, arguing he was entitled to unilateral dismissal without prejudice under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(a)(1)(A)(i) and that dismissal with prejudice was improper without opportunity to retract under Rule 41(a)(2).
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether filing an answer to an earlier complaint (but not the later amended complaint) bars plaintiff’s unilateral voluntary dismissal under Rule 41(a)(1)(A)(i) | Welsh: Amended complaint is a new pleading; no answer to it, so he has an absolute right to dismiss by notice without prejudice | Defendants: An earlier answer demonstrates defendant has expended effort, and an amended complaint does not revive the plaintiff’s right to dismiss by notice | Held: An answer to the earlier complaint precludes unilateral dismissal as to that defendant; filing an amended complaint does not revive the absolute right to dismiss by notice. |
| Whether the district court properly dismissed Welsh’s claim against McLane with prejudice without allowing Welsh to retract his motion under Rule 41(a)(2) | Welsh: He must be given the chance to withdraw his dismissal if the court conditions are too onerous; dismissal with prejudice is improper without that opportunity | Defendants: Court may impose conditions under Rule 41(a)(2), including potentially dismissal with prejudice | Held: Court abused its discretion by dismissing with prejudice without giving Welsh an opportunity to retract; remand required so Welsh can accept or withdraw the dismissal conditions. |
Key Cases Cited
- Armstrong v. Frostie Co., 453 F.2d 914 (4th Cir. 1971) (answer to original complaint can bar later unilateral dismissal by notice)
- Plains Growers v. Ickes-Braun Glasshouses, 474 F.2d 250 (5th Cir. 1973) (non-answering defendants may be dismissed by notice under Rule 41(a)(1)(A)(i))
- Elbaor v. Tripath Imaging, Inc., 279 F.3d 314 (5th Cir. 2002) (standard of review for dismissal decisions)
- Mortgage Guaranty Ins. Corp. v. Richard Carlyon Co., 904 F.2d 298 (5th Cir. 1990) (plaintiff may decline Rule 41(a)(2) dismissal if conditions are too onerous)
- Bell v. Keystone RV Co., 628 F.3d 157 (5th Cir. 2010) (plaintiff must be allowed to retract dismissal motion when court imposes conditions)
- Universidad Central Del Caribe v. Liaison Comm. on Med. Educ., 760 F.2d 14 (1st Cir. 1985) (amended complaint does not revive right to dismiss by notice)
- Baiul v. NBC Sports, [citation="708 F. App'x 710"] (2d Cir. 2017) (no new dismissal right created by amended complaint)
- Van-S-Aviation Corp. v. Piper Aircraft Corp., 551 F.2d 213 (8th Cir. 1977) (Rule 41(a)(1)(A)(i) aims to fix the point where defendants' resources are sufficiently committed)