Long v. Arnold
2016 Alas. LEXIS 137
| Alaska | 2016Background
- In July 2012 Erin Long drove off the road after Robert Arnold turned his truck onto the road and cut her off; Long’s car did not hit Arnold’s truck or any roadside object.
- Long sought medical treatment for pain starting two days after the accident and later sued Arnold for negligence seeking damages for injury, medical expenses, and non-economic losses.
- At trial Arnold admitted negligence; the jury found Arnold’s negligence was not a "substantial factor" in causing Long’s harm and did not reach damages.
- Arnold moved for and received costs and attorney’s fees under Alaska Civil Rules 79 and 82; the award included $375 in City and Borough of Juneau sales tax on attorney services.
- Long appealed, challenging: (1) admission of defendant’s medical expert, (2) causation and damages jury instructions, (3) apportionment of fees/costs between Long and her insurer (State Farm), and (4) inclusion of Juneau sales tax in the fee award.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Admissibility of defendant’s medical expert | Expert disclosures were incomplete/untimely; expert unhelpful because he did not examine Long; biased | Disclosures were supplemented in time; expert qualified by training and records review; bias goes to weight not admissibility | Admission affirmed: no abuse of discretion; disclosures adequate and expert could assist jury |
| Use of "substantial factor" instruction and "remote or trivial" language | Instruction misstated law and elevated plaintiff’s burden by requiring negligence not be "remote or trivial" | Instruction accurately states Alaska law derived from Restatement; relates negligence’s relation to harm, not re‑quantifying fault | Affirmed: instruction correct and did not raise plaintiff’s burden beyond preponderance standard |
| Multiple-cause / preexisting condition instruction | Requested instruction that several factors may each be substantial causes; concerned jury attributing harm to preexisting condition | Court gave Pattern Instruction 20.11 on aggravation of preexisting conditions; found no evidence of multiple independent sufficient causes | Affirmed: multiple-cause instruction unnecessary; Pattern Instruction 20.11 adequately addressed preexisting condition issue |
| Damages instruction (noneconomic damages; mitigation language) | Proposed noneconomic damages wording; objected to mitigation phrasing | Jury never reached damages because of negative causation finding | Moot: instructions on damages not reached by jury, so no review needed |
| Apportionment of fees/costs between plaintiff and insurer (State Farm) | Long argues fees/costs should be apportioned because insurer paid medicals and had subrogation interest | State Farm had instructed Long not to pursue its subrogation; insurer’s claim was not litigated here | Affirmed: no apportionment required because State Farm’s claim was not presented or litigated |
| Inclusion of Juneau sales tax in Rule 82 attorney’s fee award | Sales tax on attorney services is not an "actual attorney’s fee" under Rule 82 and Rule 82 does not authorize awarding the tax | Tax is an unavoidable, inseparable part of attorney cost to client; Rule 82 should compensate actual client cost | Reversed on this point: including the Juneau sales tax in the Rule 82 award was error; remanded to recalculate fees without the tax |
Key Cases Cited
- Cooper v. Thompson, 353 P.3d 782 (Alaska 2015) (standard of review for expert testimony)
- Thompson v. Cooper, 290 P.3d 393 (Alaska 2012) (medical expert causation testimony may assist jury even without physical exam)
- Sylvia L. v. State, Dep't of Health & Soc. Servs., 343 P.3d 425 (Alaska 2015) (bias of expert goes to weight, not admissibility)
- Vincent by Staton v. Fairbanks Mem'l Hosp., 862 P.2d 847 (Alaska 1993) (proximate cause/prong on significance and responsibility)
- Winschel v. Brown, 171 P.3d 142 (Alaska 2007) (substantial factor test and causation principles)
- Ruggles v. Grow, 984 P.2d 509 (Alaska 1999) (effect of insurer instructing insured not to present insurer’s claim)
