London v. State
308 Ga. 63
Ga.2020Background
- Victim Eric Terrell was found shot four times in the head/face in an apartment parking lot on March 24, 2015; his pockets were pulled out and his pants pulled down.
- Police recovered 9mm shell casings at scene and .38-caliber bullet; four bags of cocaine were found in Terrell’s car.
- Five latent fingerprints on Terrell’s car matched LaParrish London; cell‑phone records link a number registered to ‘Blakk London’ (associated with London) to calls shortly before the killing.
- Two witnesses (Donnell and Darnell Reed) gave statements implicating London: Donnell said London admitted ‘‘I did that’’ and was seen with a 9mm; Darnell’s recorded/written statements said ‘Solo’ (London) and another set up and shot the victim.
- At trial the jury convicted London of malice murder, felony murder (aggravated assault predicate), and aggravated assault; he received life; his motion for new trial was denied and the conviction was affirmed on appeal.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Sufficiency of the evidence to support malice murder | London: State lacked eyewitness and direct proof he fired the shots | State: fingerprint, phone contacts, witnesses’ inculpatory statements, shell casings, and other circumstantial evidence support guilt | Evidence sufficient; conviction affirmed (Jackson standard) |
| Denial of new trial on general grounds ("thirteenth juror") | London: verdict was against the weight of the evidence; trial court failed to properly exercise thirteenth-juror duty | State: trial court applied correct standard and independently reviewed credibility/weight | Trial court correctly exercised discretion; no abuse in denying new trial |
| Admission of Darnell Reed’s out-of-court written statement and video (hearsay and Confrontation Clause) | London: statements were hearsay and inadmissible because Reed claimed no memory, raising Confrontation Clause problems | State: statements were prior inconsistent statements admissible under OCGA § 24-6-613(b); Reed testified and was cross-examined, so no Confrontation violation | Statements admissible as prior inconsistent statements; no Confrontation Clause violation because Reed was available and cross-examined |
| Ineffective assistance for not objecting to prosecutor’s personal attacks on defense counsel during closing | London: counsel unreasonably failed to object/move for mistrial after prosecutor impugned defense counsel, causing prejudice | State: counsel had strategic reasons (avoid drawing attention, respond in own closing) and responded rhetorically; overall argument stayed largely evidence-based | Tactical choice was objectively reasonable; no ineffective assistance shown |
Key Cases Cited
- Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307 (standard for assessing sufficiency of the evidence)
- White v. State, 293 Ga. 523 (trial judge's role as thirteenth juror on general‑grounds new trial)
- Brewner v. State, 302 Ga. 6 (prior inconsistent statement admissibility when witness claims memory loss)
- Murdock v. State, 299 Ga. 177 (same — extrinsic proof of prior inconsistent statements permitted)
- Hood v. State, 299 Ga. 95 (same principle on prior inconsistent statements)
- Delaware v. Fensterer, 474 U.S. 15 (Confrontation Clause: opportunity for cross‑examination suffices despite witness memory loss)
- United States v. Owens, 484 U.S. 554 (Confrontation Clause not violated by admission of identification when witness has memory loss)
- Brown v. State, 266 Ga. 723 (cross‑examination of forgetful witness satisfies Sixth Amendment)
- Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (two‑part ineffective‑assistance standard)
- Haney v. State, 305 Ga. 785 (application of Strickland; burden on defendant to prove deficiency and prejudice)