London Triplett v. Jennifer McDermott, 996 F.3d 825

Background

Triplett pleaded guilty in Wisconsin to three counts (human trafficking, pimping/pandering, and felon-in-possession) as part of a plea deal that dismissed 17 other charges to be "read in" at sentencing; plea reduced exposure from 354 to 47.5 years.
Plea questionnaire and waiver (which Triplett signed) stated that read-in charges "may" be considered at sentencing though they would not increase the statutory maximum.
Trial counsel Earle allegedly told Triplett the read-ins could not be considered because Triplett was not admitting their truth; Triplett later claimed he would have gone to trial if he had known otherwise.
Postconviction counsel De Peters submitted an affidavit recounting Triplett’s claim and her conversation with Earle; the trial court denied withdrawal without an evidentiary hearing, finding no prejudice.
The Wisconsin Court of Appeals refused a Machner hearing, holding Triplett failed to plead objective facts showing prejudice as required by Wisconsin law; the state supreme court denied review.
The federal district court denied habeas relief on the merits; the Seventh Circuit affirms but on the independent state-law ground that Triplett did not adequately plead objective facts of prejudice.

Issues

Issue	Triplett's Argument	State/Respondent's Argument	Held
Whether the state court’s pleading rule barred federal habeas review	Triplett: he plausibly alleged counsel misadvised about read-ins and would have rejected plea	State: Wisconsin requires objective factual allegations of prejudice; Triplett’s claims were conclusory	Held: The Wisconsin pleading rule is an adequate, independent state ground that bars federal review
Whether Earle rendered ineffective assistance by misstating effect of read-in charges	Triplett: Earle’s incorrect advice caused prejudice because he would have gone to trial	State: Record (signed waiver, plea colloquy, sentencing discussion) undermines claim of prejudice	Held: Court did not reach merits due to procedural bar; independently finds prejudice not shown to excuse default
Whether Triplett established cause and prejudice to excuse procedural default	Triplett: postconviction counsel’s failures and Earle’s error establish cause; prejudice shown by affidavit	State: Even assuming cause, Triplett did not show reasonable probability of a different outcome	Held: Assuming cause, Triplett failed to prove actual prejudice sufficient to excuse default
Whether federal court can review merits despite state-court framing	Triplett: appellate court’s remarks intertwined with merits so federal review allowed	State: Appellate decision rests on independent pleading rule, not merits	Held: Appellate court’s decision was independent of the merits; federal review is foreclosed

Key Cases Cited

Johnson v. Lee, 136 S. Ct. 1802 (U.S. 2016) (federal habeas barred where state court rests on adequate, independent state ground)
Richardson v. Lemke, 745 F.3d 258 (7th Cir. 2014) (adequacy test for state procedural bars)
Harris v. Reed, 489 U.S. 255 (1989) (requirements for relying on state procedural grounds)
Crockett v. Butler, 807 F.3d 160 (7th Cir. 2015) (federal habeas review standards)
Lee v. Foster, 750 F.3d 687 (7th Cir. 2014) (Wisconsin pleading rule is well-rooted and adequate)
Davila v. Davis, 137 S. Ct. 2058 (2017) (cause-and-prejudice framework for excusing default)
Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52 (1985) (prejudice standard for ineffective-assistance claims in plea context)
State v. Bentley, 548 N.W.2d 50 (Wis. 1996) (Wisconsin requires objective factual support for claim that defendant would have pled differently)
State v. Allen, 682 N.W.2d 433 (Wis. 2004) (reiterating pleading requirements for Machner hearing)
State v. Machner, 285 N.W.2d 905 (Wis. Ct. App. 1979) (procedures for postconviction evidentiary hearing on counsel effectiveness)