Lomas Sr., R. v. Kravitz, J., Aplts.
2017 Pa. LEXIS 2275
| Pa. | 2017Background
- Lomas obtained an arbitration award (later reduced to judgment) against Cherrydale and related entities; James Kravitz controlled those entities and allegedly diverted assets to avoid payment.
- Thomas C. Branca originally represented Lomas in arbitration, then became a Montgomery County judge; he withdrew appearance and the case was litigated by SGR; Branca later testified he expected a referral fee tied to net proceeds.
- The case proceeded as a bifurcated bench trial before Judge Thomas P. Rogers (liability first, then fees/punitive damages); liability was decided against Appellants in July 2007.
- On September 6, 2007, Judge Branca testified during the damages phase about ongoing communications with SGR and a financial interest (a referral fee) in the case; Appellants did not move to recuse immediately.
- Appellants filed a motion on October 15, 2007 to recuse the entire Montgomery County bench based on Branca’s involvement; Judge Rogers briefly granted then vacated and ultimately denied recusal; Superior Court and then the Pennsylvania Supreme Court reviewed the timeliness and merits.
- The Pennsylvania Supreme Court held Appellants waived the recusal claim by not raising it at the earliest possible moment and affirmed the Superior Court judgment; a dissent would have found the motion timely and that Branca’s interest created an appearance of impropriety requiring recusal.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (Lomas) | Defendant's Argument (Kravitz/Appellants) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Timeliness/waiver of recusal motion | Recusal must be raised at earliest moment once facts known; Appellants waited 39 days and thus waived the claim | Appellants argue they only learned full facts on Sept 6, 2007 and filed quickly thereafter; timing distinguishable from post-verdict gamesmanship | Held waived: moving party must raise recusal at the earliest possible moment once facts are known; Oct 15 filing was untimely |
| Appearance of impropriety from Judge Branca’s financial interest | Even if Branca had an interest, record shows fair trial; appearance must be judged by full-informed-person standard and did not require recusal here | Branca’s ongoing participation and proportional financial stake created an appearance of impropriety undermining public confidence; recusal of county bench required | Court did not reach merits (waiver dispositive); dissent would have held appearance of impropriety warranted recusal |
| Scope of recusal — entire bench vs. single judge | Recusal of entire Montgomery County bench unnecessary absent demonstrated bias affecting the trial judge | Appellants: Branca’s interest implicated all judges of same bench because awards are decided by bench colleagues; thus whole bench should recuse | Not decided on merits due to waiver; majority rejected automatic presumption that a judge’s interest alone mandates bench-wide recusal |
| Standard and reviewability for recusal decisions | Lomas: parties aware of facts who fail to object promptly waive issue; recusal denials reviewed for abuse of discretion | Appellants/dissent: request for recusal need not be immediate like evidentiary objection; timeliness should be balanced (propose multi-factor test) | Court affirmed abuse-of-discretion standard and applied existing Pennsylvania precedent requiring prompt objection; declined to adopt new multi-factor test proposed in dissent |
Key Cases Cited
- In re Lokuta, 11 A.3d 427 (Pa. 2011) (recusal timeliness—failure to raise issues at earliest opportunity is waiver)
- Goodheart v. Casey, 565 A.2d 757 (Pa. 1989) (party must raise recusal/disqualification at earliest possible moment)
- Reilly by Reilly v. SEPTA, 489 A.2d 1291 (Pa. 1985) (timeliness/waiver principles for recusal; post-trial recusal generally time-barred)
- Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., 556 U.S. 868 (U.S. 2009) (due process and objective review regarding appearance of bias)
- Zappala v. Brandolini Prop. Mgmt., Inc., 909 A.2d 1272 (Pa. 2006) (abuse of discretion standard for reviewing recusal denials)
