Lockard v. State, 233 A.3d 228

At ~11:20 p.m. on July 23, 2018, Deputy Story stopped a car for following too closely; Jenna Clark (driver) and Dwayne Lockard (front-seat passenger) were identified. Clark showed recent track marks and had a recent drug charge; she was detained pending warrant verification.
A K-9 unit was requested; Corporal Adkins and two other officers arrived and ordered both occupants out because Adkins prefers unoccupied vehicles for canine scans.
As Lockard walked toward the officers, Adkins observed the hammer portion of a folding knife protruding from Lockard’s pocket; Trooper Frye removed and secured the closed folding knife.
Adkins asked Lockard for consent to a pat‑down; Lockard turned away and raised his hands. During a waistband frisk for weapons, Adkins immediately felt a bag of individually packaged capsules he recognized as narcotics and arrested Lockard.
The suppression court denied Lockard’s motion to suppress (finding the knife justified a Terry frisk); Lockard was convicted after a bench trial. On appeal, the Court of Special Appeals reversed, holding the frisk unlawful and remanding for a new trial.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument (Lockard)	Defendant's Argument (State)	Held
Whether a frisk was justified after officers observed and secured a closed folding knife from Lockard	Knife alone did not justify a further protective frisk for additional weapons once the knife was secured	Possession of a weapon can justify a frisk because "if there's one weapon, there could be more" and officer safety justified pat‑down	Frisk was unlawful: securing the knife, multiple officers on scene, Lockard’s cooperative demeanor, and lack of subjective fear meant no reasonable articulable suspicion that he remained armed and dangerous
Whether an officer’s subjective lack of fear may be considered in assessing reasonable suspicion for a frisk	Officer’s subjective belief that a frisk was not needed supports that there was no reasonable suspicion	The frisk should be judged objectively; officer need not be certain someone is armed to frisk	Court held officer’s subjective lack of fear is a relevant factor in the totality‑of‑circumstances analysis, and here it weighed against reasonable suspicion

Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968) (establishes that a protective frisk requires reasonable, articulable suspicion that a person is armed and dangerous)
Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032 (1983) (permissible vehicle‑compartment protective search when officer reasonably believes suspect is dangerous and may access weapons)
Norman v. State, 452 Md. 373 (2017) (reasonable‑suspicion frisk assessed under totality of circumstances and officer experience)
Thornton v. State, 465 Md. 122 (2019) (review standards for suppression and framework for stop/frisk analyses)
Sellman v. State, 449 Md. 526 (2016) (frisk validity is an objective test assessed by articulable facts)
State v. Baker, 229 P.3d 650 (Utah 2010) (relinquished pocketknife alone did not automatically justify frisk under totality of circumstances)
United States v. Hussain, 835 F.3d 307 (2d Cir. 2016) (presence of a legal folding pocketknife did not alone support a protective frisk)