Lloyd Leroy Webster, Jr. v. State
06-17-00093-CR
| Tex. App. | Nov 1, 2017Background
- Lloyd Leroy Webster Jr., convicted previously of sexual assault, had a lifetime duty to register as a sex offender. He was indicted for failing to register in Rusk County on or about March 3, 2016.
- While incarcerated in Huntsville, Webster completed a pre-release form saying he expected to reside at H&H RV Park, Highway 79 South, Henderson (no lot number); the form did not specify the local law‑enforcement agency to which he must report.
- Rusk County registration receptionist Dixie Duncan received the pre‑release paperwork and believed Webster would need to register with Rusk County within seven days of his February 26, 2016 release.
- Rusk County deputies attempted to locate Webster based on the trailer‑park reference and a report he was staying with his mother; deputies did not confirm the mother’s address. Evidence showed Webster instead lived at 329 Lula Lane in Jefferson (Marion County) after release.
- Webster did not register in Rusk County before the seven‑day deadline; he later registered with Marion County on May 21, 2016. He was arrested on the Rusk County indictment in May 2016 and convicted by a jury; he appealed claiming legal insufficiency of the evidence.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether evidence sufficed to prove Webster resided or intended to reside in Rusk County for >7 days after release | State: pre‑release form and Duncan’s testimony show intent/residence in Rusk County | Webster: evidence shows he lived in Marion County; pre‑release form alone insufficient | Held: Insufficient — State failed to prove residence or intent to reside in Rusk County for >7 days |
| Whether State proved duty to register specifically with Rusk County Sheriff’s Office | State: showing expected address in Rusk County supports duty to register there | Webster: even if pre‑release address is in Rusk County, State failed to prove whether residence was inside Henderson city limits vs. rural county, which determines registration authority | Held: Insufficient — State did not prove which local law‑enforcement entity had registration authority |
| Whether gaps in investigative steps (address confirmation, lot number) can be cured by inferences | State: reasonable inferences from forms and investigator testimony support conviction | Webster: gaps are speculative and create only suspicion, not proof beyond a reasonable doubt | Held: Insufficient — court will not supply a bridge over an evidentiary gap |
| Whether legal sufficiency standard (Jackson/Brooks) supported upholding the verdict | State: evidence should be viewed in light most favorable to verdict | Webster: even under that standard evidence quality was inadequate to support essential elements | Held: Court applied Jackson/Brooks and found evidence legally insufficient |
Key Cases Cited
- Brooks v. State, 323 S.W.3d 893 (2010) (plurality) (legal‑sufficiency standard and review framework)
- Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307 (1979) (conviction must be supportable by evidence permitting a rational trier of fact to find guilt beyond a reasonable doubt)
- Malik v. State, 953 S.W.2d 234 (1997) (use of a hypothetically correct jury charge to measure sufficiency)
- Crabtree v. State, 389 S.W.3d 820 (2012) (elements for failure to comply with sex‑offender registration statutes)
- Simpkins v. State, 300 S.W.3d 860 (2009) (proof required to establish which local authority a registrant must report to)
- Winfrey v. State, 323 S.W.3d 875 (2010) (mere suspicion or strong suspicion is insufficient to sustain a conviction)