Livingston Manners v. Officer Ronald Cannella
891 F.3d 959
| 11th Cir. | 2018Background
- In June 2014 at ~3:00 a.m., Officer Cannella activated lights/siren behind Livingston Manners after observing his vehicle; Manners knowingly did not stop and drove about three blocks to a well-lit gas station before stopping.
- At the gas station Cannella told Manners he was under arrest; a physical struggle followed as Cannella attempted to handcuff Manners, who resisted for about three minutes.
- Backup Officer Sabillon arrived and deployed a taser; multiple officers ultimately subdued and handcuffed Manners.
- Manners was criminally charged (initial charges included attempted homicide, resisting with violence, battery on an officer); later tried on lesser counts and acquitted of the counts he faced at trial. He incurred legal fees.
- Manners sued under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (excessive force and malicious prosecution) and brought a Florida false arrest claim against the City; the district court granted summary judgment for defendants on qualified immunity and probable cause grounds.
- The Eleventh Circuit affirmed: it rejected Manners’s stop-sign theory (material dispute), found actual/arguable probable cause to arrest for fleeing/attempting to elude, held force used was not excessive, and dismissed malicious prosecution and false arrest claims because of probable cause.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Probable cause to arrest for running a stop sign | Manners says he stopped; Cannella’s view was wrong so no probable cause for that offense | Cannella observed Manners run the stop sign and that belief (even if mistaken) supports probable cause | No — material factual dispute over who is believed; summary judgment on that theory inappropriate |
| Probable/arguable probable cause to arrest for fleeing/attempting to elude | Manners argues his brief, cautious drive to a well-lit area was necessary and did not constitute flight | Officers point to lights/siren, Manners’s knowledge he was ordered to stop, and his willful failure to stop for ~three blocks/14.4 seconds | Yes — actual and at minimum arguable probable cause existed to arrest for fleeing/eluding |
| Excessive force / qualified immunity | Manners contends punches and taser use were gratuitous and excessive even if arrest was lawful | Officers contend force was proportionate to active, sustained resistance and reasonable under the circumstances; qualified immunity applies absent clearly established law to the contrary | Yes — force was not constitutionally excessive given active resistance; officers entitled to qualified immunity |
| Malicious prosecution / state false arrest | Manners asserts prosecution and detention lacked probable cause and inflicted damages | Defendants assert probable cause for arrest (flight) defeats malicious prosecution and is a complete defense to false arrest | Yes — probable cause forecloses § 1983 malicious prosecution and Florida false arrest claim |
Key Cases Cited
- Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372 (2007) (courts may rely on video evidence when it blatantly contradicts a party’s story)
- District of Columbia v. Wesby, 138 S. Ct. 577 (2018) (probable cause and clearly established law must be assessed in the specific context)
- Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800 (1982) (articulating standard for qualified immunity)
- Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223 (2009) (courts may decide prongs of qualified immunity in either order)
- Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386 (1989) (excessive-force reasonableness test; consider severity, threat, and resistance)
- Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, 532 U.S. 318 (2001) (probable cause to arrest for minor offenses can justify custodial arrest)
- Florida v. Harris, 568 U.S. 237 (2013) (probable cause addresses probabilities rather than proof beyond a reasonable doubt)
- Lee v. Ferraro, 284 F.3d 1188 (11th Cir. 2002) (qualified immunity framework and burden shifting)
- Grider v. City of Auburn, 618 F.3d 1240 (11th Cir. 2010) (arguable probable cause standard for qualified immunity)
- Wood v. Kesler, 323 F.3d 872 (11th Cir. 2003) (elements of malicious prosecution under § 1983)
