Liudmila Muraveva v. Shawn Toffoli
709 F. App'x 131
| 3rd Cir. | 2017Background
- On Aug. 5, 2011, Liudmila Muraveva was arrested outside her home for disorderly conduct under N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2C:33-2a(1) after an encounter with Officer Shawn Toffoli.
- Toffoli and Officer James Stevens testified Muraveva screamed, cursed, flailed her arms, followed officers into the street, interfered with their investigation, and drew bystander attention.
- Muraveva testified she approached Toffoli to speak calmly and was immediately arrested.
- After a three-day trial, the jury found for Toffoli; the District Court entered judgment and denied Muraveva’s Rule 50 motion.
- The District Court granted summary judgment to Toffoli on punitive damages, finding no evidence of willful, malicious, or wanton conduct.
- Muraveva appealed, arguing (1) improper jury instructions about First Amendment protection for conduct, (2) improper reliance on testimony about interference with police duties, (3) insufficient evidence of probable cause, and (4) error in denying punitive damages.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether the jury should have been instructed that conduct, as well as speech, can be protected by the First Amendment | Muraveva: Court should have instructed jury that expressive conduct is protected and thus may not support probable cause | Toffoli: No evidence showed Muraveva engaged in expressive conduct; existing speech instruction sufficed | Court: No abuse of discretion; no evidence of expressive conduct so additional instruction unnecessary |
| Whether jury could consider testimony that Muraveva interfered with police duties when assessing disorderly conduct | Muraveva: Interference with police duties is not an element of NJ disorderly conduct and should not have been used | Toffoli: Jury should assess "tumultuous behavior" under the totality of circumstances, which can include interference | Court: Proper to instruct jury to consider totality; did not equate interference with an element, and guidance was not an abuse of discretion |
| Whether evidence was sufficient to support probable cause such that Rule 50 should be granted | Muraveva: Evidence insufficient to show probable cause for arrest | Toffoli: Testimony of screaming, flailing, following, interfering, and attracting bystanders supports probable cause | Court: Viewing evidence favorably to Toffoli, sufficient evidence existed for a reasonable jury to find probable cause; Rule 50 denied |
| Whether punitive damages should have gone to the jury | Muraveva: Toffoli acted callously and violated her First Amendment rights, supporting punitive damages | Toffoli: No evidence of willfulness, malice, or wanton recklessness to support punitive damages | Court: Affirmed summary judgment for Toffoli on punitive damages; record lacked evidence meeting New Jersey's punitive-damages standard |
Key Cases Cited
- Tenafly Eruv Ass'n, Inc. v. Borough of Tenafly, 309 F.3d 144 (3d Cir. 2002) (framework for when conduct is "sufficiently imbued with elements of communication" to be protected)
- Spence v. Washington, 418 U.S. 405 (1974) (test for expressive conduct)
- Clark v. Community for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288 (1984) (burden is on speaker to show First Amendment protection for conduct)
- United States v. Hoffecker, 530 F.3d 137 (3d Cir. 2008) (no abuse of discretion to deny jury instruction lacking evidentiary support)
- Paff v. Kaltenbach, 204 F.3d 425 (3d Cir. 2000) (probable cause judged by totality of circumstances)
- Avaya Inc. v. Telecom Labs, Inc., 838 F.3d 354 (3d Cir. 2016) (standard for Rule 50 motion)
- Lightning Lube, Inc. v. Witco Corp., 4 F.3d 1153 (3d Cir. 1993) (New Jersey standard for punitive damages requires wanton recklessness or malice)
- United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968) (limits on labeling conduct as protected speech)
- Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397 (1989) (conduct constitutes protected speech only if particularized message likely understood)
- Gilles v. Davis, 427 F.3d 197 (3d Cir. 2005) (disorderly conduct statutes cannot criminalize protected speech; fighting-words doctrine explained)
