138 F. Supp. 3d 1360
S.D. Fla.2015Background
- Wen Liu, an assistant professor at University of Miami School of Medicine (hired 2007), underwent mandatory midpoint/special reviews and in 2011 was advised she had not made adequate progress toward tenure.
- Liu changed from the tenure track to a research track in March 2011; in July 2011 the faculty voted against reappointment and in October 2011 she received written notice her appointment would terminate effective October 12, 2012 (12-month notice).
- Liu later requested FMLA leave (submitted proper medical documentation in Sept. 2012) and was granted leave that extended her employment/benefits through April 9, 2013; her employment ended April 9, 2013.
- Liu filed an EEOC charge on March 21, 2013 alleging discrimination based on sex, race (Asian) and national origin (Chinese) but did not check retaliation and listed October 7, 2011 as the latest discriminatory act.
- University moved for summary judgment arguing (inter alia) failure to timely exhaust administrative remedies for Title VII/FCRA claims, absence of a comparator or convincing mosaic for Section 1981, and that any FMLA claims are time-barred (or lack causation).
- Magistrate Judge Hunt recommended, and Judge Zloch adopted, granting summary judgment for the University on all counts (Counts I–V).
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Timeliness / exhaustion of EEOC charge for Title VII/FCRA claims | Use March 7, 2013 letter (extension of leave) as new adverse-action date so EEOC charge (Mar 21, 2013) is timely | Adverse action occurred when University communicated final decision on Oct 7, 2011; EEOC/FCHR deadlines run from that notice; Liu filed late | Held: EEOC charge untimely; claims based on discrimination (Counts I & III) are procedurally barred |
| Failure to exhaust retaliation claim administratively | Retaliation was discussed with the EEOC officer and should be considered included or reasonably expected to grow from the charge | Charge did not check retaliation nor include factual allegations of retaliation; plaintiff signed the form and could have added facts | Held: Retaliation claim (Count IV) not exhausted and is procedurally barred |
| Section 1981 discrimination (no direct evidence) — comparator/convincing mosaic | Argues convincing mosaic of circumstantial evidence (e.g., differing expectations, unattainable goals, grant success) | Cannot identify a specific comparator; department uniformly applied publication requirement; employer has legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason (poor performance) | Held: Summary judgment for defendant on Section 1981 (Count II) — plaintiff failed to show comparator or sufficient convincing mosaic / pretext |
| FMLA interference/retaliation and statute of limitations | Asserts interference (denial of leave in 2011) and termination while on FMLA in 2013; alleges willfulness to invoke 3-year statute | Termination decision communicated Oct 7, 2011 predated any FMLA request; March 21, 2011 letter did not constitute an FMLA notice; no willfulness shown — two-year limitations applies | Held: FMLA claims (Count V) dismissed — time-barred or lacking causation; no willful violation shown |
Key Cases Cited
- Del. State Coll. v. Ricks, 449 U.S. 250 (1980) (limitations period begins when termination decision is communicated, not last day of employment)
- Smith v. Lockheed-Martin Corp., 644 F.3d 1321 (11th Cir. 2011) (describing the "convincing mosaic" theory for circumstantial evidence)
- McLaughlin v. Richland Shoe Co., 486 U.S. 128 (1988) (willful standard and tolling principles in labor statutes)
- Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242 (1986) (summary judgment standard and reasonable inferences for nonmovant)
- McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973) (burden-shifting framework for circumstantial discrimination claims)
- Jiminez v. Mary Wash. Coll., 57 F.3d 369 (4th Cir. 1995) (deference to academic personnel decisions)
- Stewart v. Happy Herman's Cheshire Bridge, Inc., 117 F.3d 1278 (11th Cir. 1997) (summary judgment evidentiary standards)
