Lisdahl v. Mayo Foundation, 633 F.3d 712

Lisdahl, a Gold Cross paramedic and US Marine veteran, returned from Iraq in 2006 with knee surgeries and PTSD history; he was placed initially in a nonstatus then status position after return from extended leave.
Gold Cross allowed a year for Lisdahl to recertify National Registry; he terminated before the year ended and did not recertify.
Lisdahl alleges supervisor Johnson subjected him to military-related mockery and dismissive treatment, creating a hostile work environment and intolerable conditions motivating his resignation.
Upon return, Lisdahl did not raise formal complaints about Johnson’s conduct; he resigned in June 2008 after medical leave and did not rejoin Gold Cross.
Amendola and Swor, Gold Cross paramedics, asserted USERRA retaliation claims for supporting Lisdahl; they later sued Gold Cross and Johnson.
The district court ruled in favor of defendants on Lisdahl’s USERRA claims and granted summary judgment for Amendola and Swor on retaliation claims.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Constructive discharge under USERRA requires what showing	Lisdahl contends Suders imposes no intent requirement for USERRA constructive discharge.	Defendants argue USERRA constructive discharge requires objective intolerability and veteran-status motivation, with intent not necessarily required as a separate element.	No constructive discharge established; inadequate objective intolerability or veteran-motivated actions.
Whether Lisdahl proved veteran status was a motivating factor in an adverse action	Lisdahl alleges Johnson’s conduct and Gold Cross policies were motivated by his veteran status.	Defendants contend the record shows at most personality conflict and no anti-veteran animus underlying actions.	Insufficient evidence of veteran-status motivation; district court's finding affirmed.
Whether Amendola and Swor's retaliation claims were barred by a material adversity standard	Amendola and Swor argue USERRA retaliation does not require the same materiality standard as Title VII.	Court should apply material adversity standard to USERRA retaliation claims.	USERRA retaliation requires material adversity; actions here were not materially adverse; summary judgment affirmed.

Knowles v. Citicorp Mortgage, Inc., 142 F.3d 1082 (8th Cir.1998) (burden on plaintiff to show veteran-status motivation and intolerable conditions)
Maxfield v. Cintas Corp., 563 F.3d 691, 563 F.3d 691 (8th Cir.2009) (standard for USERRA retaliation and motivation burden)
Maxfield v. Cintas Corp., 427 F.3d 544, 427 F.3d 544 (8th Cir.2005) (early framing of USERRA standards as applied to motive)
Clegg v. Ark. Dep't of Correction, 496 F.3d 922 (8th Cir.2007) (broad construction of USERRA; adverse action required)
Crews v. City of Mt. Vernon, 567 F.3d 860 (7th Cir.2009) (materiality requirement in USERRA retaliation)
And a v. Wickes Furniture Co., 517 F.3d 526 (8th Cir.2008) (employee duty to act reasonably before resigning)
Sutherland v. Mo. Dept of Corrections, 580 F.3d 748 (8th Cir.2009) (petty slights not actionable; intolerability standard applied)
Bradford v. Norfolk Southern Corp., 54 F.3d 1412 (8th Cir.1995) (objective standard for intolerable working conditions)
Burlington Northern & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. White, 548 U.S. 53 (U.S. 2006) (materially adverse standard for retaliation actions)
Pa. State Police v. Suders, 542 U.S. 129 (U.S. 2004) (constructive discharge framework in hostile-work-environment context)