Lionel Alexander v. City of Round Rock
2017 U.S. App. LEXIS 6692
| 5th Cir. | 2017Background
- Around 9:15 p.m. in a hotel parking lot, Officer Garza saw Lionel Alexander looking in the grass for a cat, then get into his car and begin to drive; Garza activated lights and stopped him.
- Alexander declined to answer questions and refused an order to exit; Garza radioed for backup and, after other officers arrived, they forcibly removed Alexander from the car, pinned him face-down, kneeled/booted his neck/back, handcuffed and shackled him, and searched him and the vehicle (nothing illegal found).
- Garza’s police report listed the arrest as resisting a search (Texas Penal Code § 38.03(a)); Alexander was held ~20 hours and no criminal charges were filed.
- Alexander sued under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alleging unlawful detention (Fourth Amendment), false arrest (no probable cause), First and Fifth Amendment retaliation, and excessive force; district court dismissed all claims on qualified immunity grounds.
- On appeal the Fifth Circuit (per Judge Clement) evaluated the complaint de novo, accepting all well-pleaded allegations as true and reversed dismissal of the unlawful detention, false arrest, and excessive force claims, but affirmed dismissal of retaliation claims; case remanded.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Unlawful detention (reasonable suspicion) | Garza lacked reasonable suspicion to stop/detain Alexander for investigation | Stop was justified because Alexander appeared to be acting suspiciously and ‘‘fleeing’’ upon seeing police | Reversed dismissal — complaint plausibly alleges no reasonable suspicion; claim survives motion to dismiss |
| False arrest (probable cause for resisting search) | No probable cause: § 38.03(a) requires use of force and Alexander was passive | Officers reasonably believed Alexander obstructed/search/resist and thus had probable cause | Reversed dismissal — on alleged facts no use of force occurred, so arrest lacked probable cause and qualified immunity unavailable at this stage |
| First/Fifth Amendment retaliation | Arrest and force were motivated by Alexander’s silence and his use of an expletive | Actions were lawful or motivated by non-retaliatory reasons; qualified immunity applies | Affirmed dismissal — Fifth Amendment inapplicable (no custodial interrogation/trial); First Amendment retaliation not clearly established re: right to remain silent during a Terry stop, so qualified immunity protects officers |
| Excessive force | Officers used objectively unreasonable force (face mashed into concrete, knee/boot to neck/back) causing injuries | Force was reasonable to effect removal/arrest; alleged injuries are de minimis | Reversed dismissal — alleged force was objectively unreasonable given Alexander’s passivity; injury allegations sufficient to survive 12(b)(6) |
Key Cases Cited
- Wardlow v. Illinois, 528 U.S. 119 (U.S. 2000) (nervous, evasive behavior can inform reasonable suspicion but merely continuing one’s business does not)
- Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (U.S. 1968) (officers may briefly detain based on reasonable, articulable suspicion)
- Hill v. City of El Paso, 752 F.3d 1029 (5th Cir. 2014) (flight alone is not a bright-line trigger for reasonable suspicion; totality of circumstances required)
- United States v. Martinez, 486 F.3d 855 (5th Cir. 2007) (informant tips can contribute to reasonable suspicion)
- United States v. Rideau, 969 F.2d 1572 (5th Cir. 1992) (suspect’s presence in a high-crime area is a relevant factor)
- Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730 (U.S. 2002) (officials can be on notice that conduct violates clearly established law even in novel factual circumstances)
- Devenpeck v. Alford, 543 U.S. 146 (U.S. 2004) (officer entitled to qualified immunity if probable cause existed for any offense, not only the charged offense)
- Club Retro, L.L.C. v. Hilton, 568 F.3d 181 (5th Cir. 2009) (discussing qualified immunity where officers reasonably—but mistakenly—conclude probable cause exists)
- Ikerd v. Blair, 101 F.3d 430 (5th Cir. 1996) (degree of injury required for excessive force claim relates to whether force was objectively reasonable)
- Brown v. Lynch, [citation="524 F. App'x 69"] (5th Cir. 2013) (even relatively minor physical or psychological injuries can be cognizable when resulting from objectively unreasonable force)