31 Cal. App. 5th 628
Cal. Ct. App. 5th2019Background
- Plaintiff Janet Linton sued after she fell from her wheelchair in a county paratransit van, alleging violations of the Disabled Persons Act (DPA) and Unruh Act and seeking damages and statutory attorney fees (no injunctive relief).
- After years of litigation and settlement negotiations, Linton served a Code of Civil Procedure § 998 offer for judgment of $250,001 “plus costs under Code of Civil Procedure section 1032 and attorney’s fees allowed by law as determined by the court.”
- Defendants accepted the § 998 offer and the court entered judgment pursuant to the acceptance.
- Linton moved for attorney fees; defendants opposed, arguing the DPA and Unruh Act require a judicial finding of liability before fees may be awarded and the § 998 offer did not contain such a finding.
- The trial court denied fees, concluding the § 998 language did not satisfy the statutes’ requirement of a finding of liability and compromise settlements bar reopening the controversy; Linton appealed.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether acceptance of a § 998 offer that designates plaintiff as "prevailing party" or states fees are "allowed by law" creates a statutory right to attorney fees under CCP §§ 1032/1033.5 | Linton: acceptance + prevailing-party status under §1032 (incorporated by §998) entitles her to recover attorney fees. | Defendants: DPA and Unruh Act require an independent judicial finding that defendants denied statutory rights before fees are authorized; the §998 offer did not make such a finding. | Held: No. Prevailing-party status alone does not create entitlement to attorney fees; statutes (DPA, Unruh) require a finding of liability, so fees were not "allowed by law." |
| Whether the § 998 form language or extrinsic evidence created a contractual right to fees regardless of statutory prerequisites | Linton: the phrase "attorney's fees allowed by law" (and extrinsic settlement communications) should be interpreted to permit fees as court-determined amounts. | Defendants: the form language is not ambiguous in that sense; objective understanding did not encompass an unconditional fee award; any ambiguity is construed against Linton. | Held: No. The phrase did not reasonably or objectively convey that fees would be recoverable absent a statutory finding of liability; extrinsic evidence did not show defendants reasonably understood fees were included, so fee claim fails. |
Key Cases Cited
- Doran v. North State Grocery, Inc., 137 Cal.App.4th 484 (discusses Unruh Act fee provision requiring proof of denial of rights before fees allowed)
- Wohlgemuth v. Caterpillar, Inc., 207 Cal.App.4th 1252 (§998 silence on fees does not imply exclusion when statute or contract authorizes fees)
- One Star, Inc. v. STAAR Surgical Co., 179 Cal.App.4th 1082 (purpose of §998 is to encourage settlement; treat §998 as contractual)
- DeSaulles v. Community Hospital of Monterey Peninsula, 62 Cal.4th 1140 (settlement silence on costs does not bar later motion for costs)
- Timed Out LLC v. 13359 Corp., 21 Cal.App.5th 933 (apply contract principles to §998 offers but preserve bright-line rules to serve settlement policy)