Linnon v. Clarke, 1:16-cv-00869

Background

Craig Michael Linnon, a Virginia inmate, was convicted by a jury (sentenced to 11 years) of conspiracy to take indecent liberties with a minor (Va. Code §§ 18.2-26, 18.2-370.1), using a communications system to propose a sex act to a minor (Va. Code § 18.2-374.3), and four counts of taking indecent liberties with a minor in a custodial/supervisory role (Va. Code § 18.2-370.1).
Facts included sexual acts with a 16-year-old student (A.G.) and a separate incident involving another student (T.D.) who was videotaped receiving oral sex from Linnon’s wife after Linnon solicited it by text.
On direct appeal and in state habeas proceedings Linnon argued (inter alia) that some convictions were predicated on Virginia’s anti‑sodomy statute (Va. Code § 18.2‑361), which the Fourth Circuit declared facially invalid in MacDonald; he also asserted ineffective assistance of counsel and nondisclosure/Giglio/Napue claims.
The state habeas court denied most claims on the merits and dismissed the Giglio claim as procedurally defaulted under Slayton; the Virginia Supreme Court denied review. The federal district court treated the state habeas ruling as the last reasoned decision and reviewed Linnon’s § 2254 petition.
The district court dismissed the Giglio claim as procedurally defaulted (no cause shown), and denied federal habeas relief on the exhausted claims (statutory‑jurisdiction and ineffective assistance) as not contrary to or an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law.

Issues

Issue	Linnon’s Argument	Clarke’s Argument	Held
1) Subject‑matter jurisdiction / facial invalidity of convictions	Linnon: convictions void because they rely on anti‑sodomy statute (MacDonald) that is facially unconstitutional	Clarke: convictions were under statutes limited to conduct with minors (§§ 18.2‑370.1, 18.2‑374.3), not the anti‑sodomy statute as applied to consenting adults	Held: District court: convictions distinguishable from MacDonald; statutes here target adults’ conduct with minors and are constitutional; Claim One denied
2) Ineffective assistance — voir dire / juror bias	Linnon: venire presumed any adult‑minor sexual contact illegal; counsel failed to correct bias => deficient performance and prejudice	Clarke: prosecutor did not misstate law; objections would have been frivolous; jurors affirmed ability to be impartial	Held: State court reasonably found no deficient performance or prejudice; Claim Two(a) denied
3) Ineffective assistance — jury instructions	Linnon: counsel failed to object independently to contested instructions and failed to state bases, preserving error	Clarke: counsel reasonably relied on co‑defendant’s objections; instructions did not misstate law; objections would have been futile	Held: State court’s application of Strickland reasonable; Claim Two(b) denied
4) Ineffective assistance — investigation / witnesses	Linnon: counsel failed to investigate or call exculpatory witnesses who would have impeached victim	Clarke: counsel made strategic decisions after consulting Linnon; petitioner offered no affidavits showing what witnesses would have said	Held: State court reasonably credited counsel’s strategic choice and found no Strickland violation; Claim Two(c) denied
5) Prosecutorial nondisclosure (Giglio/Napue) — procedural default	Linnon: prosecution concealed a plea deal with key witness (Scott); not notified; thus cause to excuse default	Clarke: state court found claim defaulted under Slayton; record shows Scott’s deal was after trial so no false testimony; no cause shown	Held: Claim Three procedurally defaulted; petitioner failed to show cause, prejudice, or miscarriage of justice

Key Cases Cited

MacDonald v. Moose, 710 F.3d 154 (4th Cir. 2013) (Fourth Circuit held Virginia’s anti‑sodomy statute facially unconstitutional as written)
Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003) (constitutional protection for private consensual adult sexual intimacy)
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984) (two‑prong test for ineffective assistance of counsel)
Ylst v. Nunnemaker, 501 U.S. 797 (1991) (imputation of the last reasoned state court decision)
Cullen v. Pinholster, 563 U.S. 170 (2011) (federal § 2254(d)(1) review is limited to the state‑court record)
Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86 (2011) (highly deferential standard for § 2254(d) relief)
Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362 (2000) (standards for “contrary to” and “unreasonable application” under § 2254)
Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510 (2003) (counsel’s duty to investigate; deference to reasonable strategic choices)
Mu’Min v. Pruett, 125 F.3d 192 (4th Cir. 1997) (Slayton procedural default rule is an adequate and independent state ground)