Lindsey v. State, 176 A.3d 741

Background

Lindsey was convicted by a Montgomery County jury of second-degree assault and two counts of human trafficking (force modality and placing/harboring for prostitution); sentence included a 20-year term and concurrent ten-year terms.
Facts at trial: hotel housekeeper recorded sounds of a struggle and the victim screaming; hotel staff encountered a distressed, bruised woman who said she had been hurt and someone tried to make her have sex with someone.
Police photos of the hotel room showed condoms, wrappers, a list of phone numbers, and other indicia of commercial sex; Backpage escort ads for the victim used a phone number tied to the hotel check-in and an email account Lindsey admitted owning.
Lindsey admitted bringing the victim to the hotel “for his reason,” acknowledged knowledge she prostituted there, and admitted striking her; he claimed a non-trafficking motive (to be near a hospital and to avoid police due to warrants) and maintained the victim prostituted by choice.
Procedural issues at trial included (1) a jury question about timing of the alleged offense, (2) exclusion of defendant-offered recorded jail calls under the verbal completeness doctrine, (3) exclusion of evidence that the victim was arrested for prostitution after the charged date, and (4) challenges to the form and content of human trafficking jury instructions.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument (State)	Defendant's Argument (Lindsey)	Held
Sufficiency of evidence for human trafficking (placing/harboring)	Evidence (recording of struggle, victim’s distress, hotel evidence of prostitution, Backpage ads linked to defendant’s email) permitted reasonable inference Lindsey placed/harbored victim for prostitution.	Evidence showed victim acted voluntarily and for reasons unrelated to prostitution; Lindsey did not force or profit from her prostitution.	Affirmed. Viewing evidence in prosecution’s favor, a rational jury could find Lindsey knowingly placed/harbored victim for prostitution.
Court response to jury note about timing (“on or about March 3, 2016”)	Response mirrored indictment language and fairly covered the charged timeframe (hotel stay Feb 29–Mar 3).	Court should have limited response to a specific date (March 3) to avoid inviting conviction for an uncharged time.	No abuse of discretion. The phrasing tracked the indictment and matched the evidence timeframe.
Admission of additional jail call excerpts under doctrine of verbal completeness	State: excluded excerpts were not continuations that explained the admitted calls; they were later, self-serving hearsay and thus inadmissible.	Defendant: later calls were part of ongoing communications and necessary to provide context and show inconsistent statements/impeachment of victim.	No abuse of discretion. Calls were separate, later, self-serving statements and not admissible under Rule 5-106; exclusion was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.
Admission of evidence of victim’s subsequent prostitution arrest	State: subsequent arrest was not relevant to whether defendant forced prostitution on the charged date; would be impermissible character attack.	Defendant: post-charge arrest shows victim prostituted independently and supports defense theory she was not forced.	Exclusion proper. Subsequent conduct months later was not relevant to whether defendant forced or placed victim on the charged date; exclusion was harmless.
Jury instructions on human trafficking elements and definitions	State: court’s instructions tracked statutory language and, read as a whole with the reasonable-doubt instruction, adequately conveyed that each element must be proven beyond a reasonable doubt.	Defendant: requested clearer element-by-element instructions and definitions (place, harbor, prostitution, knowingly); argued failure risked misunderstanding and prejudice.	No abuse of discretion. Instructions correctly stated the law, were applicable, and fairly covered requested points; any error was harmless.

Key Cases Cited

Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307 (1979) (standard for appellate review of sufficiency of the evidence)
Grimm v. State, 447 Md. 482 (2016) (application of Jackson standard in Maryland)
Conyers v. State, 345 Md. 525 (1997) (limits of verbal completeness; cannot bootstrap inadmissible hearsay)
Carroll v. State, 428 Md. 679 (2012) (reasonable-doubt instruction need not explicitly state it applies to each element when instructions read together)
Mayers v. State, 417 Md. 449 (2010) (deference to jury on credibility and reasonable inferences)
Morgan v. State, 134 Md. App. 113 (2000) (appellate role: test for legal sufficiency, not weighing evidence)
Rutherford v. State, 160 Md. App. 311 (2004) (doctrine of verbal completeness explained)
Williams v. State, 302 Md. 787 (1985) (indictment must inform defendant of specific conduct charged)