*3 MURPHY, Chief Judge. question
The presented is whether Circuit Court for Baltimore City was jurisdiction without to try appellant for with robbery deadly weapon where the charging doc- ument failed expressly to allege an intent by the accused permanently deprive the owner of her property.
I. as criminal information appellant by The was follows: duly authorized City,
“The for Baltimore Attorney State’s law, said on official oath informs the his Defendant(s), late of hereto- City, said above named above, forth at on or date offense set fore about the Baltimore, above, in the City the location forth set dangerous and unlawfully State of Maryland, of the aforesaid deadly Complainant did rob weapon A, herein reference Exhibit property, incorporated case Assembly, form of the Act of such contrary against government the peace, made and provided, dignity of the State.” charg- of the elaborating upon allegations Factual data caption in the title ing document contained was accused, information; specified the date and it identified the offense, of the victim and the name location ($20 money). current stolen property nature during to the made no trial appellant objection contained the criminal or form of the sufficiency deadly robbery conviction of with a Upon information. his He Special Appeals. he to the Court of appealed weapon, an offense information failed to state contended that jurisdiction defective for lack of fatally and hence was allege every it did not essential the circuit court because i.e., it an charged, failed assert element of the crime *4 to deprive the victim appellant’s part permanently intent on to certiorari decision granted prior We property. of her the significant court to consider appellate the intermediate case. issue raised
II. to document is of a purpose A primary 21 Article requirement contained constitutional fulfill the Rights person that each Declaration of Maryland of the informed of accusation must be a crime charged
791
against
Morton,
487, 490,
v.
him.1 State
295 Md.
456 A.2d
(1983);
596,
State,
591,
909
231
Jackson v.
Md.
It is a fundamental that court is power without impose render verdict or a sentence a charging under which does not an offense within its jurisdiction prescribed by common or by law statute. State Canova, supra, 988; Md. Putnam v. provides prosecutions, every Article 21 in all criminal “[t]hat man him; right against hath to be informed of the accusation to have a Indictment, copy (if charge, required) prepare in due time for his defence." The implemented constitutional mandate has been 4-202(a) by Maryland d) (formerly requires Rule Rule which document “contain a concise and definite statement of the and, essential facts offense with which the defendant particularity, place with reasonable the time and the offense oc- curred.”
792
1,
(1964);
537, 540-41 n.
Under document “defect” alleging motion its in the court or jurisdiction its failure to show “other than desig must be filed within a an offense” charge failure or defect to trial is waived.2 period prior nated time (c) “asserting motion that a provides rule subsection in the jurisdiction document show failure may be raised and determined or to an offense court fails to A claim that a time.” any may is jurisdictional an offense charge or characterize here, time Put raised, appeal. for the first on See be Rule Where Baker, supra; Maryland 885. nam, supra; it must season is not jurisdictional, the claimed defect before the trial court it is waived. raised ably III. law offense Maryland is a common
Robbery
courts of the State.
jurisdiction
is
of the circuit
within
taking
carrying
as the felonious
The crime
defined
of another from his
personal
person
property
away
Stebbing
in fear. See
by putting
use of
by the
violence
(1984);
v.
351,
The information in charged this case appellant that unlawfully, dangerous with did deadly weapon, and “rob” victim, time, the named at a specified and at a place within State of this We think that these $20. averments sufficient charged and characterized crime ly the of robbery armed the thereby and invested circuit court jurisdiction with to the In try offense. common parlance, the word “rob” (a means “to from something person) take away by force: from to [;] personal (the steal ... take from property another) person presence feloniously violence threat of violence.” Third Webster’s New International Dictionary (1976). The averment that the defendant “did rob” the plainly implies victim that the crime was committed with intent permanently deprive to the owner of her property.
As the criminal sufficiently information characterized the crime of robbery, armed it was not for lack defective circuit jurisdiction Although the court. customary method of identifying particular has been aver its document, to essential elements in the charging that is not method, the exclusive the use of other words that sufficiently characterize the crime will satisfy State, supra, See Putnam v. jurisdictional requirement. 544-45, Md. 59. This not mean does the charging attack, that document immune will be from may be failing otherwise deficient in to inform fully accused the specific charged, conduct which he a timely pursuant 4-252(a) event motion to Rule may be filed.3 State nor
Neither Ayre v. Canova v. supra, both upon places reliance, which appellant requires that we find places None actually which cases the dissent reliance (albeit indicate) may jurisdic- hold some that to invest the court with charge, every over a tion criminal element of crime must essential alleged charging be in the document. to jurisdictionally in this case each an offense. those failing
defective statutory characterizing essential cases averments doc- from the omitted completely crime were motions dismiss there concluded uments. We granted. been should have prior trial indictments filed case, need we present filed As no motion was such defective document was not consider whether ground. a non-jurisdictional on AFFIRMED, WITH JUDGMENT COSTS.
COLE, dissenting. Judge, *7 in this have the State people For to two centuries close would not be knowledge they that secure in the been did document that to on a criminal subjected trial of the crime elements forth the essential fully not set to its support no analysis reasoned charged. Today, away fiat that decision, by wipes majority judicial the therefore, I, official conduct. unlawful against protection dissent. must, our deci- prior
The that majority recognizes, 21 the Maryland sions have made clear that Article of to right each citizen the Rights guarantees Declaration of to many the him. Of the against informed of accusation of two requirement, this constitutional purposes served of to the defendant on notice important put the most are characterizing and defend what he is called to from crime, protect and to the defendant describing the charge. for the same prosecution future our cases have acknowledges further is the court no offense cognizable held that where of convic judgment render a deprived of jurisdiction the of and that punishment, tion or to sentence impose any the conviction and sentence attack may defendant time, appeal. Strangely, for the first time on including concessions, ignores the majority these making after
795 of plethora Maryland consistently cases that have required all State include the “essential” or “material” ele ments document so as guard wrongful prosecution. See, v. against e.g., Robinson State, 193, 202, 328, (1983) 298 Md. 468 A.2d (“Mary 333 requires land law document to include all essential elements State v. Mor charged.”); offense ton, 487, 492, 909, (1983) 295 Md. 456 A.2d 912 (charging document must “include all the essential elements State, crime.”) (quoting Ayre v. 155, 164, 291 Md. A.2d 433 1150, id. (1981)); 1156 (“[necessary] all include the essen tial elements of the crime a charging document.]”); [in Williamson, State 100, 108, v. 282 588, Md. 592 382 A.2d (1978) (“[I]ndictment allege shall fully the essential ele ments of the offense charged.”) (quoting State v. Wheat ley, 44, 50, 644, Md. v. (1949)); 192 63 A.2d State 647 Canova, 483, 498, 278 988, (1976) Md. A.2d (“ ‘[I]t always held, has been it is an requisite essential every indictment that it should allege all matters material to constitute particular ”) crime charged[.]’ (quoting State, Kearney (1877)); 48 Md. 23-24 Cropper v. 384, 390, (1964)(indictment 197 A.2d valid as to substance because “it alleged necessary essential elements of the offense charged[.]”); Pearlman 251, 258, Md. (1963) (statutory *8 short-form indictment must contain “the essential elements denied, of the crime it purports to charge[.]”), cert. 376 U.S. 943, 797, 84 11 State, Lank v. (1964); S.Ct. L.Ed.2d 767 219 433, 436, Md. 367, 149 A.2d (1959) 368 (“[M]odern courts disregard technical extremely rules and an require only that indictment shall allege fully the essential elements the of State, Shelton v. charged.”); offense 405, 409, 198 Md. 84 76, (1951) A.2d 78 (“[I]t has become the of modern policy the courts to disregard extremely technical rules re quire only that an indictment shall the fully allege essential of elements the crime charged.”); State v. su Wheatley, pra, 50, 192 Md. at 63 (“[T]he A.2d at 647 modern of policy the courts require ... that only an indictment shall [is]
796 charged.”); of the offense the elements
allege fully
essential
872,
(1928)
875
State, 156 Md.
149, 156, 143 A.
v.
Neusbaum
”
“
or
elements’
formula
indictments
(the
essential
'all
Edwards, 124
v.
Maryland); State
applies
informations
1037,
(1915)
settled
595,
(“[I]t
A.
1038
a well
592,
92
Md.
all
allege
the
of
...
pleading
rule
criminal
[that
indictment]
charged against
to constitute the offense
matters material
State,
v.
I When the charges completed State a defendant with a law, crime in accordance with the common the State must include the the document essential or material elements of crime. the This has been in Mary- settled law land since at State, supra. See Deckard v. least judice sub information in the case pertinent part: states The State’s Attorney duly Baltimore authoriz- City, law, ed his by on official oath informs the said that the Defendant(s), above named late of City, said hereto- fore above, on or about date of offense set forth above, location forth Baltimore, set the City of State of Maryland, unlawfully with dangerous deadly did weapon Complainant rob the of the aforesaid property, incorporated by A, herein reference as Exhibit form contrary to the Act of in such Assembly, case made and provided, against peace, government (Art. 27, 489). dignity State. Sec. 488 & This count fails the crime robbery armed under the common law because it omits entirely necessary larcenous intent furandi) an {animus constitutes es- sential or material element of that crime. More to the point, the does count not aver did defendant steal from the victim with the deprive intent permanently property. owner her this Despite shortcoming, fatal 1. An is a information filed in a court State’s Attorney, while an indictment is a document returned grand jury and in a filed circuit court. *10 798 crime of armed that the common law suggests
majority taking carrying felonious and is “defined as the robbery from person of another his personal property away in v. putting of or fear.” the use violence Williams 792, (1985) 787, 1277, (citing A.2d State, Md. 490 1280 302 351, 912-13, 331, 903, A.2d State, 299 Md. 473 v. Stebbing — 212 U.S.-, 276, 83 L.Ed.2d denied, 105 S.Ct. cert. 378, 602, 606, 298 Gover, Md. A.2d (1984); State v. State, 341, 354, 209 A.2d v. 238 Md. (1973); 380-81 Hadder definition, from directly which is taken (1965)). This Court, correctly approved by instruction Hadder jury had the goes. far as it But the law—as states it that statement following to the sentence bothered read however, robbery], learned that would have “[t]he [of deprive is an to unless there intention is not committed or the property property his permanently the owner sup (emphasis his Id. possession.” in lawfully another at Stebbing supra, also plied); see that (a that indicates at 912-13 instruction jury perma the intent taking and removal with there must be a that property, of her and deprive to the owner nently robbery “correctly accompany precede must or violence Prescott, law.”). writing Judge Chief Maryland states the that Hadder, on to state for in went a unanimous Court intent an essen held that larcenous definitely have “[w]e to and have no desire robbery, tial ... we ingredient that simply This means position. recede from that taken, i.e., perma property must to steal the robber intend his (or possessor) owner the lawful deprive nently Md. supra, property.” Hadder for definition. 77. So much the Court’s A.2d at
II Attorney it State’s appearances all seems From defendant with attempted the instant case form statutory-short robbery armed accordance with in full: provides offense. This statute or warrant any robbery indictment with a dan- gerous weapon deadly attempt rob dangerous weapon, deadly shall be sufficient to use substantially following formula to the effect: “That 19_____ A-B on day of..... the County ...... (City) aforesaid with a feloniously dangerous dead- ly (or weapon did rob C-D did with a attempt danger- C-D, be) ous and to rob deadly weapon may case (or steal, did violently attempt steal as the case *11 may be) (here him ........ dollars list property from stolen); the form of contrary to the Act Assembly such provided cases made against peace, government and of the dignity State.” § (1957, Repl.Vol.), Md.Code (emphasis Art. 489 supplied). charge When the State elects to a defendant with a completed crime the statutory accordance with short-form authorized it Assembly, General must substantially comply legislatively-prescribed form. State, Brown supra, See v. at 410 A.2d Md.App. (citing Ward, (1978); State v. A.2d 1041 supra). Williamson
Here, the State failed to for satisfy requirement this two First, reasons. did not allege State that the defendant “violently did steal” certain from the victim. property omission what the General deemed to be an Assembly essential element of the is robbery armed not compliance substantial under any reasonable standard. Second, the State inserted the word “unlawfully” place of “feloniously.” These words are not synonomous. “Unlaw- fully” means “[ijllegally; Black’s Law wrongfully[,J” Dic- (5th 1979), tionary ed. while “feloniously” is defined “[o]f, to, as or pertaining having, quality of felony.” at 555. I simply Id. fail see how the term “unlawfully” puts defendant on notice that he being charged with a felony. From a defendant’s it is of standpoint, utmost that he know whether importance the crime is a or a felony. misdemeanor The reasons appear obvious A felony invariably greater me. carries punishment than a fine
misdemeanor, lengthier greater whether addition, forfeits conviction felon incarceration. differences, Based on these citizenship. various rights that the statu- appropriately required Assembly General “felo- contain the tory robbery armed word short-form t niously.” law or Therefore, measured the common against whether here short-form, plain it is that the information statutory robbery. failed armed
Ill conclusion, argu- concocts an majority To this avoid internal contradiction ment that is as remarkable its above, the First, as indicated it is for its contrived nature. taking “as the robbery defines majority felonious from his of another carrying away personal property in fear.” by putting the use of person violence on its Although this definition omits (Emphasis supplied.) robbery, element of see Hadder face the essential larcenous professes nonetheless supra, “feloni- adjective requisite supplied by mental element is *12 entrenched, the Second, non-sequitur firmly ous.” with this that “did rob” explain Court the averment proceeds intent that the crime was committed with plainly implies The deprive property. the owner of her permanently the “com- this conclusion because is able reach majority the “felo- carries it word parlance” mon “rob” lay tells us that a the niously.” Specifically, in terms the word to define dictionary happens “rob” us that Third, finally, the Court informs “feloniously.” partic- the identifying the method of “[although customary its essential elements has been aver ular method, document, that is not the exclusive in the the sufficiently other that characterize and the use of words These requirement.” the satisfy jurisdictional crime will cannot with- separately together, considered or arguments, scrutiny. stand supplies that “felonious” premise
The Court’s initial is robbery intent for armed without requisite larcenous and, contradicts the “com- important, majority’s merit more The common of “feloni- approach. parlance mon parlance” convey, requisite not alone suggest, ous” does not robbery. approach, for armed The Court’s mental element remembered, assumption that the it must rests on in a lay dictionary. of a word is set forth parlance common dictionaries define felonious assumption, lay view of this “of, to, being of a relating having quality felony: as or law[,]” Third New International against Webster’s “of, like, (1981), constituting a felo- Dictionary (2d 1981). ed. ny[.]” Dictionary New Webster’s World definitions, not surprising it is prosaic Given these rather mental ele- dictionary requisite that neither mentions defining ment in “felony.” definition of felonious a defend-
To arrive at the Court’s to the treatise cited option referring legal ant has the (2d 1969)) (R. Perkins, 279-80 ed. the Court Criminal Law legal dictionary Dictionary, supra). or a Law {Black’s “felonious” technical word law The latter defines “[a ] crime, i.e., criminal means done with intent to commit which In the context of (emphasis supplied). intent.” at 555 Id. case, term of art legal is manifest that felonious is a this it differs from its “common considerably whose definition rea- majority’s I fathom the parlance.” Although cannot if the made more understandable soning, perhaps is criminal defend- under the laboring misapprehension or Perkins’s Dictionary tote Law treatise ants Black’s hind as a matter of course. pockets their simple falls reason premise second Court’s bootstrapping initial is unsound. premise By its definition of rob- lay dictionary “felonious” onto the word weight. its own argument collapses under bery, Court’s *13 what “rob” majority, everybody to the knows According doubt, lay resort to a may If in the defendant means. I had not meaning. today, its Before to ascertain dictionary the defendant to resort require the law understood sources outside the charging document to ascertain its event, meaning. any is no answer to say defendant that the term knows “rob” means that the de- specific fendant had the intent to deprive a permanently person Indeed, property. his parlance” “common instance, For rob belies fact. it is not uncommon to hear those in steeped not terminology the criminal store, automobile, law to that a say person “robbed” a an a house, a purse, or some other inanimate object. Newspaper accounts make similar statements basis, on a as do daily television and radio newscasters. Any first stu- year law dent, however, readily recognizes the misuse of the term “rob” examples. above a Consequently, document should not rendered be sufficient merely because the State deems a crime understood generally particular that a is in lay word defined a dictionary. See Bussiere, 659, 662, State v. 118 N.H. 392 A.2d (1978).
The most alarming aspect of the majority’s pre- second mise is gives prosecutor that it license to omit essential elements other crimes because the “common parlance” of the named offense inferentially supplies missing ele- ments. The breadth of this premise gives pause. one For instance, an indictment a defendant with a specific crime, intent such as burglary, can omit the conceivably (intent essential mental element to commit a felony within dwelling) still pass but muster by simply mentioning the term “burglary.” Because “burglary” lay is defined I dictionary have confidence every that the would find that such a characteriz- sufficiently Moreover, conclusion, es crime. taken to logical its majority’s approach would sanction a murder conviction based an indictment omitting the essential element of I “malice.” therefore expressly reject the “im- majority’s plied element common parlance” approach.
The Court’s premise third According likewise flawed. to the majority, express an averment of every essential element of an in charging offense document is one of but *14 apparently several methods of charging criminal offense. The Court premise upon bases its the exclusive authority Putnam 537, (1964).
The information in
Putnam
charged
defendant with
attempt
an
housebreaking
commit a
of an outhouse.
It
did not charge
completed
crime of
The
housebreaking.
Putnam Court itself noted that an
attempt
information for
need not
set
be
out as
as would
fully
specifically
required
charging the actual commission of the crime.
Putnam v.
supra,
But even if I were to agree that Putnam bore some (and not), relevance this case I do the majority’s reliance upon Putnam is suspect yet another reason. The 2. The current edition of this treatise states that crime the "[t]he having attempted accused is alleged, to commit must be fully required but need not be set forth as as would be in an accusation for the commission of such crime.” 2 Wharton’sCriminal (C. 1975) (footnote omitted). Procedure § at 114 Torcia 12th ed.
Putnam para exclusive reliance a two placed Court graph turn-of-the-century civil case from the Supreme for the that a proposition Alabama does expressly every part, not have to aver constituent component, or element of the offense charged. Adams v. Coe, Adams (1898). 123 Ala. Court held 26 So. that it criminal com was sufficient under statute *15 of the offense plaint justice peace designate before a name. That referred to enactments legislative court in designed dispense precision with the fullness and the offense that in an indictment describing necessary was at In no Maryland, common law. because we have corre authorization, sponding statutory charging document must the common or the comply legislatively-pre law short-form, must contain statutory scribed both which fully the essential or material elements to characterize charged. offense makes much of the fact
Finally, Court in not file defendant this case did a motion dismiss simple trial. The and correct answer is that he did not have 4-252(a).4 to do so under Rule Because the Maryland upon buttressing opinion authority Interestingly, its in of Ad- became, remains, Coe, the sole Ameri- ams v. the Putnam Court jurisdiction presidency can to cite to Adams since the of Calvin Coolidge. light, majority's it is manifest that the Viewed this fragile opinion rests a most slender and reed. 4-252(a) (c) 4. Md.Rules state: court, (a) following Mandatory the circuit mat- Motions.—In conformity with this Rule and if ters shall be raised motion in not so raised are waived unless the orders otherwise:' court, shown, good cause (1) prosecution; A defect in the institution of the (2) other than its failure to A defect in the document offense; charge jurisdiction in the court or its failure to an show search, seizure, (3) interception unlawful of wire or oral An communication, identification; pretrial or admission, statement, confession; (4) (5) unlawfully An obtained joint separate trial of defendants or offenses. A motion (c) Other Motions.—Amotion to show [******] jurisdiction in the court or to asserting failure of an offense defect, allege jurisdictional failure to an offense is he time on- appeal. could raise the issue for the first Ayre also the defendant’s reliance on questions Canova, supra, supra. State Those cases indicated that the documents therein were fatally defective because each failed to include an essential element cases, charged. deciding of the crime those this Court did not address the jurisdictional question have to because case trial. the defendant each filed motions before There mind, however, if had is no doubt the issue been my Court, squarely necessarily before the it would have had to challenges conclude that the went to the heart of the very and Canova Ayre prosecution. differently, Stated both allege held that it was the essential elements necessary the minimum constitution- to meet crimes al requirements import under Article 21. The clear allege these decisions is that the failure to the essential jurisdictional. elements of a crime is
IV Why place responsibility does not for majority charging belongs—on defective documents where Attorney—is mystery State’s to me. The State’s Attor- is an ney presumed elected official who is to know the law assistants, paralegals, who is staffed countless clerks, and secretaries. It should therefore a fairly task him simple an accused properly by including all essential or material elements in the document. This Court should not reward the State’s Attor- ney charging practices that fail to the minimum satisfy constitutional standard set forth Article 21. view,
In my upon Kafkaesque has cast us encourage prosecutors slip- course that will to engage defense, may Any any be raised and determined at time. other objection, request capable of determination before trial without issue, general any trial of the time shall be raised motion filed at before trial. Indeed, the Court impunity. practices shod doc- for a permissible that it is effect states most, all, elements not of the essential contain but ument to analysis repugnant of This result-oriented an offense. to established yet another blow represents Article information in this Because the safeguards. constitutional offense, defective. fatally it is characterize case failed to I it at time. challenge any can the defendant Consequently, the Circuit Court. judgment would reverse 490 A.2d Gary Harrison HALL Maryland. STATE Term, Sept. 1984. No. Maryland. Appeals
April