Lindquist v. City of Pasadena Texas
2012 U.S. App. LEXIS 1356
5th Cir.2012Background
- Lindquists operated a used-car dealership at 2602 Preston Rd and sought licenses under Pasadena's used-car dealer ordinance with 1000' and 150' distance requirements and a grandfather clause.
- The city administrator process requires building official review, police investigation, and a de novo City Council appeal where the applicant bears the burden of proof for license entitlement.
- Lindquists pursued licenses for a 4646 Spencer Hwy site; officials denied it for violating the 1000' Rule, while a different Spencer Hwy site (4545) later faced a separate denial for the 1000' Rule but its neighboring Nielsens received a license after appealing.
- Nielsens obtained a license at 4545 Spencer Hwy after the council found the site met the grandfather clause and residents supported the plan, despite city staff maintaining the 60-day window and compliance concerns.
- Lindquists then applied for a license at 4646 Spencer Hwy and were denied; they appealed, while the Nielsens’ successful appeal and the Chambers decision later in 2006 shaped subsequent litigation.
- Lindquists sued in federal court alleging due process and equal protection violations based on unbridled discretion, with district court granting summary judgment for the City on the current remand.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Lindquists prove class-of-one equal protection claim. | Lindquists allege intentional disparate treatment with no rational basis. | City had rational bases distinct to compare with Chambers and Nielsens. | No genuine issue; rational basis exists. |
| Whether Lindquists and Nielsens/Chambers are similarly situated. | Chambers and Nielsens are comparable comparators for the Lindquists. | They are not similarly situated due to different ordinance provisions and evidentiary contexts. | Not similarly situated; no class-of-one basis. |
| Whether City Council decisions reflect unbridled discretion under Spann. | City acted with unbridled discretion, violating due process. | Discretionary decisions can be rational even if not perfectly explained in writing. | Waiver; unbridled-discretion claim barred on remand; law-of-the-case not controlling. |
Key Cases Cited
- Vill. of Willowbrook v. Olech, 528 U.S. 562 (2000) (class-of-one equal protection standard)
- Stern v. Tarrant Cnty. Hosp. Dist., 778 F.2d 1052 (5th Cir. 1985) (any rational decisionmaker could have classified; rational-basis review)
- Beeler v. Rounsavall, 328 F.3d 813 (5th Cir. 2003) (similarly situated analysis in code enforcement)
- Lindquist I, v. City of Pasadena, 525 F.3d 383 (5th Cir. 2008) (initial decision on facial validity; unbridled discretion discussion)
- City of St. Louis v. Praprotnik, 485 U.S. 112 (1988) (custom or practice evidence in municipal liability)
- Piotrowski v. City of Houston, 237 F.3d 567 (5th Cir. 2001) (policy, not just written regulation, may guide action)