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Paul A. Stern v. Tarrant County Hospital District v. George J. Luibel
778 F.2d 1052
5th Cir.
1985
Check Treatment

*1 1052

right any petition was violated. of Johnson’s for writ of corpus habeas event, light of the careful voir dire of AFFIRMED. Allen, Jr., Jimmy prosecutor, counsel, judge and trial

defense examined understand, recall ability

his and narrate shootings, impression

his would be

difficult conclude that trial court’s fundamentally

decision rendered the trial Allen, Jimmy

unfair. Whether Jr.’s testi internally

mony was so inconsistent as a credible,

matter of fact that it was not as argues,

Johnson further is not an issue may Maggio this consider. v. 2261, Fulford, 462 U.S. 103 S.Ct. al., STERN, Paul A. et (1983); see 794 United Plaintiffs-Appellees, Jersey, States ex rel. Petillo v. New v. (3d Cir.1977); Mapp F.2d v. Clem ent, F.Supp. (S.D.N.Y.), TARRANT COUNTY HOSPITAL aff'd Cir.1978), DISTRICT, opinion, (2d without 591 F.2d 1330 Defendant-Appellant, denied, rt. ce v. L.Ed.2d George LUIBEL, Defendant-Appellee. J. jury Johnson claims that in struction possi on alibi defense and the No. 83-1638. bility mistaken identification was “not Appeals, United States Court of assuming Even ].” sufficient[ Fifth Circuit. issue, raises a constitutional see Henderson Kibbe, Dec. (1977), L.Ed.2d there is no indication record that defense

objected given. charge to the as There

fore, Wainwright under doctrine of

Sykes, addressing we are barred from Furthermore,

merits issue. it may noted that trial court instructed the

jury that the circumstances of the “[i]f convincing beyond

identification are not you

reasonable doubt find the must defend guilty.”

ant not It is inconceivable that the charge jury,

refusal to further as de requested, you

fendant that “if ... have a

reasonable doubt whether the defendant present place at the time and offenses,

alleged you him must find

guilty,” fundamentally rendered the trial

unfair specific or violated a constitutional Indeed,

right. requested charge would nearly nothing charge

have added

given.

VI. above,

For the reasons set forth the Or- dismissing

der of the District Court *2 Curry, Atty., Tim Crim. Dist. judgment Frederick of the district court that we Worth, Schattman, Tex., M. Fort for Tar- now review. County Hosp. rant Dist. background, The factual as recited Williams, Westfall, Fowler, Bailey, Lee & panel, follows: *3 Keith, Tex., Dallas, Stern, for Kevin J. et Hospital operated John Peter Smith al. by County District, Hospital the Tarrant Law, Snakard, Gambill, & Brown Alan agency. a Texas state Before Worth, Tex.,

Wilson, George Fort for J. hospital permitted bylaws physician a Luibel. be a member of its staff only he was a County

member of Tarrant Medical Society, an association which admitted only allopaths. In this was changed require graduation with a CLARK, Judge, Before Chief and GOLD- (M.D.) degree of Doctor of Medicine from BERG, GEE, RUBIN, REAVLEY, POL- by school accredited the Council on ITZ, RANDALL, TATE, JOHNSON, WIL- Medical Education of the American Medi- GARWOOD, JOLLY, LIAMS, HIGGIN- cal Association. The Council accredits BOTHAM, DAVIS, JONES, HILL and Cir- only allopathic only schools allopath- and Judges. cuit degree; ic schools award the M.D. osteo- pathic degree schools award the Doctor HIGGINBOTHAM, E. PATRICK Circuit Osteopathy (D.O.). requirements Judge: hospital admission staff were today We reaffirm the settled again changed requirement in 1979. The agencies may constitutional rule that state deleted, degree of an M.D. was in- pursue legitimate by purposes any means stead, required staff members were to be having conceivable relationship rational by licensed the state and to have two purposes. passes those A decision that years post-doctoral training pro- in a constitutional muster under the rational-ba gram by accredited the Accreditation equal protec sis test does not violate the Committee Graduate Medical Edu- [on simply tion clause because it violates a Accreditation Committee is cation]. [The state anti-discrimination statute. affiliated with AMA and accredits programs aligned institutions I allopathic with medicine.] osteopaths privi- Five were denied staff leges by Hospital, John Smith Peter parties stipulated that the sole rea- operated by County the Tarrant plaintiffs privi- son the were staff denied District, Hospital agency, Texas leges they was because had trained in they because had in an osteopathic trained osteopathic-institution programs [rather allopathic pro- institution not in an programs by than in approved the Ac- gram. Their upon attack constitution- Committee]____ creditation ality by of this exclusion sustained In Texas state district court after a trial on the merits. enacted the Medical Practice Act and de- court, F.Supp. The district held prohibit clared its intention “to hospital unconstitutionally had de- [state- agency hospitals differentiating] from osteopathic physicians equal pro- nied the solely on the basis of the academic medi- thereby tection under the law and violated degree by” physician cal held a licensed judgment fourteenth This amendment. determining appoint- medical by panel was affirmed staff divided of our art. judges court. A ments. of the of this [Tex.Rev.Civ.Stat.Ann. A, 1.02(9) (Vernon banc, 4495b, Subchapter court voted to case consider the en § thereby vacating opinion. Supp.1984).] recognizes The Act that all panel It is prohibition osteopaths same to Texas’ their physicians are examined examination, board, use the initials “M.D.” pass same standards, “irrespective same meet the binding Being prece- in its view free of degree.” of academic medical [M] dent, the court concluded that district there Act, a to be licensed under the order county hospi- for the was no rational basis an graduated must have from physician osteopaths allopaths and differ- tal to treat school, approved medical but both light contrary particularly in ently, by the Accreditation schools accredited legislature, Texas ex- decision by the Committee and those accredited Medical pressed in Texas Practice Act. Osteopathic Association are American Accordingly, the court struck down the approved. rule as a hospital’s violation case, plaintiffs in this Dr. Paul protection clause. [The *4 osteopaths, four other each of Stern and -2- years at least two whom has had panel opinion adopted a different in post-doctoral training program ac- the rationale but reached same conclusion As- by Osteopathic credited the American court. as the district Rather than hold sociation, challenge county hospital’s the Hayman distinguish outdated or Berman grant privileges.]1 refusal to them staff Maceluch, panel and found “it unneces- sary to reach so far.” 755 F.2d at 433. II has, Arguing legislature that the Texas in Act, expressed the Texas Medical Practice -1- appreci- the determination that there are no hospital’s The district court held that allopathic differences and osteo- able denying privileges rule staff to those who degrees pathic medical and that the Act programs in osteopathic-institution trained hospitals deny to confer or forbids plaintiffs’ amend- violated the fourteenth privileges “solely on the of aca- staff basis protection right equal to of the laws. ment degree,” panel found an demic medical justification no for the The court found violation, equal protection implicitly con- requirement, os- hospital’s save to exclude cluding there no rational basis for is ex- teopaths staff. That hospital from the county hospital’s rule. irrational, the court con- clusion was itself view, panel’s In the cluded, significant were no because there hospital’s stems from the violation violation qualifications differences between law, disregard apparent its of state allopaths osteopaths. and osteopaths allo- requirement that and contrary de The district court noted the equally: paths be treated Hayman cision required the state itself has its Because Galveston, 414, 47 City allopathy osteopa- agencies to treat (1927), L.Ed. 714 but refused to be alike, necessary it is for us to thy not case, changes in given the bound might, if it whether the state consider requirements for osteo medical education so, a rational for chose do find basis fifty years had paths that ensued allopathic and os- distinguishing between The court Hayman was decided. since generally. The Tex- teopathic physicians language in our as dicta then characterized Medical Practice Act mandates Florida Medi own decision Berman v. must accord Texas institutions (5th Center, Inc., Cir. 600 F.2d cal professionals educated in treatment 1979), upheld rule that de a similar philosophy. either osteopaths. The privileges nied staff 755 F.2d at decision not mention our district court did concurring Judge (5th Clark’s Chief F.2d 1062 Wysong, in Maceluch suggest- analysis and per se challenge endorsed Cir.1982), rejected a in which we adopt unchallenged, we it here. panel factual recitation 1. 755 F.2d 432. This county ed an alternative rationale —that the legislature theless found because the Texas hospital’s rule is unconstitutional as a enjoined viola- has its hospitals to treat process allopaths tion of the due clause. osteopaths Chief alike. property Judge found a interest Clark for per approach se assumes that privileges osteopaths county in staff at the by choosing to forbid discrimination hospital because Texas has against osteopaths, the state of Texas has privileges staff commanded that such necessarily made contrary decision hospitals shall be denied on the basis of state-agency hospital its an irrational one. degree. academic medical He then found disagree. We The outer lim constitutional plaintiffs that depriving proper- of this imposed by the fourteenth amendment ty necessarily arbitrary interest was and upon power is that all the state’s acts thus a violation the fourteenth amend- be must rational. reasoning parallels per ment. His se terms, legislative legit purpose be analysis: regardless the rationality imate, challenge “may prevail long so Hay choice under state’s man Ber- question as the of rational relationship [to man, Texas has decided that there is no ” legislative purpose] ‘at least debatable.’ distinguish osteopaths reason to and allo- — Metropolitan Ward, Ins. Co. v. Life paths, can no and there rational basis U.S. -, agencies continue to do so. (1985)(quoting S. Western & Ins. Life *5 Equalization, Co. v. State Bd. 451 U.S. of Ill 674, 2070, 2086, 648, 101 S.Ct. 68 L.Ed.2d reject per equal protection We a se (1981), 514 and United v. States Carolene analysis. guarantees The of four Co., 154, 144, Products 58 S.Ct. amendment, requirement teenth its that (1938)). City 82 L.Ed. 1234 Cf. of applied state way laws in the same to Dukes, 297, New v. Orleans 303- those entitled to treatment and its 2513, 2516-17, 96 S.Ct. 511 promise arbitrary from or ir (1976). legislature When a a has choice of action, guarantees rational state that means, rationally legisla each related to its turn federal on constitutional standards of purpose, may constitutionally tive choose equality and rationality rather than on any of Its them. choice of one does not Converting alleged state standards. viola render the others irrational. It follows equal protec tions of state into law federal means, that acts violative of the chosen process tion and due improperly claims although by contrary definition to state bootstraps law into the Constitution. law, ipso contrary are facto so, doing In approach this novel would ex fourteenth amendment. The constitutional pand scope the fourteenth amend rationality legislative for a test classifi ment, would render meaning its less cer cation, whether the classes be distin tain, legitimate serve policy. and would no guished in the text of the or law in

administration, is de whether rational so cisionmaker could have classified. -1- per equal protection se construct purports not to overrule or otherwise con- -2- flict our per analysis with decisions Berman and is to se said find its Supreme sustenance, or part, Maceluch Court’s decision at least in in Yick v.Wo it would Hayman: permit Hopkins, the conces- U.S. 6 30 118 S.Ct. sion, irrelevant, (1886). but find it that a 220 755 at & n. rational L.Ed. See F.2d Wo,however, or agency might support dis- 8. Yick does not Wo, tinguish allopaths osteopaths between conclusion. In Yick a San Francisco violating required without the fourteenth amend- ordinance consent from the Board per approach, Supervisors operate ment. one could Under se viola- before equal protection laundry building tion of made of federal none- materials Department grounds, or The Board Monell Social than brick stone. other Servs., in wooden permits laundries U.S. 98 S.Ct. granted applicants save buildings all non-Chinese This statement sum- L.Ed.2d one, applicants. none of 200 Chinese marizes results the Court’s extensive 359, 6 S.Ct. 1066. The Court 118 U.S. at at background of the historical sec- review Wo's under the reversed Yick conviction tion 1983: federal courts are afford a that, ground although the ordinance on remedy only discriminatory for such en- neutral, ap- facially it had law was been as forcement of laws violates deny so citizens plied as Chinese independent guarantees of the fourteenth 362-63, at protection of the laws. Id. amendment. at 1067-68. proper application A of Yick Wo will not case, broadly principle of the support finding of an stated, facially neutral stat is that when a facts case. violation on the of this To the classes, administered so as to create ute is ad- extent has pass must constitutional mus those classes it has point, confirmed the view dressed The court struck it down because ter. law that under Yick Wo state does not “hostili basis for the classification was sole rationality equality guaran- define nationality ... which ty to ... race teed the fourteenth amendment. See eye justified____” law is not Hughes, 321 Snowden v. U.S. 64 S.Ct. at Its differs rule U.S. (1944). The 88 L.Ed. 497 selective premise per se from central cases, Boles, prosecution Oyler such as panel in case approach: the determined U.S. 7 L.Ed.2d 446 con- facially may neutral statute (1962), progeny, plain and its also make so to treat stitutionally be administered per analysis impoverished. se differently that the state has deter- classes an the Court addressed Snowden similarly The distinc- mined are situated. *6 protection by claim a for candidate significant. between the two rules tion legislature. Illinois candidate the neutral recognizes facially that Yick Wo primary in the received sufficient votes- opportunity for dis- present laws the ballot, placed on the but be nominated crimination, they can be adminis- because get on because the was unable to the ballot But discriminatory fashion. tered Canvassing Board intention- Primary State replace not Constitution Yick Wo does certify ally his election. refused deter- as the with state law benchmark for refusal did not sur- reasons the board’s permissible. mines classifications Court opinion, face in the but the assumed matter federal necessarily That task is by Illinois law that the Board had violated constitutional, state, Similarly, as not law. denying certification. said of 42 U.S.C. Court has 1983: § found a flaws with Court number abundantly that one reason protection

It is clear plaintiff’s equal argument. legislation passed was was to afford problem from same The claim suffered because, right in courts a federal federal although at there that in case bar: as neglect, prejudice, passion, by violated, reason showing that was was a state law otherwise, laws or intolerance showing was violation there no the claims of might enforced and not be the federal also offended rights, privi- enjoyment citizens to the is, made the Court clear clause. That guaranteed by the leges, immunities decision was rationality of the Board’s might be denied Fourteenth Amendment prohi- legislature’s by the state unaffected agencies. the state legisla- of that decision. Since bition have written a constitutionally 167, 180, could ture Pape, 365 U.S. Monroe v. plaintiff have denied 480, (1961) that would (emphasis statute L.Ed.2d 492 nomination, to do decision the Board’s added), his part on other overruled necessarily equality were so in violation of state law was not shown to have been enforcement, also constitutional. Justice Stone wrote: discriminatory violated equal protection no claim was stated: subject of the Board is ... action [T]he infirmity to constitutional to the same though Even the statistics in this ease greater but no extent than if the action might imply policy of selective enforce- legislature. were taken the state Its ment, it was not stated that the selection illegality under the can state statute nei- deliberately upon unjustifi- was based an ther add to nor from its consti- subtract race, religion, able standard such as validity. tutional Mere violation of a arbitrary other classification. Therefore infringe state statute does not the feder- grounds supporting finding of a denial Constitution____ action, And state al equal protection were alleged____ law, though illegal even under state can Hughes, Snowden v. 1U.S. [64 Cf. no more and no less constitutional (1944); S.Ct. 88 L.Ed. Yick Wo 497] under the Fourteenth Amendment than Hopkins, v. 118 U.S. 356 S.Ct. [6 legisla- sanctioned the state were (1886)(by implication). L.Ed. 220] Nashville, Ry. ture. L. C. & St. v. at 505. The Id. S.Ct. Browning, 310 U.S. 369-70 S.Ct. [60 just past reaffirmed the same rule 968, 972, (1940)]. 84 L.Ed. 1254 See also rejected term when it v. Louisville Coulter & Nashville R. young reg claim of a man who refused to Co., 599], U.S. 608-9 S.Ct. [196 [25 singled ister for the draft and who was out (1905)]; Hayman 49 L.Ed. 615 v. prosecution after he wrote letters to Galveston, S.Ct. [47 government stating officials that he would 363, 364, 714]; 71 L.Ed. Iowa-Des Moines States, register. Wayte See United Bennett, Bank U.S. 244 [52 — -, U.S. 265], 76 L.Ed. A state recently Our own court fol provided statute which that one nominee well, principle rejecting lowed the rather than two should be certified in a prosecution striking selective claims of air particular election district would not be traffic controllers who failed to demon unconstitutional on its face and would be government’s strate that decision to shown, open to attack if it were as it prosecute discriminatory them was enforce here, is not that the exclusion of one and ment that “invidious or in bad faith election another were invidious impermissible that it on such con restfed] purposely discriminatory. Compare race, religion, siderations as or the desire Lewis, 22, 30, 32, Missouri v. Otto [11 prevent exercise of constitutional *7 22, 30, 32, 989]; 101 U.S. 25 L.Ed. [the] Yick Hoover, rights.” United States v. Hopkins, supra. Wo v. (5th Cir.1984) (quoting F.2d Unit 321 U.S. at 64 S.Ct. at 402. Greene, ed 697 F.2d States guarantee equality That Yick Wo’s of (5th Cir.), denied, cert. U.S. administration of the laws turns onfederal (1983)). S.Ct. 77 L.Ed.2d 1391 rather than state standards is also made prosecu- Both Snowden and selective plain prose- in the rules on Court’s selective cution, plain tion cases make that Yick did not quintessential prob- Yick Wo Wo Boles, lem. 82 make state law the determinant of what Oyler v. (1962), may 7 L.Ed.2d 446 for exam- classifications drawn under the be ple, equal protection the Court denied the Simply fourteenth amendment. and cor- Virginia prisoner claim of a West who rectly recognizing that unconstitutional imprisonment sentenced to life under the may created in the administra- classes be felony state’s three-time offender statute. laws, ostensibly neutral Yick tion of Wo prisoner complained that the state had forbids such classifications. against selectively enforced the statute panel cited several cases in prisoners, also himself and other but the Court requirements explained procedural federal that because standards which federal jurisdictions mind. In those that have tied to state-created substantive were “equal rights amendment,” adopted Compare 755 F.2d 433-34 & nn. rights. (Clark, C.J., proposed 12-13, ratification federal ERA id. at 434-35 con- of (Goldberg, virtually superfluous n. 8 be because vio- curring) with at 438 & would id. J., quite lations of state ERA would dissenting). It is of course true simulta- that, neously the fourteenth system, property federal most violate amendment. our Furthermore, courts by state law. It has would sudden- rights are created federal ly responsibility determining for inexorably that the fourteenth assume followed operates meaning clause of the state ERA’s and would process due amendment’s property rights. many encounter difficulties protect state-created Erie of that have our exercise of procedural standards bedeviled diversi- The constitutional are, however, ty jurisdiction. Whenever a court process clause whol- federal the due person acting in nature: that a exclusively federal a vio- determined under col- ly and necessary of had run is neither or state law afoul of one of lation of state law laws, typically vague finding for a of a these broad nor a sufficient condition Indeed, “a Judge agency’s it would conclude that process violation. due dissent, discriminatory id. action when state com- Goldberg pointed out in at 438 law equality patent mands Court cases cited denial of n. none of protection equality.” involved violation to those denied panel not and F.2d at 432.2 state law at all. It does cannot process from these due decisions follow federal principle that constitutional every apparent transgression of state protection independent of state law is triggers opera- agency law a state review, nothing In habeas limit new. we protection the federal clause. tion of the issuance of writ those cases federal where there have been constitution- -3- violations; possible al we do not review all logical force there seeming Whatever Harris, In Pulley errors state law. it is might argument neces- 79 L.Ed.2d 29 “arbitrary,” in the sarily “irrational” and (1984), example, prisoner under sen- sense, for constitutional a state federal denied tence death was federal review law, intentionally to agency violate state his claim that he had been denied the “com- quickly dissipates force when the im- him parative proportionality review” due are plications argument considered. may under “A federal court state law: is entitled what If state law defines who writ on of a issue the basis [habeas] goal means to a treatment which chosen perceived of state law.” Id. 104 S.Ct. error rational, then intentional violations easy explain all not be at 874-75. It would agencies would why requires state law state violate federal su- Constitution if the pervision fourteenth amendment: action the enforcement of state law against prac- it would taken a class offend for the benefit of those who wish to were panel's osteopathy not for the per under the se tice but construct, facing those execution at the hands of against an individu- of taken *8 state. process as defined the al it would offend due Judge

by Clark. Chief system government power Our of shared traditionally giv- requires all the deference example per approach se One of how in review. Our lodestar is questions law en rational-basis transmogrify would legislature or what has done springs readily to not the state into constitutional claims bar, fairly to whether the state law had order determine In the case at which involved a F.Supp. differentiating at In prohibition against been violated. See 565 1445-52. precise state clear, "solely law is less federal courts appointments cases where state staff on the in medical greater correspondingly degree by” difficulties would face of the medical held basis academic prone extent be to physician, and would to that more court to en- licensed the district had complex analysis gage error. in a extended and do, purported any allopaths but what rational osteopaths to treatment and might requirement have to do. decisionmaker chosen “not a which has as a founda- may put professional be “lost we tion a reasonable as We maze basis such by,” certainly qualifications compass but we will be and ethical for the common on trespassing good public hospital itself”, state domains. law is of the State or the way by F.Supp. in no demeaned trivialized its at and concluded that the state, present federal, as today status rather than facts different from those exist- part, judiciary, law. The federal for its has ing at the time of Hayman City enough Galveston, law to enforce an- federal without nexing legislation. (1927), new We bodies F.Supp. L.Ed. see will, must, and leave violations of law It only is conceded that the facts allow appropriate to be corrected allopathic osteopathic conclusion that and mechanisms. training programs have similar course re- content, quirements and gradu- and that

IV testing ates face identical and licensing re- Having rejected panel’s per se quirements. We find fault no with the analysis, opinion we undertake a court respect review district in this and we judgment. approve district court’s Because the dis that court’s decision to use the trict court found differences allo rational-relationship between standard review. osteopaths paths agree, and our that are in view We also that the Texas Medical Prac- permit agencies to, though sufficient to Texas or disposi- tice Act relevant of, hospital the granting question differentiate tive of whether there was privileges, staff that court’s conclusion a rational basis for differentiation. unconstitutionality cannot stand. difficulty is that the district court only remaining also concluded that

In the “[t]he trial of constitutional is difference between and M.D.’s has sues, D.O.’s differing roles of historical and simply philoso been described one of legislative present conceptual facts can dif phy.” F.Supp. question Our at 1443. attempt ficulties. need not in We this case whether could have sanc distinguish precisely historical between tioned classification the Tar- drawn legislative and facts in the district court’s County Hospital deny rant without District findings: the findings however be charac ing osteopaths equal protection. If the dis terized, the state action in question was approaches adopted by medical tinct allo general constitutional. distinction be paths osteopaths provide and a sufficient legislative adjudicative tween facts is classification, such inquiry basis for our important helps nevertheless because Guste, Depot, ends. Home Inc. why show district ought court to have Cf. (5th Cir.1985). F.2d 616 asked there was conceiv whether County Hospital able basis for Tarrant 680 F.2d 1062 Wysong, Maceluch v. legislative implicit judgment District’s re Cir.1982), (5th we that the differ- concluded garding import be differences allopathic osteopath- ences between programs. training tween the two medical approach ic in their to medical schools court, A factual conclusion the district justified requirement treatment the state’s conflicting based on an his evidence about osteopaths themselves identify fact, torical binding would court. medical consumers with the “D.O.” label. But such a factual conclusion could not be adopted We the district displace legislative judgment used to court, explained: therefore not be a basis for could sufficient prac- Despite the medicine is fact that declaring Hospital action un District’s within scientific frame- objective ticed an constitutional. *9 work, physi- of a processes the decisional aggregate trial, only reflect not of a

After a court cian the bench the district of clinical tech- knowledge Hospital found that the District’s different substantive RUBIN, Judge, the B. ñiques, judgments also his as to ALVIN Circuit with but of, for, need and nature treatment. That CLARK, Judge, POLITZ, whom Chief skill, experience, perception of of born JOHNSON, TATE, Judges, join and Circuit nature, as human and intuitions to what dissenting: patient, jumps a the is best for over prevent The refuses to a many knowledge in “scientific” and voids agency discriminating against from state from separates the scientist the doctor. osteopathic physicians in allopathic favor of that two schools of medicine It follows of physicians in defiance state law. In so approaches, differing even advocate doing, disregards plain language it both the they advocacy in of if differ their of the fourteenth amendment and the his- approaches to the differing philosophical enactment, its toric reasons for for the realities, present differ- same scientific a forbids, equal protection clause and was legislature may without ence that a note forbid, purposefully intended to a state to one, discriminating against unlawfully arbitrarily deny persons to one class of preferring one over the other. protection of a state that it law affords persons. to another class sum, the state has demonstrated licens- relationship rational between its addition, majority, The accords to the real, debatable, ing categories conclusions of a board directors possessing differences between doctors hospital district the same deference it ex- degrees. That all that M.D. and D.O. is legisla- to the a state tends enactments of requires. the Constitution presumptive It ture. attaches same (citation omitted). every validity at 1066-68 Id. decisions agency, petty jur- however or limited underlying The reasons our deci isdiction, that is extended to formal enact- apply also to sion the case Maceluch reasoning, ments of state statutes. In so We that it rational for the bar. held majority disregards findings of fact steps to to ensure that medical take directly it contrary to conclusion reach- easily distinguish could between consumers es and fails to heed mandate of rule allopaths osteopaths. It is no less 52(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Proce- state, in the of its rational for exercise dure, sidestepping appli- the rule’s adroitly power, police to make the same choice that by labeling cability the facts on as permitted give to its citi review Maceluch “adjudicative.” than “legislative” zens. Nor does choice become less rather I agency, must, therefore, it is respectfully rational when made dissent. County Hospital as Tarrant Dis such “[Tjhose challenging legislative trict. I. must convince the court that

judgment any The amendment forbids fourteenth legislative facts on which classification any “deny person within its reasonably apparently based could governmental jurisdiction true conceived to be The amendment was not needed to

decisionmaker.” Minnesota Clover laws.” Leaf 456, 464, Co., provide equal protec- Creamery U.S. states ensure (1981) 715, 723, (quoting L.Ed.2d 659 laws, for the text of the tion of federal Bradley, Vance original makes federal law the Constitution (1979)). land, “any Thing supreme law the in the case, legislative in this facts involved or Laws State to Constitution Maceluch, conceivably, if not indubita notwithstanding.”1 Contrary bly, true. in- needed and was protection clause was that the states afford tended to assure judgment district court protection of their persons all REVERSED. accordingly Const, VI, 1. U.S. art. cl. 2.

1062 certainly continues. “While one main source of the Court own laws. view, perhaps leading the one—was the Ku Pape, for Monroe v. it takes this evil— Klux states, Klan,” remedy the “the 1983: of section said remedy against it created was not a or its abundantly the clear that one reason It is against represent- members but those who passed was to afford a legislation was capacity ing a state in some were unable because, right in federal courts federal law____ unwilling or to a state prejudice, passion, neglect, by reason of enforce was, said, quarrel the There no with otherwise, or laws intolerance state laws on the books. It was their lack and the claims of might not be enforced of of enforcement that was the nub the enjoyment rights, privi- of to the citizens Howard, difficulty.”5 As Senator one of guaranteed by the immunities leges, and amendment, stated, sponsors might be denied Fourteenth Amendment purpose equal clause was agencies.2 by the state prohibit to the states from upon single seizes word denying [any person] equal protec- to from passage in this Monroe “and” tion of the laws This State. of that federal then asserts legislation abolishes all class [clause] en- only when a state’s failure to denied away injus- the States and does with the its laws also constitutes a denial of force subjecting persons one tice caste immunity or secured right, privilege applicable a code not to another.6 This is an unwarranted and Constitution. adoption reading. The fourteenth Before fourteenth unprecedented amendment, required forbids the states either the states were amendment provide either due or enforce law which shall Constitution “make process equal protection. citi- or The Bill of abridge privileges or immunities of Rights, “deprive of the United States” or to Chief Justice Marshall wrote zens 1833, life, solely any person liberty, property, or was “intended as a limitation power by govern- process deny of law” or “to on the exercise of without due States, appli- and is not any person jurisdiction ment of United within legislation to the of the states.”7 protection of the laws.” The sentence cable amendment, prohibit- to The thirteenth which Pape from Monroe v. was not intended servitude, involuntary adopted rights legislation of the civil ed had been limit the shield responded by equal pro- that denies in 1868. Some states enact- to state action both discriminated, explicit- citizenship privileges ing immu- laws that either tection and slaves, Indeed, continues, ly implicitly, against the former as that nities. grandfather example, by the use of “It is no answer that the State has a law Many appar- give relief. The clauses. states also enforced if enforced would ently discriminatory in a man- remedy supplementary neutral laws federal explicitly crimes that were forbidden remedy____”3 ner: by state law were condoned when commit- unavailability of state “It was against ted whites blacks. remedies but the certain states failure of discrimination, To combat both kinds of the laws with an hand to enforce enacted, Congress over the veto of Presi- powerful momentum be- that furnished ” Johnson, bill,’ rights Andrew the first civil Pape4 the ‘force dent hind Monroe 473, 480, Fairman, 6. 6 C. History Supreme Court 2. 81 S.Ct. added). (1961) (emphasis and Reunion the United States —Reconstruction added). 1864-88, (1971) (emphasis at 1925 at L.Ed.2d at 503. Id. at Mayor City 7. Barron v. Council Balti- 174-75, 4. (7 Pet.) more, added). U.S. 8 L.Ed. (1961) (emphasis L.Ed.2d L.Ed.2d at 499 Id. at (added original).

1063 however, doubt, interpreted the equal was whether the laws. There adopt Congress power had to these prohibit the to protection discriminatory clause laws, given had the and President Johnson application judge of law who legislation8 the unconstitutionality of because, jury from a in excluded blacks “Immediately for his veto. one reason part, authority “outside his in was and fourteenth pressing to [the amendment] spirit violation of the of the direct State provide the desire to a firm sponsors was gave That statute him no statute. authori- already the basis for enacted constitutional selecting jurors ty, ... to when exclude all legislation.”9 Congress rights civil merely they men because col- colored were addition, sought, to amend “the Constitu- in Such an exclusion was not left ored. with- beyond repeal accomplish- to the place tion 12 in the limits of his discretion.” simple majority of in a future Con- ment por- that case involvedthe criminal While 10 gress.” Rights tions of the Civil Acts and racial equal major purpose pro- of the While a discrimination, its rationale was based prevent to discrimina- tection clause was later-developed scrutiny on differential know, blacks, not, against it as we was tion theory simple but on the thesis that was requiring equal of to treatment confined equal protection for a a denial of equal protection of for it the races assures against agent to discriminate a class of Thus, pur- “persons.” to all the laws in people Similarly, violation of state law. equal protection clause of the pose dicta, sitting in a circuit court Alabama amendment was to forbid both fourteenth said United States Hall:13 unequal kinds of state action: enact- amendment not fourteenth [T]he discriminatory and the dis- ment of laws making or prohibits enforcing of criminatory administration or enforcement abridge privileges shall of laws which laws were not themselves discrimi- of that citizen, prohibits but the states from natory. persons jurisdic- denying to all within its however, jurisprudence, has been equal tion the of laws. entirely with discrimina- concerned almost Denying includes inaction as well as ac- is, laws, determining tory that with wheth- tion, denying equal protection nondiscriminatory on their laws are er protect, the laws includes the omission discriminatory fact and whether face pass as well as the omission laws expressly drawn classifications protection. con- constitutional. These cases laws are writ-worthy by tinue considered intentionally A state treats official who Court. people differently in the classes of face two implies law treat- of a valid state legal The fact that the contest has been guaran- ment violates not, how- in this area should concentrated ago in century Hop- A Yick Wo tee. ever, neglect cause us consideration kins,14 unconstitutional the the Court held “majestically plain, but the amendment’s municipal ordinance administration unconfined,”11 language. when persons,” particular denied “a class purpose fourteenth history and owners, laundry permits that every justice, were were known to Chinese amendment Service, supra Leg- Congressional Schnapper, 11. note See Action Research 8. Affirmative Amendment, History at 1471. Fourteenth islative (1985). Va.L.Rev. 785-86 Virginia, 10 Otto 12. Ex Parte added). (1880) (emphasis 25 L.Ed. 676 Service, Library Congressional Research 9. United States Congress, The Constitution (No. 15,- (C.C.S.D.Ala.1871) 26 F.Cas. Analysis Interpretation of America— 282). (1973). 356, 374, 6 S.Ct. 14. Id. L.Ed.2d granted to others who were not ease presented here involves an even Chinese. ful classes of discrimination between persons.” “So far as persons appears egregious more denial of protec- certify Board’s failure to [Illinois State] tion—intentional discrimination in petitioner defiance unaffected and unrelated plies, equal of a state law that treatment. *12 exacts, The not majority opin- merely im- nee,” the Court said. certification of Absent such other nomi- pur- agrees requires ion that Texas poseful law two discrimination between classes of persons, holding classes of doctors persons, the Illinois State Board’s action degree holding M.D. and doctors equal the D.O. was not a denial protection of the degree, to treated majority be alike. The law. opinion agrees County the Tarrant majority’s The reliance on the Hospital and, District has violated that law Boles,20 Oyler discriminatory prosecu- a inferentially, accepts at least the conclusion case, justified. tion is no more As the this discrimination between the two majority’s quotation notes, disregards, This, persons purposeful. classes of is I Supreme there held that selective submit, enough is Hospital to make the law enforcement “is not in itself a federal

District’s action a equal protec- denial of constitutional violation” unless “the selec- tion. deliberately tion was upon unjust- based an [but, suggest, ifiable standard such as I not majority opinion The upon relies a race, religion, limited or arbitrary other lengthy quotation to] from Snowden v. Hughes.15 But it fails to include another classification.”21 statement of the Snowden court that di scope applicability rectly conflicts with the rationale the ma are, course, clause determined jority opinion espouses. At the outset of by validity federal standards. The equal protection its discussion of the clause being Texas unchallenged, statute discrimi- Snowden, Court said: nation in its administration violates the fed-

The unlawful administration eral constitution. face,

officers of a state statute fair on its II. resulting in its unequal application to alike, those who are entitled to be treated majority opinion starts with a bland equal protection not a denial of unless statement of law: rational state action does present there is shown to be in it an not violate the clause sim- particular face of the action sic evidence itself____” another not to be inferred from the action sign to favor one individual or class over tinued, “This discrimination.16 element [discrimination] “or it class or showing may only intentional or Snowden himself did not taken with person,” a discriminatory de- may appear be shown the Court con- respect purposeful on the extrin- to a persons action and whether a subordinate state law and discriminates there agency uous. ply nation statute. The action of the Tarrant County Hospital District is not so innoc- because questions put by inis Stating acts while fact a rational basis for the state rationally favoring violates a state anti-discrimi- the rule in this fashion against when it defies state this case: whether another. one class of begs qualify equal protection guarantee for the agency may, The state or a state without allege purpose- because he did not even denying equal protection, “a make a distine- 15. 1, 397, (1944). Id., 88 L.Ed. 497 88 L.Ed. at 504. 16. Id. at 64 S.Ct. at 88 L.Ed. at 502 20. 7 L.Ed.2d 446 added). (emphasis Id., (citations 64 S.Ct. at 88 L.Ed. at 502 21. Id. at omitted). 82 S.Ct. at 7 L.Ed.2d at 453. 18. Id. at 64 S.Ct. at 88 L.Ed. at 504. persons if guar- classes of tuted a violation of constitutional between two

tion protection. antee of lawful making the distinction is purpose rationally related and the distinction “seeming logi concedes however, Once, purpose. legitimate analysis by of this first cal force” what affirmatively adopts re- a statute the state year recognize law students will as the persons be classes quiring two slippery slope argument: to accept the the alike, agency may de- consequences. might treated lead to sis dread Vio that, lawfully rationally de- equal rights cree either lation of amendment says, it is still might federal constitutional spite what violation. contention, however, portends suggest That no dis I that it is going to discriminate. Purposeful unlawful, aster. discrimination a state arbitrary ;per but se persons against a class of *13 in order rational, agency a state hence not for capricious, to favor another class dis deliberate create a agency intentionally to discrimina- (or regard per of a state valid law—even forbidden a valid tory classification especially) equal rights haps an law—con state law. equal protection. a denial of stitutes grant County did Tarrant The state of County Hospi- The action the Tarrant consider, any Hospital District discretion to merely a tal District was not of violation qualifications, respect physician’s with a might state law that be in the remedied physician's de- the nature of the medical state courts. It also a violation of the case, gree, allopathic osteopathic. This court, A federal Constitution. district or therefore, presents distinguish- a situation appellate, ignore duty simply cannot found in “selective typically from able alleged because an constitutional violation cases, In such state enforcement” cases. may contrary also be to state law or be- agencies, as state such law often accords require claim may cause the constitutional boards, liquor licensing great a zoning or in a engage complex the court “to and This case deal of discretion. is different. analysis”24 “typically of a extended broad grounds, the prevail on To vague and state law.”25 (1) plaintiff only show he is here need persons class of who have member III. against on discriminated the basis been majority opinion pre- The rests the on class; (2) membership in that mem- their Hospital mise that the District acted ration- classes, similarly other bers of otherwise pursuit legitimate pur- ally in of a state situated, differently; have treated been however, pose. purely Rationality, not a (3) discriminatory treatment was judgment. subjective “Rational” means purposeful. on reason.” Reason rests on facts. “based was, Hospital The action of the District as County Hospi- The actions of the Tarrant found, district court unreasonable. discriminatory patently District were tal it, testimony adduced Based on before stat- taken in violation a state and were conjecture possible reasons merely on denied discretion. Its ac- ute that it action, the court conclud- for District’s obviously not further tions did what that, purposes prac- of admission to ed legislature determined to be a had significant hospital, in the no differ- tice pur- The legitimate purpose. District post-graduate ences existed between protec- posefully osteopaths the denied to allopaths training osteopaths. granted allopaths.22 tion of the law it notes, pro- doing plaintiffs majority opinion it the district so denied As the Hospital dif- law, found that the District’s and this turn consti- court tection of opinion, p. Majority 24. Virginia, 1059 n. 2. Parte 10 Otto 22. ExCf. 25 L.Ed. 676 opinion, p. Majority 1059. 25. Majority opinion, p. allopaths agencies challenged, and osteo-

ferent treatment but are in- only paths was not founded on “reasonable stead determine whether there is professional quali- “any and ethical the [agency’s] basis such as conceivable basis for good public implicit legislative judgment.”29 agen- fications for the common conceded,” cy’s hospital having up, itself.”26 “It is mind been made or the neither the states, agency the facts allow nor “that the court is to confused facts, allopathic and oste- and the only the conclusion that court is to evaluate agency lawyer’s post-hoc suggestion opathic training programs have similar content, might conceivable and that basis that have been in requirements course agency’s testing mind—even if it was not. graduates face identical and licens- adds, ing requirements.”27 And “[w]e findings Even factual when are of consti- court find no fault with the district importance appellate tutional and an court Nevertheless, the ma- respect.”28 52(a), appellate is not bound rule opinion ignores all of these facts on jority court undertakes to the facts review inde- that, might if the val- basis pendently. Court and this idly against osteopaths, have discriminated hypothesize court do not but determine the Hospital may District do so—without facts from the evidence.30 regard to the facts. repeatedly rejected sugges- We have majority opinion not even men- does tion that the actions of a federal adminis- *14 52(a), requires tion Fed.R.Civ.P. agency might trative be validated on the by are the facts found a district court to be developed by basis of rationalizations coun- accepted appeal clearly on unless errone- presume sel.31 While we valid and accord there ous. Whether is rational basis deference to determinations made state treating differently persons two classes of legislatures,32 part we do so at least in must, submit, I turn on the facts distin- highest because the is the guishing these classes as shown law-making agency, by a elected democrat- majority justify evidence. seeks to its process, ic in enacts statutes a deliberative disregard of the evidence and the fact find- manner, and its enactments become law ings by asserting validity that the only approved by highest the state’s ex- against osteopaths is discrimination to be ecutive or reenacted a substantial ma- by something “legisla- determined called jority his veto. In New over Orleans v. “adjudicative” tive” facts rather than or Dukes,33 this deference was extended to a facts, “legislative” ordinance, historical facts. But it municipal adopted legislative in out, are, They fashion, turns are not at all. in city’s objective facts in which the in instance, assumptions up- enacting clearly utilized the ordinance was identi- disregard agency’s hold the state fied. But as Justice Powell said in dissent- apparently ing facts. District courts are not to from the Court’s in Schweiker Wilson,34 legis- take evidence when the actions of inferior v. “The deference to which Dist., See, County e.g., Hosp. 26. Stern v. Tarrant 31. United States v. New Orleans Public 565 Service, 422, 1440, (5th Cir.1984). F.Supp. 723 F.2d 428-29 1454. See, Guste, e.g., Depot, Inc. v. 32. Home 773 F.2d Majority opinion, p. 1060. 27. (1985). 616 p. opinion, Majority 1060. 297, 304, 2513, 2517, 33. 427 U.S. 96 S.Ct. 49 511, (1976). L.Ed.2d 517 Majority opinion, p. 1060. U.S., Inc., 221, 243, 1074, 1087, Corp. 30. Bose v. Consumers Union 34. 450 U.S. 101 S.Ct. 67 Regents (1981); the Uni- L.Ed.2d 203 466 U.S. 80 502 L.Ed.2d cf. Bakke, 265, 309, Diamond, versity (1984); v. U.S. Jones v. 438 636 F.2d 1370 California 2733, 2758, (1978); City (5th Cir.1981); 783 see also Cousins S.Ct. & n. 7 Dist., Council, School No. (7th Cir.), cert. de see also Kramer Union Free 466 F.2d 1886, 1895-96, nied, L.Ed.2d (1969) (Steward, dissenting). J. L.Ed.2d discriminating against osteopaths conflicting inter- did not accommodation lative part upon princi- provision rests constitutional ests is entitled violate the Texas majori- political process of our ple that any preference given by that forbids “be democracy responds to the wishes of tarian law to schools of medicine.”37 The people.” No similar deliberations found that state constitutional appointed agencies and no exacted of qualifi- directed limitation was presumption of constitu- similar deferential cations of those to be admitted to medical Deference tionality attends their actions. practice in the state and not limit did con- hardly due to the of this extreme sort practitioners’ qualifi- sideration medical board, hospital decision of practice hospital.38 in a cations allopathic physicians, members are whose Hayman significant changes Since have evidence, hearings or to ex- made without education, training, occurred and li- Instead, osteopathic physicians. clude censing osteopaths Texas law. me, such self- seems to we should view arbitrary That state action was not under serving with at least some mea- decisions existing century ago facts a half does not skepticism. sure of today. make it rational The decision of a said, legisla- Powell has “when a Justice in Berman v. Florida panel of this court suggested only by the purpose tive can be Center, Medical Inc.39 is no more confin- lawyer litigat- ingenuity government of a ing, private hospi- for that case dealt with a statute, constitutionality ing the of a tal and did not involve state action. may presented not so reviewing court legislative policy as its ab- much with a 35 Moreover, IV. at least one fact that sence.” ig- undoubtedly legislative cannot be The fourteenth amendment forbids legislature has de- The Texas state nored: agencies to discriminate creature, the Tar- unlawful what its clared against any persons. class of It is a bul- District, County Hospital has chosen rant against against prejudice, wark state action *15 decisive, it is a if this is not to do. Even The that condemns rational basis. without determining that must be considered fact adopted only to assure not that clause was actions rationality of the District’s both nondiscriminatory enact laws but states its actions are to be accorded and whether equally they also that administer state law legislature’s given deference a state opinion refuses to fairly. The enactments. deliberate mandate of the Constitu- apply the literal majority opinion puts the Constitu ignores history led to its tion and that every agen mercy petty tion at the bigotry of an enactment. It condones the thesis, cy lawyers can submit hospital district allopathic-dominated evidence, unsupported by factual by either refuses to be bothered might support opin constitutionality. constitution, law, or the the federal supported by the ion cannot be facts. Hayman City Galv decision eston,36 the kind here for evidence in the record before that presented was not

Court. opinion Hayman, moreover, rest- part on the conclusion

ed at least Hospital Board

the action of the Galveston Wilson, 71 L.Ed. at 38. U.S. at 35. Schweiker (1981). L.Ed.2d 417. 71 L.Ed. 36. 1979). (5th Cir. 600 F.2d 466 Const, art. 16 37. Tex. §

Case Details

Case Name: Paul A. Stern v. Tarrant County Hospital District v. George J. Luibel
Court Name: Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit
Date Published: Dec 18, 1985
Citation: 778 F.2d 1052
Docket Number: 83-1638
Court Abbreviation: 5th Cir.
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