Lindner v. Kindig
293 Neb. 661
| Neb. | 2016Background
- In 2006 the City of La Vista enacted Ordinance No. 979 creating an off-street parking district (to serve a Cabela’s store) and later enacted Ordinance No. 983 authorizing general obligation off-street parking bonds to finance the project.
- Lindner, a city resident, sued in December 2011 seeking declaratory relief that Ordinance No. 979 was unconstitutional under Neb. Const. art. VIII, § 6 and art. III, § 18 because the City paid costs from general revenues/sales tax rather than by special assessment, allegedly conferring a special benefit on Cabela’s.
- The district court initially dismissed the complaint as time barred, but the Nebraska Supreme Court in Lindner I (285 Neb. 386) reversed and remanded because the complaint did not show when the City chose or implemented the general-funding mechanism.
- On remand the City moved for summary judgment and produced undisputed evidence that: Ordinance No. 983 was passed March 2006; bonds were issued April 15, 2006; and the City made the first interest payment October 16, 2006, with bond payments made from a checking account containing general revenues and sales tax receipts.
- The district court concluded the 4-year catchall statute of limitations (Neb. Rev. Stat. § 25-212) applied and that the claim accrued by, at the latest, October 16, 2006, so Lindner’s December 16, 2011 suit was time barred; the court granted summary judgment for defendants.
- The Nebraska Supreme Court affirmed, holding the 4-year statute applied and that accrual occurred by the dates identified on the undisputed record, so the claim was barred.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Lindner’s constitutional challenge is subject to a statute of limitations | Lindner: Claim alleges an ongoing, continuously accruing constitutional wrong; each day is a new accrual date, so no fixed limitations bar applies | City: Constitutional challenges can be time-barred; a limitations period applies and bars stale perennial review | Held: Constitutional claims can be time-barred; the 4-year statute applies (following Lindner I and Block) |
| Which statute of limitations governs | Lindner: No specific limitations period applies to this ongoing constitutional challenge | City: The 4-year catchall in § 25-212 applies because no more specific statutory limitations period fits | Held: § 25-212 (4-year catchall) controls because no specific limitations period governs the claim |
| When the claim accrued (trigger for limitations) | Lindner: Accrual recurs daily; complaint does not show a single accrual date within 4 years of filing | City: Accrual occurred when City decided/implemented general-funding (Ordinance No. 983 passage, bond issuance, or first bond payment) | Held: Accrual occurred by the undisputed dates (March–Oct 2006); using latest date, Oct. 16, 2006, the suit filed Dec. 16, 2011 was after four years |
| Whether summary judgment was appropriate given disputed facts about funding decision timing | Lindner: Remand showed issues remain as to when City chose funding method | City: Evidence is undisputed showing decision/implementation in 2006; no genuine issue remains | Held: Summary judgment proper — no genuine material fact; claim time barred |
Key Cases Cited
- Lindner v. Kindig, 285 Neb. 386 (Neb. 2013) (remanded where complaint did not show when funding decision was made or implemented)
- Block v. North Dakota, 461 U.S. 273 (U.S. 1983) (constitutional claims can become time-barred)
- Adkins v. Burlington Northern Santa Fe RR. Co., 260 Neb. 156 (Neb. 2000) (§ 25-212 is the catchall limitations period)
- Sherman T. v. Karyn N., 286 Neb. 468 (Neb. 2013) (choice of applicable statute of limitations is a question of law)
- H & B Builders, Inc. v. City of Sunrise, 727 So. 2d 1068 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1999) (policy reasons support applying limitations to municipal funding challenges)
- Phillips v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 293 Neb. 123 (Neb. 2016) (summary judgment standards)
- Sulu v. Magana, 293 Neb. 148 (Neb. 2016) (appellate review of summary judgment; view evidence in light most favorable to nonmovant)