Linda Stermer v. Millicent Warren, 959 F.3d 704

Background

Linda Stermer was convicted of felony murder (arson) after her husband Todd died in a house fire and from blunt-force and burn injuries; prosecution claimed she doused him with gasoline, set the house on fire, and later ran him over with a van.
The state’s case relied heavily on a Michigan State Police fire investigator who concluded the fire was intentionally set; Todd’s clothing tested positive for gasoline.
The prosecutor’s closing repeatedly branded Stermer a liar, misstated certain testimony, and vouched for other witnesses; trial counsel never objected.
Trial counsel also did not retain or consult a defense fire expert despite arguing at trial that the fire may have been accidental or that Todd was the arsonist.
Stermer’s state post-conviction motion was denied without an opinion; she obtained federal habeas relief in district court after an evidentiary hearing, which granted a conditional writ based on prosecutorial misconduct and ineffective assistance.
On appeal the Sixth Circuit affirmed the conditional writ: it held the state denial was a merits decision (so AEDPA applies) but that the state court unreasonably denied Stermer’s prosecutorial-misconduct and some ineffective-assistance claims, entitling her to a new trial.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument (Stermer)	Defendant's Argument (State)	Held
Was the state-court denial "on the merits" so AEDPA deference applies?	The state trial court’s summary language indicated a procedural denial; federal court should review de novo and consider new evidence.	The summary denial should be presumed a merits adjudication under Richter; AEDPA deference applies.	Court: The Richter presumption stands here; the state court decision is treated as on the merits and AEDPA applies.
Prosecutorial misconduct (closing argument)	Prosecutor repeatedly called Stermer a liar, misstated facts (e.g., phone location), vouched for witnesses, and injected impermissible opinion—denial of due process.	Statements were fair inferences from evidence, peripheral, and cured by jury instructions; not reversible error.	Court: Remarks were improper, pervasive, and in context prejudicial; state court’s rejection was an unreasonable application of Supreme Court precedent—habeas relief warranted.
Ineffective assistance — failure to object to prosecutor	Counsel’s failure to object to repeated improper remarks was not reasonable and prejudiced the defense.	Trial counsel’s inaction could be a strategic choice; not necessarily deficient or prejudicial.	Court: Failure to object was objectively unreasonable and prejudicial under Strickland; warrants relief.
Ineffective assistance — failure to retain/fire expert	Counsel unreasonably failed to consult/call a fire expert though the prosecution’s case turned on expert fire-cause opinion; prejudice likely.	Strategy: presenting alternate theories without an expert was reasonable; also Pinholster limits reliance on new federal hearing evidence.	Court: Counsel’s failure to retain an expert was deficient. Because of AEDPA/Pinholster complications the court declined to make a final prejudice determination here, but the record supports that expert help would likely have mattered; petitioner already gets a new trial on other grounds.

Key Cases Cited

Cullen v. Pinholster, 563 U.S. 170 (2011) (limits federal habeas review to state-court record when §2254(d) deference applies)
Darden v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 168 (1986) (framework for prosecutorial-misconduct due-process inquiry)
United States v. Young, 470 U.S. 1 (1985) (prosecutor may not vouch or inject personal opinion on credibility)
Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78 (1935) (prosecutor must not make prejudicial, repeated, or misleading assaults on defendant)
Donnelly v. DeChristoforo, 416 U.S. 637 (1974) (misstating or inflaming jury may be cured by context and instructions but may still be prejudicial)
Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86 (2011) (AEDPA’s standard: state-court decisions are presumptively reasonable)
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984) (two-prong test for ineffective assistance of counsel)
Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510 (2003) (importance of counsel’s reasonable investigation and use of experts in capital/serious cases)
Parker v. Matthews, 567 U.S. 37 (2012) (limits use of circuit precedent as "clearly established" law under AEDPA)