Linda Solomon v. Thomas Vilsack
412 U.S. App. D.C. 127
| D.C. Cir. | 2014Background
- Linda Solomon, a Department of Agriculture budget analyst, sought a maxiflex schedule as a reasonable accommodation for chronic depression.
- She alleged informal practice of flexible hours for months and a comparable accommodation for another employee.
- The Department denied the maxiflex request, and Solomon filed suit alleging Rehabilitation Act violations and retaliation.
- The district court granted summary judgment, deeming maxiflex an unreasonable accommodation as a matter of law and rejecting retaliation claims.
- On appeal, the D.C. Circuit held maxiflex is not categorically unreasonable and is fact-specific; remanded for factual development.
- Solomon ultimately retired due to the Department’s accommodations denials and pursued formal EEO processes.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Is a maxiflex schedule a reasonable accommodation under the Rehabilitation Act? | Solomon argues maxiflex can be reasonable given job duties. | Secretary contends maxiflex is inherently unreasonable for her role. | Not per se unreasonable; fact-specific inquiry required. |
| Was the revocation of permission to work late retaliation for accommodation requests? | Revocation was retaliatory for seeking accommodations. | Action was a non-retaliatory policy enforcement by supervisors. | Evidence could support retaliation; procedural remand warranted. |
| Do other accommodation denials support retaliation claim? | The denials show retaliatory motive. | Justifications were legitimate and non-retaliatory. | Summary judgment reversed only as to late-work retaliation; others dismissed. |
Key Cases Cited
- Carr v. Reno, 23 F.3d 525 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (Carr unusual facts; not controlling rule against flexibility in all cases)
- Breen v. Department of Transportation, 282 F.3d 839 (D.C. Cir. 2002) (rejected Carr as absolute; case-specific inquiry on schedule flexibility)
- Woodruff v. Peters, 482 F.3d 521 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (presence requirement not absolute if prior accommodations shown)
- Langon v. Department of Health and Human Services, 959 F.2d 1053 (D.C. Cir. 1992) (evidence on deadlines and flexibility relevant to essential functions)
- Taylor v. Rice, 451 F.3d 898 (D.C. Cir. 2006) (recognizes fact-specific accommodation analysis; on-face or applied)