18 F.4th 177
6th Cir.2021Background:
- Linda Sexton, a probationer, was assigned to a court-ordered Redford Township work-release program supervised by Thomas Cernuto and Larry Dunn.
- Township policy prohibited supervisors driving alone with female probationers, but Cernuto repeatedly ordered Sexton to ride alone with Dunn and refused her requests to ride with other participants.
- Dunn sexually assaulted Sexton multiple times during those solo rides and at program sites; Sexton reported the incidents, Dunn pleaded no contest, and both supervisors were fired.
- Sexton sued under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alleging (1) Cernuto actively facilitated Dunn’s assaults (bystander/joint liability) and (2) Cernuto failed to protect her based on a special-relationship theory; district court denied Cernuto qualified immunity.
- The district court found genuine disputes of material fact about whether Cernuto’s orders and conduct isolated Sexton and whether the work program created a special relationship imposing a duty to protect.
- Cernuto appealed the denial of qualified immunity; the Sixth Circuit affirmed.
Issues:
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Active-facilitation (§ 1983 bystander/joint liability) | Cernuto repeatedly isolated Sexton, ordered solo rides, and his conduct enabled Dunn’s assaults | Cernuto was only a co-supervisor, not Dunn’s supervisor, and did not actively participate in the assaults | Genuine factual disputes exist as to active participation; an active participant (even without a supervisor relationship) can be liable under § 1983 |
| Special-relationship duty to protect | The court-ordered work program sufficiently restrained Sexton’s liberty and imposed state control, creating a duty to protect | The program was non-custodial/intermittent; no special relationship existed; Sexton could care for herself outside program hours | Viewing facts favorably to Sexton, the program’s restrictions (threat of incarceration, movement limits, required orders) could create a special relationship and a duty to protect |
| Applicability of "private-actor" limitation to special-relationship exception | Duty to protect should apply regardless whether the assailant is a state actor | The Sixth Circuit’s DeShaney-line cases limit protection to private acts in some contexts | The court declined to extend the private-actor limitation to the special-relationship exception; that limitation has applied primarily to the state-created-danger doctrine |
| Clearly established right for qualified immunity | Right to bodily integrity and freedom from sexual assault by state actors (and facilitating such assaults) was clearly established in July 2017 | No clearly established precedent requiring a non-law-enforcement, non-supervisory co-worker to intervene or protect in this context | The right was clearly established; reasonable officials would know that facilitating or failing to prevent a state-actor sexual assault violates due process, so qualified immunity was denied |
Key Cases Cited
- Doe v. Claiborne Cnty., 103 F.3d 495 (recognizes public-employee sexual abuse violates substantive due process)
- DeShaney v. Winnebago Cnty. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 489 U.S. 189 (establishes general rule against affirmative state duty to protect and two exceptions)
- Hall v. Shipley, 932 F.2d 1147 (officials’ active participation can defeat qualified immunity even absent supervisory status)
- Stemler v. City of Florence, 126 F.3d 856 (state actors owe a duty when they deprive individuals of indicia of liberty)
- Peete v. Metro. Gov’t of Nashville & Davidson Cnty., 486 F.3d 217 (discusses state-created-danger doctrine and private-actor requirement)
- Guertin v. Michigan, 912 F.3d 907 (confirms the special status of the bodily-integrity right)
- Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194 (sets out two-step qualified immunity framework)