Linda J. Brumfield v. City of Chicago, 735 F.3d 619

Brumfield, a Chicago police officer since 1999, developed unspecified psychological problems in 2006 that led to four required psychological exams showing fitness but noted vulnerability to workplace stress.
Brumfield was suspended without pay three times and ultimately terminated in 2010 amid discharge proceedings before the Chicago Police Board.
In 2010–2011 Brumfield filed two federal suits: the second asserting Title II ADA and Rehabilitation Act claims, the third asserting Title I ADA claims later deemed barred by res judicata.
The district court dismissed the Title II and Rehabilitation Act claims, finding Title II’s applicability to public employment uncertain and Brumfield failed to state an ADA/RA claim; it declined to exercise jurisdiction over a state-law claim.
On appeal, the Seventh Circuit consolidated Brumfield’s appeals and ultimately reaffirmed dismissal of Title II and RA claims, holding Title II does not cover public-employment discrimination and Title I controls employment claims; the Title I claim was deemed waived due to res judicata.
Key interpretive issue: whether Title II’s prohibition against disability discrimination in public entities applies to public employment, given Title I’s comprehensive employment provisions.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Does Title II ADA cover employment discrimination by public entities?	Brumfield argues Title II prohibits disability discrimination in public employment.	City argues Title II does not reach employment decisions; Title I covers employment.	Title II does not cover public-employment discrimination; Title I governs.
Is Brumfield's Rehabilitation Act claim viable where discrimination is alleged in employment?	RA claim based on disability discrimination in suspensions/termination should proceed.	RA incorporates Title I standards; Brumfield failed to show disability-caused discipline.	RA claim fails because Brumfield did not allege the disciplinary actions were solely by reason of disability.
Was Brumfield's Title I claim properly precluded by res judicata in the third suit, such that it should be analyzed here?	Title I claim not barred; procedural preclusion should not bar merits here.	Title I claim precluded by res judicata from the earlier suit.	Brumfield waived challenge to preclusion; Title I claim is precluded and affirmed on that basis; remaining issues concern Title II.

Elwell v. Okla. ex rel. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of Okla., 693 F.3d 1303 (10th Cir. 2012) (Title II does not apply to employment discrimination)
Zimmerman v. Or. Dep’t of Justice, 170 F.3d 1169 (9th Cir. 1999) (Title II not applicable to public employment discrimination)
Bledsoe v. Palm Beach Cnty. Soil & Water Conservation Dist., 133 F.3d 816 (11th Cir. 1998) (contrasting view on Title II employment coverage)
Mary Jo C. v. N.Y. State & Local Ret. Sys., 707 F.3d 144 (2d Cir. 2013) (Title II scope discussed in context of employment)
Nat’l Ass’n of Home Builders v. Defenders of Wildlife, 551 U.S. 644 (2007) (contextual reading of statutory schemes in Chevron analysis)
TRW Inc. v. Andrews, 534 U.S. 19 (2001) (cardinal rule of statutory construction in context)
Garg v. Potter, 521 F.3d 731 (7th Cir. 2008) (two-part test for determining “qualified” under ADA)
Hammel v. Eau Galle Cheese Factory, 407 F.3d 862 (7th Cir. 2010) (two-step qualification test; reasonable accommodation trigger)
U.S. Airways v. Barnett, 535 U.S. 391 (2002) (reasonableness of accommodations and eligibility)