Linda Hassler v. The Talbots Inc., 2:19-cv-05793

Plaintiff Linda Hassler, a Caucasian former Talbots employee, sued Talbots and regional loss-prevention manager Wendy Gomez in Los Angeles Superior Court alleging FEHA claims, Labor Code §1102.5, wrongful termination, and intentional infliction of emotional distress (IIED).
Hassler alleges she complained of race discrimination (favoritism toward an African‑American subordinate) and was then falsely accused of misconduct and terminated in retaliation.
Defendants removed the case to federal court asserting diversity jurisdiction and claiming Gomez, a California citizen, was fraudulently joined to defeat diversity.
Defendants argued Gomez’s IIED exposure is barred by the California Workers’ Compensation Act (WCA), protected by a managerial privilege, and that alleged conduct is not sufficiently extreme and outrageous.
The Court analyzed fraudulent‑joinder standards, WCA preemption, managerial privilege, and the plausibility of IIED facts, and considered whether leave to amend would be permitted.
The Court granted remand to state court, denied Hassler’s request for attorneys’ fees, and denied Defendants’ pending motion to dismiss as moot.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether Gomez was fraudulently joined so diversity jurisdiction exists	Hassler legitimately sued Gomez for IIED based on discriminatory, outside‑the‑employment conduct	Gomez was a sham defendant; IIED is preempted or legally insufficient against a supervisor	Remand: defendants failed to show fraudulent joinder; Gomez cannot be disregarded
Whether WCA preempts Hassler's IIED claim against Gomez	Discriminatory conduct and false accusations fall outside normal employment risks and avoid WCA preemption	IIED arising from employment‑related acts is barred by WCA	WCA may not preempt if conduct is sufficiently outside ordinary employment; factual inquiry required — possible to plead IIED not preempted
Whether managerial privilege/ordinary personnel decisions bar IIED	Managerial acts that go beyond normal personnel actions (e.g., discriminatory false accusations) can support IIED	Personnel management decisions are privileged and insufficiently outrageous for IIED	Managerial privilege not dispositive; IIED may proceed if conduct goes beyond termination or ordinary management
Whether plaintiff is entitled to attorneys' fees under 28 U.S.C. §1447(c)	Fees requested because removal was improper	Removal was objectively reasonable even if unsuccessful	Fees denied: removal not objectively unreasonable

Strawbridge v. Curtiss, 7 U.S. (3 Cranch) 267 (U.S. 1806) (establishes complete diversity requirement)
In re Digimarc Corp. Derivative Litigation (Diaz v. Davis), 549 F.3d 1223 (9th Cir. 2008) (discusses diversity and citizenship rules)
Luther v. Countrywide Home Loans Servicing LP, 533 F.3d 1031 (9th Cir. 2008) (remand burden-shifting principles)
Gaus v. Miles, Inc., 980 F.2d 564 (9th Cir. 1992) (strong presumption against removal)
McCabe v. General Foods Corp., 811 F.2d 1336 (9th Cir. 1987) (fraudulent joinder standard; consider pleadings and possible amendments)
Cole v. Fair Oaks Fire Protection Dist., 43 Cal.3d 148 (Cal. 1987) (WCA preemption of torts arising from employment)
Gantt v. Sentry Ins., 1 Cal.4th 1083 (Cal. 1992) (WCA preemption applies even to intentional acts within employment)
Calero v. Unisys Corp., 271 F. Supp. 2d 1172 (N.D. Cal. 2003) (employer conduct outside normal employment risks may avoid WCA preemption)
Janken v. GM Hughes Electronics, 46 Cal. App. 4th 55 (Cal. Ct. App. 1996) (personnel decisions alone typically insufficient for IIED)
Martin v. Franklin Capital Corp., 546 U.S. 132 (U.S. 2005) (attorney's fees under §1447(c) only where removal objectively unreasonable)
Grancare, LLC v. Thrower by & through Mills, 889 F.3d 543 (9th Cir. 2018) (district courts must consider whether amendment could cure defects when evaluating fraudulent joinder)