Linda Brooks v. Avancez, 39 F.4th 424

Background

Linda Brooks, a woman in her mid-to-late 50s and a U.S. Army service‑connected veteran with PTSD, worked third shift at Avancez and became a permanent employee in September 2018.
Brooks complained in October 2018 that a team lead said she was "too old" to be trained; she filed HR complaints and wrote the CEO about "AGE DISCRIMINATION."
In February 2019 Brooks disclosed she had PTSD during an HR meeting; management recorded that she had said something to the effect of "I have PTSD and anything could happen," which was treated as a threatening remark.
On May 9–10, 2019 Brooks had another workplace dispute; attendees interpreted comments she made as threats, she was suspended, and Avancez terminated her on May 24, 2019 for threats, disruptive conduct, and insubordination (refusing to sign meeting notes).
Brooks sued under the ADEA and ADA (discrimination and retaliation), and later sought to amend to add an intentional infliction of emotional distress claim; the district court granted summary judgment for Avancez and denied leave to amend; the court of appeals affirmed.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether termination was age discrimination (ADEA)	Brooks says ageist comments, a supervisor remark about being "too old," and differential treatment show unlawful motive	Avancez says it terminated Brooks for legitimate non‑discriminatory reasons—threatening remarks and related misconduct	Held for Avancez: no admissible evidence that age was the but‑for cause; remarks were isolated/corrected and not shown to drive the firing
Whether termination was disability discrimination or retaliation (ADA)	Brooks contends her PTSD disclosure and complaints about harassment linked to adverse actions	Avancez says termination was based on honest belief that Brooks made threats; Brooks never clearly complained of discrimination based on PTSD	Held for Avancez: no showing that PTSD or protected activity was the cause; plaintiff did not present evidence of pretext
Whether employer's stated reason (threats) was pretextual	Brooks argues management mischaracterized her remarks and selectively enforced rules	Avancez asserts contemporaneous determinations, written termination reasons, and union notes show an honestly held belief that threats occurred	Held for Avancez: employer honestly believed threats were made; pretext not shown—courts evaluate honesty of belief, not correctness
Whether Brooks could amend to add intentional infliction of emotional distress (IIED)	Brooks sought leave to add IIED based on workplace hostility and alleged relapse of PTSD	Avancez opposed as futile—Indiana law rarely extends IIED to employment contexts absent extreme conduct	Held for Avancez: amendment denied as futile—alleged conduct not "extreme and outrageous" sufficient under Indiana law

Key Cases Cited

McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (U.S. 1973) (establishes burdenshifting framework for disparate‑treatment claims)
Ortiz v. Werner Enters., Inc., 834 F.3d 760 (7th Cir. 2016) (advocates viewing the evidence as a whole rather than rigid steps)
Staub v. Proctor Hosp., 562 U.S. 411 (U.S. 2011) (cat’s‑paw liability; proximate cause requirement for biased subordinate influence)
Vance v. Ball State Univ., 570 U.S. 421 (U.S. 2013) (definition of "supervisor" for harassment/liability purposes)
Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 523 U.S. 75 (U.S. 1998) (hostile work environment framework)
Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17 (U.S. 1993) (severe or pervasive standard for hostile work environment)
Smith v. Chicago Transit Auth., 806 F.3d 900 (7th Cir. 2015) (pretext as a phony reason; employer’s honest belief standard)
Jones v. Union Pac. R.R. Co., 302 F.3d 735 (7th Cir. 2002) (courts assess whether employer’s stated reason is the true reason, not whether it was wise)
Gordon v. United Airlines, Inc., 246 F.3d 878 (7th Cir. 2001) (employer’s reason need not be correct—only honestly held)