Lincoln Lamar Caldwell v. State of Minnesota
2016 Minn. LEXIS 665
| Minn. | 2016Background
- In 2008 Caldwell was convicted of first-degree murder for the benefit of a gang; this Court affirmed his conviction and denied two prior postconviction petitions.
- In 2012 Caldwell filed a third postconviction petition asserting that three trial witnesses (Harrison, Brooks, Turnage) had recanted and given false trial testimony; the petition was remanded for an evidentiary hearing.
- At the December 2014 hearing Turnage recanted his trial testimony on direct examination, then showed confusion about self-incrimination and ultimately sought counsel after cross-examination questioned perjury, threats, and alleged bribery.
- At a later session Turnage, now represented, invoked the Fifth Amendment and refused further questioning; the postconviction court struck his earlier December testimony from the record.
- The postconviction court found Harrison’s recantation not credible, Brooks unavailable, and concluded that even if Turnage’s recantation were credited, Caldwell could not satisfy the Larrison standard’s second prong (that the jury might have reached a different result).
- Caldwell appealed arguing (1) the court and prosecutor intimidated Turnage, substantially interfering with his decision to testify (violating due process), and (2) the court erred in striking Turnage’s prior testimony; the Supreme Court affirmed denial of relief.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether judge/prosecutor substantially interfered with recanting witness’s decision to testify at postconviction hearing | Caldwell: court and prosecutor intimidated Turnage with perjury/aiding-offender warnings, causing him to invoke Fifth and depriving Caldwell of testimony | State: warnings and cross-examination were proper, based on evidence; court intervened to protect witness and ensure counsel when needed | No substantial interference shown as prejudicial; warnings and cross were permissible and court did not impair Caldwell’s substantial rights |
| Whether Caldwell was prejudiced (required showing under substantial-interference test) | Caldwell: loss of Turnage’s testimony prejudiced ability to meet Larrison prong two | State: Turnage’s testimony was cumulative and, alone, would not change verdict; Harrison’s recantation lacked credibility and Brooks was unavailable | No prejudice—postconviction court found Turnage’s testimony insufficient by itself to satisfy Larrison second prong |
| Whether postconviction court abused discretion by striking Turnage’s prior testimony after he invoked Fifth Amendment | Caldwell: striking earlier answers was unfair and prejudicial because those statements were already on the record | State: invocation prevented meaningful cross-examination into motives (bribery/threats); truth of testimony could not be tested, justifying strike | Court applied abuse-of-discretion standard and affirmed strike as within discretion because invocation prevented meaningful cross; any error harmless given Larrison finding |
| Whether Turnage’s initial waiver of Fifth Amendment was knowing and voluntary | Caldwell: initial waiver was valid; testimony should stand | State and court: waiver was not necessarily complete/knowing given lack of advisement re: aiding-offender exposure; court recessed for counsel | Court did not decide waiver definitively because striking was supported by denial of meaningful cross-examination and any error was harmless |
Key Cases Cited
- State v. Caldwell, 803 N.W.2d 373 (Minn. 2011) (affirming Caldwell’s conviction)
- Caldwell v. State, 853 N.W.2d 766 (Minn. 2014) (remanding for evidentiary hearing on recantation claim)
- McKenzie v. State, 872 N.W.2d 865 (Minn. 2015) (adopting the substantial-interference test for witness interference claims)
- Colbert v. State, 870 N.W.2d 616 (Minn. 2015) (defining substantial-interference elements)
- Webb v. Texas, 409 U.S. 95 (1972) (right to present witnesses as part of due process)
- United States v. Wilkens, 742 F.3d 354 (8th Cir. 2014) (abuse-of-discretion standard for striking testimony after Fifth Amendment invocation)
- United States v. Doddington, 822 F.2d 818 (8th Cir. 1987) (striking direct testimony where invocation precluded cross-examination going to heart of testimony)